National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

No. 419

Argued February 10, 11, 1937

Decided April 12, 1937 

301 U.S. 1

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus



1. The distinction between what is national and what is local in the

activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance of our federal form

of government.  P.29.



2. The validity of provisions which, considered by themselves, are

constitutional, held not affected by general and ambiguous declarations

in the same statute.  P. 30.



3. An interpretation which conforms a statute to the Constitution must

be preferred to another which would render it unconstitutional or of

doubtful validity.  P. 30.



4. Acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or foreign

commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the congressional

[301 U.S. 2] power, and this includes acts, having that effect, which

grow out of labor disputes.  P. 31.



5. Employees in industry have a fundamental right to organize and select

representatives of their own choosing for collective bar gaining, and

discrimination or coercion upon the part of their employer to prevent

the free exercise of this right is a proper subject for condemnation by

competent legislative authority.  P. 33.



6. The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from

burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be

deemed to be an essential part of a "flow" of such commerce.  Pp.

34-36.



7. Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately

considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to

interstate commerce that their control is essential, or appropriate, to

protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress has the

power to exercise that control.  P. 37.



8. This power must be considered in the light of our dual system of

government, and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon

interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them would,

in view of our complex society, effectually obliterate the distinction

between what is national and what is local and create a completely

centralized government.  The question is necessarily one of degree.  P.

37.



9. Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to

obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce, is

within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and

it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of the

danger and meet it.  P. 37.



10. The close and intimate effect which brings the subject within the

reach of federal power may be due to activities in relation to

productive industry, although the industry when separately viewed is

local.  P. 38.



11. The relation to interstate commerce of the manufacturing enterprise

involved in this case was such that a stoppage of its operations by

industrial strife would have an immediate, direct and paralyzing effect

upon interstate commerce.  Therefore, Congress had constitutional

authority, for the protection of interstate commerce, to safeguard the

right of the employees in the manufacturing plant to self-organization

and free choice of their representatives for collective bargaining.  P.

41. [301 U.S. 3]



Judicial notice is taken of the facts that the recognition of the right

of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their

own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an

essential condition of industrial peace, and that refusal to confer and

negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife.



12. The National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935, empowers the

National Labor Relations Board to prevent any person from engaging in

unfair labor practices "affecting commerce"; its definition of

"commerce" (aside from commerce within a territory or the District of

Columbia) is such as to include only interstate and foreign commerce,

and the term "affecting commerce" it defines as meaning in commerce, or

burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or

having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or

obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce. The "unfair labor

practices," as defined by the Act and involved in this case, are

restraint or coercion of employees in their rights to self-organization

and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own

choosing, and discrimination against them in regard to hire or tenure of

employment for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in

any labor organization.   7 and 8.  The Act ( 9a) declares that

representatives, for the purpose of collective bargaining, of the

majority of the employees in an appropriate unit shall be the exclusive

representatives of all the employees in that unit; but that any

individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any

time to present grievances to their employer.  Held:



(1) That in safeguarding rights of employees and empowering the Board,

the statute, insofar as involved in the present case, confines itself to

such control of the industrial relationship as may be constitutionally

exercised by Congress to prevent burden or obstruction to interstate or

foreign commerce arising from industrial disputes.  P. 43.



(2) The Act imposes upon the employer the duty of conferring and

negotiating with the authorized representatives of the employees for the

purpose of settling a labor dispute, but it does not preclude such

individual contracts as the employer may elect to make directly with

individual employees.  P. 44.



(3) The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. 

Its theory is that free opportunity for negotiation [301 U.S. 4] with

accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial

peace, and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act,

in itself, does not attempt to compel.  P. 45.



(4) The Act does not interfere with the normal right of the employer to

hire, or with the right of discharge when exercised for other reasons

than intimidation and coercion, and what is the true reason in this

regard is left the subject of investigation in each case, with full

opportunity to show the facts.  P. 45.



13. A corporation which manufactured iron and steel products in its

factories in Pennsylvania from raw materials, most of which it brought

in from other States, and which shipped 75% of the manufactured products

out of Pennsylvania and disposed of them throughout this country and in

Canada, was required by orders of the National Labor Relations Board to

tender reinstatement to men who had been employed in one of the

factories but were discharged because of their union activities and for

the purpose of discouraging union membership.  The orders further

required that the company make good the pay the men had lost through

their discharge, and that it desist from discriminating against members

of the union, with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and from

interfering by coercion with the self-organization of its employees in

the plant.  Held that the orders were authorized by the National Labor

Relations Act, and that the Act is constitutional as thus applied to the

company.  Pp. 30, 32, 34, 41.



14. The right of employers to conduct their own business is not

arbitrarily restrained by regulations that merely protect the

correlative rights of their employees to organize for the purpose of

securing the redress of grievances and of promoting agreements with

employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of work.  P. 43.



15. The fact that the National Labor Relations Act subjects the employer

to supervision and restraint and leaves untouched the abuses for which

employees may be responsible, and fails to provide a more comprehensive

plan, with better assurance of fairness to both sides and with increased

chances of success in bringing about equitable solutions of industrial

disputes affecting interstate commerce, does not affect its validity. 

The question is as to the power of Congress, not as to its policy, and

legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not embrace

all the evils within its reach.  P. 46. [301 U.S. 5]



16. The National Labor Relations Act establishes standards to which the

Board must conform.  There must be complaint, notice and hearing.  The

Board must receive evidence and make findings.  These findings as to the

facts are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence.  The

order of the Board is subject to review by the designated court, and

only when sustained by the court may the order be enforced.  Upon that

review, all questions of the jurisdiction of the Board and the

regularity of its proceedings, all questions of constitutional right or

statutory authority, are open to examination by the court.  These

procedural provisions afford adequate opportunity to secure judicial

protection against arbitrary action, in accordance with the well settled

rules applicable to administrative agencies set up by Congress to aid in

the enforcement of valid legislation.  P. 47.



17. The provision of the National Labor Relations Act,  10(c),

authorizing the Board to require the reinstatement of employees found to

have been discharged because of their union activity or for the purpose

of discouraging membership in the union, is valid.  P. 47.



18. The provision of the Act,  10(c), that the Board, in requiring

reinstatement, may direct the payment of wages for the time lost by the

discharge, less amounts earned by the employee during that period, does

not contravene the provisions of the Seventh Amendment with respect to

jury trial in suits at common law.  P. 48.



83 F.2d 998, reversed.



CERTIORARI, 299 U.S. 534, to review a decree of the Circuit Court of

Appeals declining to enforce an order of the National Labor Relations

Board. [301 U.S. 22] HUGHES, J., lead opinion



MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.



In a proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,{1}

the National Labor Relations Board found that the respondent, Jones &

Laughlin Steel Corporation, had violated the Act by engaging in unfair

labor practices affecting commerce.  The proceeding was instituted by

the Beaver Valley Lodge No. 200, affiliated with the Amalgamated

Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of America, a labor

organization.  The unfair labor practices charged were that the

corporation was discriminating against members of the union with regard

to hire and tenure of employment, and was coercing and intimidating its

employees in order to interfere with their self-organization.  The

discriminatory and coercive action alleged was the discharge of certain

employees.



The National Labor Relations Board, sustaining the charge, ordered the

corporation to cease and desist from such discrimination and coercion,

to offer reinstatement to ten of the employees named, to make good their

losses in pay, and to post for thirty days notices that the corporation

would not discharge or discriminate against members, or those desiring

to become members, of the labor union.  As the corporation failed to

comply, the Board petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the

order.  The court denied the petition, holding that the order lay beyond

the range of federal power.  83 F.2d 998.  We granted certiorari.



The scheme of the National Labor Relations Act -- which is too long to

be quoted in full -- may be briefly stated.  The first section sets

forth findings with respect to the injury to commerce resulting from the

denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and from the

refusal of employers to accept the procedure of collective [301 U.S. 23]

bargaining.  There follows a declaration that it is the policy of the

United States to eliminate these causes of obstruction to the free flow

of commerce.{2}  The Act [301 U.S. 24] then defines the terms it

uses, including the terms "commerce" and "affecting commerce."   2.  It

creates the National Labor Relations Board, and prescribes its

organization.   6.  It sets forth the right of employees to

self-organization and to bargain collectively through representatives of

their own choosing.   7.  It defines "unfair labor practices."   8.  It

lays down rules as to the representation of employees for the purpose of

collective bargaining.   9.  The Board is empowered to prevent the

described unfair labor practices affecting commerce and the Act

prescribes the procedure to that end.  The Board is authorized to

petition designated courts to secure the enforcement of its orders.  The

findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, are to

be conclusive.  If either party, on application to the court, shows that

additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds

for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearings before the

Board, the court may order the additional evidence to be taken.  Any

person aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain a review in

the designated courts with the same procedure as in the case of an

application by the Board for the enforcement of its order.   10.  The

Board has broad powers of investigation.   11.  Interference with

members of the Board or its agents in the performance of their duties is

punishable by fine and imprisonment.   12.  Nothing in the Act is to be

construed, to interfere with the right to strike.   13.  There is a

separability clause to the effect that, if any provision of the Act or

its application to any person or circumstances shall be held invalid,

the remainder of the Act or its application to other persons or

circumstances shall not be affected.   15.  The particular provisions

which are involved in the instant case will be considered more in detail

in the course of the discussion.  The procedure in the instant case

followed the statute.  The labor union filed with the Board its verified

charge.  [301 U.S. 25] The Board thereupon issued its complaint against

the respondent alleging that its action in discharging the employees in

question constituted unfair labor practices affecting commerce within

the meaning of  8, subdivisions (1) and (3), and  2, subdivisions (6)

and (7) of the Act.  Respondent, appearing specially for the purpose of

objecting to the jurisdiction of the Board, filed its answer. 

Respondent admitted the discharges, but alleged that they were made

because of inefficiency or violation of rule or for other good reasons,

and were not ascribable to union membership or activities.  As an

affirmative defense, respondent challenged the constitutional validity

of the statute and its applicability in the instant case.  Notice of

hearing was given, and respondent appeared by counsel.  The Board first

took up the issue of jurisdiction, and evidence was presented by both

the Board and the respondent.  Respondent then moved to dismiss the

complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and, on denial of that motion,

respondent, in accordance with its special appearance, withdrew from

further participation in the hearing.  The Board received evidence upon

the merits, and, at its close, made its findings and order.



Contesting the ruling of the Board, the respondent argues (1) that the

Act is in reality a regulation of labor relations, and not of interstate

commerce; (2) that the Act can have no application to the respondent's

relations with its production employees, because they are not subject to

regulation by the federal government, and (3) that the provisions of the

Act violate  2 of Article III and the Fifth and Seventh Amendments of

the Constitution of the United States.



The facts as to the nature and scope of the business of the Jones &

Laughlin Steel Corporation have been found by the Labor Board, and, so

far as they are essential to the determination of this controversy, they

are not in dispute.  The Labor Board has found:  the corporation is [301

U.S. 26] organized under the laws of Pennsylvania and has its principal

office at Pittsburgh.  It is engaged in the business of manufacturing

iron and steel in plants situated in Pittsburgh and nearby Aliquippa,

Pennsylvania.  It manufactures and distributes a widely diversified line

of steel and pig iron, being the fourth largest producer of steel in the

United States.  With its subsidiaries -- nineteen in number -- it is a

completely integrated enterprise, owning and operating ore, coal and

limestone properties, lake and river transportation facilities, and

terminal railroads located at its manufacturing plants.  It owns or

controls mines in Michigan and Minnesota.  It operates four ore

steamships on the Great Lakes, used in the transportation of ore to its

factories.  It owns coal mines in Pennsylvania.  It operates towboats

and steam barges used in carrying coal to its factories.  It owns

limestone properties in various places in Pennsylvania and West

Virginia.  It owns the Monongahela connecting railroad which connects

the plants of the Pittsburgh works and forms an interconnection with the

Pennsylvania, New York Central, and Baltimore and Ohio Railroad systems.

 It owns the Aliquippa and Southern Railroad Company, which connects the

Aliquippa works with the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie, part of the New York

Central system.  Much of its product is shipped to its warehouses in

Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati and Memphis -- to the last two places by

means of its own barges and transportation equipment.  In Long Island

City, New York, and in New Orleans, it operates structural steel

fabricating shops in connection with the warehousing of semi-finished

materials sent from its works.  Through one of its wholly owned

subsidiaries, it owns, leases and operates stores, warehouses and yards

for the distribution of equipment and supplies for drilling and

operating oil and gas wells and for pipelines, refineries, and pumping

stations.  It has sales offices in [301 U.S. 27] twenty cities in the

United States and a wholly owned subsidiary which is devoted exclusively

to distributing its product in Canada.  Approximately 75 percent. of its

product is shipped out of Pennsylvania.



Summarizing these operations, the Labor Board concluded that the works

in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa might be likened to the heart of a

self-contained, highly integrated body.  They draw in the raw materials

from Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, in part through

arteries and by means controlled by the respondent; they transform the

materials and then pump them out to all parts of the nation through the

vast mechanism which the respondent has elaborated.



To carry on the activities of the entire steel industry, 33,000 men mine

ore, 44,000 men mine coal, 4,000 men quarry limestone, 16,000 men

manufacture coke, 343,000 men manufacture steel, and 83,000 men

transport its product.  Respondent has about 10,000 employees in its

Aliquippa plant, which is located in a community of about 30,000

persons.



Respondent points to evidence that the Aliquippa plant, in which the

discharged men were employed, contains complete facilities for the

production of finished and semi-finished iron and steel products from

raw materials; that its works consist primarily of a byproduct coke

plant for the production of coke; blast furnaces for the production of

pig iron; open hearth furnaces and Bessemer converters for the

production of steel; blooming mills for the reduction of steel ingots

into smaller shapes, and a number of finishing mills such as structural

mills, rod mills, wire mills, and the like.  In addition, there are

other buildings, structures and equipment, storage yards, docks and an

intra-plant storage system.  Respondent's operations at these works are

carried on in two distinct stages, the first being the conversion of raw

materials into pig [301 U.S. 28] iron and the second being the

manufacture of semi-finished and finished iron and steel products, and,

in both cases, the operations result in substantially changing the

character, utility and value of the materials wrought upon, which is

apparent from the nature and extent of the processes to which they are

subjected and which respondent fully describes.  Respondent also directs

attention to the fact that the iron ore which is procured from mines in

Minnesota and Michigan and transported to respondent's plant is stored

in stockpiles for future use, the amount of ore in storage varying with

the season, but usually being enough to maintain operations from nine to

ten months; that the coal which is procured from the mines of a

subsidiary located in Pennsylvania and taken to the plant at Aliquippa

is there, like ore, stored for future use, approximately two to three

months' supply of coal being always on hand, and that the limestone

which is obtained in Pennsylvania and West Virginia is also stored in

amounts usually adequate to run the blast furnaces for a few weeks. 

Various details of operation, transportation, and distribution are also

mentioned which, for the present purpose, it is not necessary to detail.



Practically all the factual evidence in the case, except that which

dealt with the nature of respondent's business, concerned its relations

with the employees in the Aliquippa plant whose discharge was the

subject of the complaint.  These employees were active leaders in the

labor union.  Several were officers, and others were leaders of

particular groups.  Two of the employees were motor inspectors; one was

a tractor driver; three were crane operators; one was a washer in the

coke plant, and three were laborers.  Three other employees were

mentioned in the complaint, but it was withdrawn as to one of them and

no evidence was heard on the action taken with respect to the other two.

[301 U.S. 29]



While respondent criticizes the evidence and the attitude of the Board,

which is described as being hostile toward employers and particularly

toward those who insisted upon their constitutional rights, respondent

did not take advantage of its opportunity to present evidence to refute

that which was offered to show discrimination and coercion.  In this

situation, the record presents no ground for setting aside the order of

the Board so far as the facts pertaining to the circumstances and

purpose of the discharge of the employees are concerned.  Upon that

point, it is sufficient to say that the evidence supports the findings

of the Board that respondent discharged these men "because of their

union activity and for the purpose of discouraging membership in the

union."  We turn to the questions of law which respondent urges in

contesting the validity and application of the Act.



First.  The scope of the Act. -- The Act is challenged in its entirety

as an attempt to regulate all industry, thus invading the reserved

powers of the States over their local concerns.  It is asserted that the

references in the Act to interstate and foreign commerce are colorable,

at best; that the Act is not a true regulation of such commerce or of

matters which directly affect it, but, on the contrary, has the

fundamental object of placing under the compulsory supervision of the

federal government all industrial labor relations within the nation. 

The argument seeks support in the broad words of the preamble (section

one{3}) and in the sweep of the provisions of the Act, and it is

further insisted that its legislative history shows an essential

universal purpose in the light of which its scope cannot be limited by

either construction or by the application of the separability clause.



If this conception of terms, intent, and consequent inseparability were

sound, the Act would necessarily fall [301 U.S. 30] by reason of the

limitation upon the federal power which inheres in the constitutional

grant, as well as because of the explicit reservation of the Tenth

Amendment.  Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549,

550, 554.  The authority of the federal government may not be

pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the

commerce clause itself establishes, between commerce "among the several

States" and the internal concerns of a State.  That distinction between

what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is

vital to the maintenance of our federal system.  Id.



But we are not at liberty to deny effect to specific provisions, which

Congress has constitutional power to enact, by superimposing upon them

inferences from general legislative declarations of an ambiguous

character, even if found in the same statute.  The cardinal principle of

statutory construction is to save, and not to destroy.  We have

repeatedly held that, as between two possible interpretations of a

statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other

valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act.  Even to

avoid a serious doubt, the rule is the same.  Federal Trade Comm'n v.

American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 307; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264

U.S. 375, 390; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U.S. 466, 472;

Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148; Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v.

United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346.



We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may be construed

so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority.  The

jurisdiction conferred upon the Board, and invoked in this instance, is

found in  10(a), which provides:



SEC. 10(a).  The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent

any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section

8) affecting commerce. [301 U.S. 31]



The critical words of this provision, prescribing the limits of the

Board's authority in dealing with he labor practices, are "affecting

commerce."  The Act specifically defines the "commerce" to which it

refers ( 2(6)):



The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or

communication among the several States, or between the District of

Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other

Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or

the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any

Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other

State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign

country.



There can be no question that the commerce thus contemplated by the Act

(aside from that within a Territory or the District of Columbia) is

interstate and foreign commerce in the constitutional sense.  The Act

also defines the term "affecting commerce" ( 2(7)):



The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or

obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or

tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or

the free flow of commerce.



This definition is one of exclusion as well as inclusion.  The grant of

authority to the Board does not purport to extend to the relationship

between all industrial employees and employers.  Its terms do not impose

collective bargaining upon all industry regardless of effects upon

interstate or foreign commerce.  It purports to reach only what may be

deemed to burden or obstruct that commerce, and, thus qualified, it must

be construed as contemplating the exercise of control within

constitutional bounds.  It is a familiar principle that acts which

directly burden or obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, or its free

flow, are within the reach of the congressional power.  Acts having that

effect are not [301 U.S. 32] rendered immune because they grow out of

labor disputes.  See Texas & N.O. R . Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S.

548, 570; Schechter Corp. v. United States, supra, pp. 544, 545;

Virginian Railway v. System Federation, No. 40, 300 U.S. 515.  It is the

effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the

criterion.  Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51.  Whether

or not particular action does affect commerce in such a close and

intimate fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence to lie

within the authority conferred upon the Board, is left by the statute to

be determined as individual cases arise.  We are thus to inquire

whether, in the instant case, the constitutional boundary has been

passed.



Second.  The  fair labor practices in question. -- The unfair labor

practices found by the Board are those defined in  8, subdivisions (1)

and (3).  These provide:



Sec. 8.  It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer --



(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of

the rights guaranteed in section 7.



(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any

term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in

any labor organization. . . .{4} [301 U.S. 33]



Section 8, subdivision (1), refers to  7, which is as follows:



Sec. 7.  Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,

join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through

representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted

activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid

or protection.



Thus, in its present application, the statute goes no further than to

safeguard the right of employees to self-organization and to select

representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other

mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer.



That is a fundamental right.  Employees have as clear a right to

organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the

respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and

agents.  Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the

right of employees to self-organization and representation is a proper

subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority.  Long ago

we stated the reason for labor organizations.  We said that they were

organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single

employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent

ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family;

that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair,

he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and

unfair treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity

to deal on an equality with their employer.  American Steel Foundries v.

Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209.  We reiterated these

views when we had under consideration the Railway Labor Act of 1926. 

Fully recognizing the legality of collective action on the part of

employees in [301 U.S. 34] order to safeguard their proper interests, we

said that Congress was not required to ignore this right, but could

safeguard it.  Congress could seek to make appropriate collective action

of employees an instrument of peace, rather than of strife.  We said

that such collective action would be a mockery if representation were

made futile by interference with freedom of choice.  Hence, the

prohibition by Congress of interference with the selection of

representatives for the purpose of negotiation and conference between

employers and employees, "instead of being an invasion of the

constitutional right of either, was based on the recognition of the

rights of both."  Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, supra.  We have

reasserted the same principle in sustaining the application of the

Railway Labor Act as amended in 1934.  Virginian Railway Co. v. System

Federation, No. 40, supra.



Third.  The application of the Act to employees engaged in production.

-- The principle involved. -- Respondent says that whatever may be said

of employees engaged in interstate commerce, the industrial relations

and activities in the manufacturing department of respondent's

enterprise are not subject to federal regulation.  The argument rests

upon the proposition that manufacturing, in itself, is not commerce. 

Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20, 21; United Mine Workers v. Coronado

Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 407, 408; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172,

178; United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457,

465; Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 82; Coronado

Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310; Schechter Corp. v.

United States, supra, p. 547; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.

238, 304, 317, 327.



The Government distinguishes these cases. The various parts of

respondent's enterprise are described as interdependent and as thus

involving "a great movement of [301 U.S. 35] iron ore, coal and

limestone along well defined paths to the steel mills, thence through

them, and thence in the form of steel products into the consuming

centers of the country -- a definite and well understood course of

business."  It is urged that these activities constitute a "stream" or

"flow" of commerce, of which the Aliquippa manufacturing plant is the

focal point, and that industrial strife at that point would cripple the

entire movement.  Reference is made to our decision sustaining the

Packers and Stockyards Act.{5}  Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495. 

The Court found that the stockyards were but a "throat" through which

the current of Commerce flowed and the transactions which there occurred

could not be separated from that movement.  Hence, the sales at the

stockyards were not regarded as merely local transactions, for, while

they created "a local change of title," they did not "stop the flow,"

but merely changed the private interests in the subject of the current. 

Distinguishing the cases which upheld the power of the State to impose a

nondiscriminatory tax upon property which the owner intended to

transport to another State, but which was not in actual transit and was

held within the State subject to the disposition of the owner, the Court

remarked: The question, it should be observed, is not with respect to

the extent of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but

whether a particular exercise of state power in view of its nature and

operation must be deemed to be in conflict with this paramount

authority. Id., p. 526.  See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 8. 

Applying the doctrine of Stafford v. Wallace, supra, the Court sustained

the Grain Futures Act of 1922{6} with respect to transactions on the

Chicago Board of Trade, although these transactions were "not in and of

themselves interstate commerce."  Congress had found [301 U.S. 36] that

they had become "a constantly recurring burden and obstruction to that

commerce."  Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32; compare

Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 69.  See also Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.

United States, 280 U.S. 420.



Respondent contends that the instant case presents material

distinctions.  Respondent says that the Aliquippa plant is extensive in

size and represents a large investment in buildings, machinery and

equipment.  The raw materials which are brought to the plant are delayed

for long periods and, after being subjected to manufacturing processes,

"are changed substantially as to character, utility and value."  The

finished products which emerge are to a large extent manufactured

without reference to preexisting orders and contracts, and are entirely

different from the raw materials which enter at the other end. Hence,

respondent argues that, If importation and exportation in interstate

commerce do not singly transfer purely local activities into the field

of congressional regulation, it should follow that their combination

would not alter the local situation. Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St.

Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 134, 151; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord,

supra.



We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of

defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the "stream of

commerce" cases.  The instances in which that metaphor has been used are

but particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of the protective power

which the Government invokes in support of the present Act.  The

congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and

obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an

essential part of a "flow" of interstate or foreign commerce.  Burdens

and obstructions may be due to injurious action springing from other

sources.  The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate

commerce is [301 U.S. 37] the power to enact "all appropriate

legislation" for "its protection and advancement"  (The Daniel Ball, 10

Wall. 557, 564); to adopt measures "to promote its growth and insure its

safety" (Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696, 697); "to foster,

protect, control and restrain."  Second Employers' Liability Cases,

supra, p. 47.  See Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, supra.  That

power is plenary, and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce "no

matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it."  Second

Employers' Liability Cases, p. 51; Schechter Corp. v. United States,

supra.  Although activities may be intrastate in character when

separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial

relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or

appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,

Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.  Schechter

Corp. v. United States, supra.  Undoubtedly the scope of this power must

be considered in the light of our dual system of government, and may not

be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so

indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex

society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is

national and what is local and create a completely centralized

government.  Id.  The question is necessarily one of degree.  As the

Court said in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, supra, p. 37, repeating

what had been said in Stafford v. Wallace, supra: Whatever amounts to

more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to

burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power

of Congress under the commerce clause and it is primarily for Congress

to consider and decide the fact of the danger and meet it.



That intrastate activities, by reason of close and intimate relation to

interstate commerce, may fall within federal control is demonstrated in

the case of carriers who [301 U.S. 38] are engaged in both interstate

and intrastate transportation.  There federal control has been found

essential to secure the freedom of interstate traffic from interference

or unjust discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the interstate

service.  Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351, 352; Wisconsin

Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588.  It is

manifest that intrastate rates deal primarily with a local activity. 

But, in ratemaking, they bear such a close relation to interstate rates

that effective control of the one must embrace some control over the

other.  Id.  Under the Transportation Act, 1920,{7} Congress went so

far as to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish a

statewide level of intrastate rates in order to prevent an unjust

discrimination against interstate commerce.  Wisconsin Railroad Comm'n

v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., supra; Florida v. United States, 282 U.S.

194, 210, 211. Other illustrations are found in the broad requirements

of the Safety Appliance Act and the Hours of Service Act.  Southern

Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.

Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S. 612.  It is said that this exercise

of federal power has relation to the maintenance of adequate

instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  But the agency is not

superior to the commerce which uses it.  The protective power extends to

the former because it exists as to the latter.



The close and intimate effect which brings the subject within the reach

of federal power may be due to activities in relation to productive

industry although the industry, when separately viewed, is local.  This

has been abundantly illustrated in the application of the federal

Anti-Trust Act.  In the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases, 221

U.S. 1, 106, that statute was applied to combinations of employers

engaged in productive industry.  [301 U.S. 39] Counsel for the offending

corporations strongly urged that the Sherman Act had no application

because the acts complained of were not acts of interstate or foreign

commerce, nor direct and immediate in their effect on interstate or

foreign commerce, but primarily affected manufacturing and not commerce.

 221 U.S. pp. 5, 125 [argument of counsel omitted in electronic

version]. Counsel relied upon the decision in United States v. Knight

Co., 156 U.S. 1.  The Court stated their contention as follows: That the

act, even if the averments of the bill be true, cannot be

constitutionally applied, because to do so would extend the power of

Congress to subjects dehors the reach of its authority to regulate

commerce, by enabling that body to deal with mere questions of

production of commodities within the States. And the Court summarily

dismissed the contention in these words: But all the structure upon

which this argument proceeds is based upon the decision in United

States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1.  The view, however, which the

argument takes of that case and the arguments based upon that view have

been so repeatedly pressed upon this court in connection with the

interpretation and enforcement of the Anti-trust Act, and have been so

necessarily and expressly decided to be unsound as to cause the

contentions to be plainly foreclosed and to require no express notice

(citing cases).  221 U.S. pp. 68, 69.



Upon the same principle, the Anti-Trust Act has been applied to the

conduct of employees engaged in production.  Loewe v.Lawlor, 208 U.S.

274; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, supra; Bedford Cut Stone

Co. v. Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U.S. 37.  See also Local 16 v. United

States, 291 U.S. 293, 397; Schechter Corp. v. United States, supra.  The

decisions dealing with the question of that application illustrate both

the principle and its limitation.  Thus, in the first Coronado case, the

Court held that mining was not interstate commerce, that the power of

Congress did not extend to its regulation as such, [301 U.S. 40] and

that it had not been shown that the activities there involved -- a local

strike -- brought them within the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act,

notwithstanding the broad terms of that statute.  A similar conclusion

was reached in United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co.,

supra, Industrial Association v. United States, supra, and Levering &

Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107.   But, in the first Coronado

case, the Court also said that if Congress deems certain recurring

practices, though not really part of interstate commerce, likely to

obstruct, restrain or burden it, it has the power to subject them to

national supervision and restraint. 259 U.S. p. 408.  And, in the second

Coronado case, the Court ruled that, while the mere reduction in the

supply of an article to be shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal

or tortious prevention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily an

indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce, nevertheless when the

intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is

shown to be to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in

interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate markets, their

action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Act. 268 U.S. p. 310. 

And the existence of that intent may be a necessary inference from proof

of the direct and substantial effect produced by the employees' conduct.

 Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. p. 81.  What was

absent from the evidence in the first Coronado case appeared in the

second, and the Act was accordingly applied to the mining employees.



It is thus apparent that the fact that the employees here concerned were

engaged in production is not determinative.  The question remains as to

the effect upon interstate commerce of the labor practice involved.  In

the Schechter case, supra, we found that the effect there was so remote

as to be beyond the federal power.  To find "immediacy or directness"

there was to find it "almost [301 U.S. 41] everywhere," a result

inconsistent with the maintenance of our federal system.  In the Carter

case, supra, the Court was of the opinion that the provisions of the

statute relating to production were invalid upon several grounds -- that

there was improper delegation of legislative power, and that the

requirements not only went beyond any sustainable measure of protection

of interstate commerce, but were also inconsistent with due process. 

These cases are not controlling here.



Fourth.  Effects of the unfair labor practice in respondent's

enterprise. -- Giving full weight to respondent's contention with

respect to a break in the complete continuity of the "stream of

commerce" by reason of respondent's manufacturing operations, the fact

remains that the stoppage of those operations by industrial strife would

have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce.  In view of

respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect

would be indirect or remote.  It is obvious that it would be immediate,

and might be catastrophic.  We are asked to shut our eyes to the

plainest facts of our national life, and to deal with the question of

direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum.  Because there

may be but indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in

connection with a host of local enterprises throughout the country, it

does not follow that other industrial activities do not have such a

close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make the

presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national

concern.  When industries organize themselves on a national scale,

making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in

their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor

relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter

when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing

consequences of industrial war?  We have often said that interstate

commerce itself is a practical [301 U.S. 42] conception.  It is equally

true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a

judgment that does not ignore actual experience.



Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right

of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their

own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an

essential condition of industrial peace.  Refusal to confer and

negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife.  This is

such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is

a proper subject of judicial notice, and requires no citation of

instances.  The opinion in the case of Virginian Railway Co. v. System

Federation, No. 40, supra, points out that, in the case of carriers,

experience has shown that, before the amendment of 1934 of the Railway

Labor Act, when there was no dispute as to the organizations authorized

to represent the employees and when there was a willingness of the

employer to meet such representative for a discussion of their

grievances, amicable adjustment of differences had generally followed,

and strikes had been avoided. That, on the other hand, a prolific source

of dispute had been the maintenance by the railroad of company unions

and the denial by railway management of the authority of representatives

chosen by their employees. The opinion in that case also points to the

large measure of success of the labor policy embodied in the Railway

Labor Act.  But, with respect to the appropriateness of the recognition

of self-organization and representation in the promotion of peace, the

question is not essentially different in the case of employees in

industries of such a character that interstate commerce is put in

jeopardy from the case of employees of transportation companies.  And of

what avail is it to protect the facility of transportation if interstate

commerce is throttled with respect to the commodities to be transported!

[301 U.S. 43]



These questions have frequently engaged the attention of Congress, and

have been the subject of many inquiries.{8}  The steel industry is

one of the great basic industries of the United States, with ramifying

activities affecting interstate commerce at every point.  The Government

aptly refers to the steel strike of 1919-1920, with its far-reaching

consequences.{9}  The fact that there appears to have been no major

disturbance in that industry in the more recent period did not dispose

of the possibilities of future and like dangers to interstate commerce

which Congress was entitled to foresee and to exercise its protective

power to forestall.  It is not necessary again to detail the facts as to

respondent's enterprise.  Instead of being beyond the pale, we think

that it presents in a most striking way the close and intimate relation

which a manufacturing industry may have to interstate commerce, and we

have no doubt that Congress had constitutional authority to safeguard

the right of respondent's employees to self-organization and freedom in

the choice of representatives for collective bargaining.



Fifth.  The means which the Act employs. -- Questions under the due

process clause and other constitutional restrictions. -- Respondent

asserts its right to conduct its business in an orderly manner without

being subjected to arbitrary restraints.  What we have said points to

the fallacy in the argument.  Employees have their correlative [301 U.S.

44] right to organize for the purpose of securing the redress of

grievances and to promote agreements with employers relating to rates of

pay and conditions of work.  Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks,

supra; Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40.  Restraint

for the purpose of preventing an unjust interference with that right

cannot be considered arbitrary or capricious.  The provision of 

9(a){10} that representatives, for the purpose of collective

bargaining, of the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit

shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in that unit

imposes upon the respondent only the duty of conferring and negotiating

with the authorized representatives of its employees for the purpose of

settling a labor dispute.  This provision has its analogue in  2, Ninth,

of the Railway Labor Act, which was under consideration in Virginian

Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, supra.  The decree which we

affirmed in that case required the Railway Company to treat with the

representative chosen by the employees and also to refrain from entering

into collective labor agreements with anyone other than their true

representative as ascertained in accordance with the provisions of the

Act.  We said that the obligation to treat with the true representative

was exclusive, and hence imposed the negative duty to treat with no

other.  We also pointed out that, as conceded by the Government,{11}

the injunction [301 U.S. 45] against the Company's entering into any

contract concerning rules, rates of pay and working conditions except

with a chosen representative was "designed only to prevent collective

bargaining with anyone purporting to represent employees" other than the

representative they had selected.  It was taken "to prohibit the

negotiation of labor contracts generally applicable to employees" in the

described unit with any other representative than the one so chosen,

"but not as precluding such individual contracts" as the Company might

"elect to make directly with individual employees."  We think this

construction also applies to  9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.



The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees.  It

does not compel any agreement whatever.  It does not prevent the

employer "from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring

individuals on whatever terms" the employer "may by unilateral action

determine."{12}  The Act expressly provides in  9(a) that any

individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any

time to present grievances to their employer.  The theory of the Act is

that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of

employees is likely to promote industrial peace, and may bring about the

adjustments and agreements which the Act, in itself, does not attempt to

compel.  As we said in Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, supra, and

repeated in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, supra,

the cases of Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, and Coppage v.

Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, are inapplicable to legislation of this character. 

The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the

employer to select its employees or to discharge them.  The employer may

not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with

respect to their [301 U.S. 46] self-organization and representation,

and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its authority

a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right

is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion.  The

true purpose is the subject of investigation with full opportunity to

show the facts.  It would seem that, when employers freely recognize the

right of their employees to their own organizations and their

unrestricted right of representation, there will be much less occasion

for controversy in respect to the free and appropriate exercise of the

right of selection and discharge.



The Act has been criticized as one-sided in its application; that it

subjects the employer to supervision and restraint and leaves untouched

the abuses for which employees may be responsible; that it fails to

provide a more comprehensive plan -- with better assurances of fairness

to both sides and with increased chances of success in bringing about,

if not compelling, equitable solutions of industrial disputes affecting

interstate commerce.  But we are dealing with the power of Congress, not

with a particular policy or with the extent to which policy should go. 

We have frequently said that the legislative authority, exerted within

its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach.  The

Constitution does not forbid "cautious advance, step by step," in

dealing with the evils which are exhibited in activities within the

range of legislative power.  Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199

U.S. 401, 411; Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227; Miller v.

Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 384; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 396.  The

question in such cases is whether the legislature, in what it does

prescribe, has gone beyond constitutional limits.



The procedural provisions of the Act are assailed.  But these

provisions, as we construe them, do not offend against the

constitutional requirements governing the [301 U.S. 47] creation and

action of administrative bodies.  See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v.

Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91.  The Act establishes

standards to which the Board must conform.  There must be complaint,

notice and hearing.  The Board must receive evidence and make findings. 

The findings as to the facts are to be conclusive, but only if supported

by evidence.  The order of the Board is subject to review by the

designated court, and only when sustained by the court may the order be

enforced.  Upon that review, all questions of the jurisdiction of the

Board and the regularity of its proceedings, all questions of

constitutional right or statutory authority, are open to examination by

the court.  We construe the procedural provisions as affording adequate

opportunity to secure judicial protection against arbitrary action in

accordance with the well settled rules applicable to administrative

agencies set up by Congress to aid in the enforcement of valid

legislation.  It is not necessary to repeat these rules which have

frequently been declared.  None of them appears to have been

transgressed in the instant case.  Respondent was notified and heard. 

It had opportunity to meet the charge of unfair labor practices upon the

merits, and, by withdrawing from the hearing, it declined to avail

itself of that opportunity.  The facts found by the Board support its

order, and the evidence supports the findings.  Respondent has no just

ground for complaint on this score.



The order of the Board required the reinstatement of the employees who

were found to have been discharged because of their "union activity" and

for the purpose of "discouraging membership in the union."  That

requirement was authorized by the Act.   10(c).  In Texas & N.O. R. Co.

v. Railway Clerks, supra, a similar order for restoration to service was

made by the court in contempt proceedings for the violation of an

injunction issued by the court to restrain an interference with [301

U.S. 48] the right of employees as guaranteed by the Railway Labor Act

of 1926.  The requirement of restoration to service of employees

discharged in violation of the provisions of that Act was thus a

sanction imposed in the enforcement of a judicial decree.  We do not

doubt that Congress could impose a like sanction for the enforcement of

its valid regulation.  The fact that, in the one case, it was a judicial

sanction, and, in the other, a legislative one, is not an essential

difference in determining its propriety.



Respondent complains that the Board not only ordered reinstatement but

directed the payment of wages for the time lost by the discharge, less

amounts earned by the employee during that period.  This part of the

order was also authorized by the Act.   10(c).  It is argued that the

requirement is equivalent to a money judgment and hence contravenes the

Seventh Amendment with respect to trial by jury.  The Seventh Amendment

provides that, "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy

shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be

preserved."  The Amendment thus preserves the right which existed under

the common law when the Amendment was adopted.  Shields v. Thomas, 18

How. 253, 262; In re Wood, 210 U.S. 246, 258; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293

U.S. 474, 476; Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657. 

Thus, it has no application to cases where recovery of money damages is

an incident to equitable relief even though damages might have been

recovered in an action at law.  Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 325;

Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Engineering Co., 243 U.S. 273, 279.  It does not

apply where the proceeding is not in the nature of a suit at common law.

 Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 537.



The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a

suit.  The proceeding is one unknown to the common law.  It is a

statutory proceeding.  Reinstatement of the employee and payment for

time lost are [301 U.S. 49] requirements imposed for violation of the

statute, and are remedies appropriate to its enforcement.  The

contention under the Seventh Amendment is without merit.



Our conclusion is that the order of the Board was within its competency,

and that the Act is valid as here applied.  The judgment of the Circuit

Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further

proceedings in conformity with this opinion.



Reversed.



For dissenting opinion, see p. 76. Footnotes HUGHES, J., lead opinion

(Footnotes)



* No. 419, National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel

Corp.; Nos. 420 and 421, National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf

Trailer Co., post, p. 49; Nos. 422 and 423, National Labor Relations

Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., post, p. 58; No. 365,

Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, post, p. 103, and

No. 469, Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor

Relations Board, post, p. 142, which are known as the "Labor Board

Cases," were disposed of in five separate opinions.  The dissenting

opinion, post, p. 76, applies to Nos. 419, 420 and 421, and 422 and 423.

 The dissenting opinion, post, p. 133, applies to No. 365.  The opinion

in No. 469 was unanimous.



1. Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. 151.



2. This section is as follows:



Section 1.  The denial by employers of the right of employees to

organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of

collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial

strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of

burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency,

safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring

in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or

controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods

from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials

or goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages

in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for

goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce.



The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess

full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers

who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership

association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and

tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage

rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by

preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working

conditions within and between industries.



Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees

to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury,

impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by

removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by

encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of

industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or

other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power

between employers and employees.



It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate

the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of

commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have

occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective

bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of

association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of

their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and

conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.



3. See Note 2, supra, p. 23.



4. What is quoted above is followed by this proviso -- not here involved

-- Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in the National Industrial

Recovery Act (U.S.C. Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended

from time to time, or in any code or agreement approved or prescribed

thereunder, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude

an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not

established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act

as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment

membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of

the employees as provided in section 9(a), in the appropriate collective

bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made.



5. 42 Stat. 159.



6. 42 Stat. 998.



7.  416, 422, 41 Stat. 484, 488; Interstate Commerce Act,  13(4).



8. See, for example, Final Report of the Industrial Commission (1902),

vol.19, p. 844; Report of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission (1902),

Sen.Doc. No. 6, 58th Cong., spec. sess.; Final Report of Commission on

Industrial Relations (1916), Sen.Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st sess.,

vol. I; National War Labor Board, Principles and Rules of Procedure

(1919), p. 4; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 287 (1921), pp.

52-64; History of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, U.S. Bureau

of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 283.



9. See Investigating Strike in Steel Industries, Sen.Rep. No. 289, 66th

Cong., 1st sess.



10. The provision is as follows:



SEC. 9.  (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of

collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit

appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of

all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining

in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other

conditions of employment:  Provided, That any individual employee or a

group of employees shall have the right at any time to present

grievances to their employer.



11. See Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, 300 U.S.

515.



12. See Note 11.

