Watkins v. United States

No. 261

Argued March 7, 1957

Decided June 17, 1957

354 U.S. 178

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Syllabus



Petitioner was convicted of a violation of 2 U.S.C.  192, which makes it

a misdemeanor for any person summoned as a witness by either House of

Congress or any committee thereof to refuse to answer any question

"pertinent to the question under inquiry."  Summoned to testify before a

Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American

Activities, petitioner testified freely about his own activities and

associations, but he refused to answer questions as to whether he had

known certain other persons to have been members of the Communist Party.

 He based his refusal on the ground that those questions were outside of

the proper scope of the Committee's activities, and not relevant to its

work.  No clear understanding of the "question under inquiry" could be

gleaned from the resolution authorizing the full Committee, the

legislative history thereof, the Committee's practices thereunder, the

action authorizing the Subcommittee, the statement of the Chairman at

the opening of the hearings or his statement in response to petitioner's

protest.



Held:  Petitioner was not accorded a fair opportunity to determine

whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and his

conviction was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment.



(a) The power of Congress to conduct investigations, inherent in the

legislative process, is broad, but it is not unlimited.



(b) Congress has no general authority to expose the private affairs of

individuals without justification in terms of the functions of Congress.



(c) No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in

furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress.



(d) The Bill of Rights is applicable to congressional investigations, as

it is to all forms of governmental action.



(e) A congressional investigation is subject to the command that

Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or

assembly.   [354 U.S. 179]



(f) When First Amendment rights are threatened, the delegation of power

to a congressional committee must be clearly revealed in its charter. 

United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41.



(g) A congressional investigation into individual affairs is invalid if

unrelated to any legislative purpose, because it is beyond the powers

conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.  Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103

U.S. 168.



(h) It cannot simply be assumed that every congressional investigation

is justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights

affected, since to do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed

by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that Congress does not

unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right of privacy nor abridge

his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.



(i) There is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure

where the predominant result can be only an invasion of the private

rights of individuals.



(j) In authorizing an investigation by a committee, it is essential that

the Senate or House should spell out the committee's jurisdiction and

purpose with sufficient particularity to insure that compulsory process

is used only in furtherance of a legislative purpose.



(k) The resolution authorizing the Un-American Activities Committee does

not satisfy this requirement, especially when read in the light of the

practices of the Committee and subsequent actions of the House of

Representatives extending the life of the Committee.



(l) Every reasonable indulgence of legality must be accorded to the

actions of a coordinate branch of our Government, but such deference

cannot yield to an unnecessary and unreasonable dissipation of precious

constitutional freedoms.



(m) Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the absence of

a clear determination by the House or Senate that a particular inquiry

is justified by specific legislative need.



(n) Congressional investigating committees are restricted to the

missions delegated to them -- to acquire certain data to be used by the

House or Senate in coping with a problem that falls within its

legislative sphere -- and no witness can be compelled to make

disclosures on matters outside that area.   [354 U.S. 180]



(o) When the definition of jurisdictional pertinency is as uncertain and

wavering as in the case of the Un-American Activities Committee, it

becomes extremely difficult for the Committee to limit its inquiries to

statutory pertinency.



(p) The courts must accord to a defendant indicted under 2 U.S.C.  192

every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all other criminal

cases, including the right to have available information revealing the

standard of criminality before the commission of the alleged offense.



(q) Since the statute defines the crime as refusal to answer "any

question pertinent to the question under inquiry," part of the standard

of criminality is the pertinency of the questions propounded to the

witness.



(r) Due process requires that a witness before a congressional

investigating committee should not be compelled to decide, at peril of

criminal prosecution, whether to answer questions propounded to him

without first knowing the "question under inquiry" with the same degree

of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the

expression of any element of a criminal offense.  Sinclair v. United

States, 279 U.S. 263.



(s) The authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members

of the committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves,

might make the "question under inquiry" sufficiently clear to avoid the

"vice of vagueness"; but these sources often leave the matter in grave

doubt.



(t) In this case, it is not necessary to pass on the question whether

the authorizing resolution defines the "question under inquiry" with

sufficient clarity, since the Government does not contend that it could

serve that purpose.



(u) The opening statement of the Chairman at the outset of the hearings

here involved is insufficient to serve that purpose, since it merely

paraphrased the authorizing resolution, and gave a very general sketch

of the past efforts of the Committee.



(v) Nor was that purpose served by the action of the full Committee in

authorizing the creation of the Subcommittee before which petitioner

appeared, since it merely authorized the Chairman to appoint

subcommittees "for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the

Committee as a whole is authorized to do."



(w) On the record in this case, especially in view of the precise

questions petitioner was charged with refusing to answer, it cannot [354

U.S. 181] be said that the "question under inquiry" was Communist

infiltration into labor unions.



(x) Unless the subject matter of the inquiry has been made to appear

with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body,

upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the

record the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which

the propounded questions are pertinent thereto.



(y) The Chairman's response, when petitioner objected to the questions

on grounds of pertinency, was inadequate to convey sufficient

information as to the pertinency of the questions to the "question under

inquiry."



98 U.S.App.D.C.190, 233 F.2d 681, reversed and remanded. WARREN, J.,

lead opinion



MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.



This is a review by certiorari of a conviction under 2 U.S.C.  192 for

"contempt of Congress."  The misdemeanor is alleged to have been

committed during a [354 U.S. 182] hearing before a congressional

investigating committee.  It is not the case of a truculent or

contumacious witness who refuses to answer all questions or who, by

boisterous or discourteous conduct, disturbs the decorum of the

committee room.  Petitioner was prosecuted for refusing to make certain

disclosures which he asserted to be beyond the authority of the

committee to demand.  The controversy thus rests upon fundamental

principles of the power of the Congress and the limitations upon that

power.  We approach the questions presented with conscious awareness of

the far-reaching ramifications that can follow from a decision of this

nature.



On April 29, 1954, petitioner appeared as a witness in compliance with a

subpoena issued by a Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American

Activities of the House of Representatives.  The Subcommittee elicited

from petitioner a description of his background in labor union

activities.  He had been an employee of the International Harvester

Company between 1935 and 1953.  During the last eleven of those years,

he had been on leave of absence to serve as an official of the Farm

Equipment Workers International Union, later merged into the United

Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers.  He rose to the position of

President of District No. 2 of the Farm Equipment Workers, a district

defined geographically to include generally Canton and Rock Falls,

Illinois, and Dubuque, Iowa.  In 1953, petitioner joined the United

Automobile Workers International Union as a labor organizer.



Petitioner's name had been mentioned by two witnesses who testified

before the Committee at prior hearings.  In September, 1952, one Donald

O. Spencer admitted having been a Communist from 1943 to 1946.  He

declared that he had been recruited into the Party with the endorsement

and prior approval of petitioner, whom he identified as the then

District Vice-President of the Farm Equipment [354 U.S. 183] Workers. 

Spencer also mentioned that petitioner had attended meetings at which

only card-carrying Communists were admitted.  A month before petitioner

testified, one Walter Rumsey stated that he had been recruited into the

Party by petitioner.  Rumsey added that he had paid Party dues to, and

later collected dues from, petitioner, who had assumed the name, Sam

Brown.  Rumsey told the Committee that he left the Party in 1944.



Petitioner answered these allegations freely and without reservation. 

His attitude toward the inquiry is clearly revealed from the statement

he made when the questioning turned to the subject of his past conduct,

associations and predilections:



I am not now nor have I ever been a card-carrying member of the

Communist Party.  Rumsey was wrong when he said I had recruited him into

the party, that I had received his dues, that I paid dues to him, and

that I had used the alias Sam Brown.



Spencer was wrong when he termed any meetings which I attended as closed

Communist Party meetings.



I would like to make it clear that, for a period of time from

approximately 1942 to 1947, I cooperated with the Communist Party and

participated in Communist activities to such a degree that some persons

may honestly believe that I was a member of the party.



I have made contributions upon occasions to Communist causes.  I have

signed petitions for Communist [354 U.S. 184] causes.  I attended

caucuses at an FE convention at which Communist Party officials were

present.



Since I freely cooperated with the Communist Party, I have no motive for

making the distinction between cooperation and membership except the

simple fact that it is the truth.  I never carried a Communist Party

card.  I never accepted discipline, and, indeed, on several occasions, I

opposed their position.



In a special convention held in the summer of 1947, I led the fight for

compliance with the Taft-Hartley Act by the FE-CIO International Union. 

This fight became so bitter that it ended any possibility of future

cooperation.



The character of petitioner's testimony on these matters can perhaps

best be summarized by the Government's own appraisal in its brief:



A more complete and candid statement of his past political associations

and activities (treating the Communist Party for present purposes as a

mere political party) can hardly be imagined.  Petitioner certainly was

not attempting to conceal or withhold from the Committee his own past

political associations, predilections, and preferences.  Furthermore,

petitioner told the Committee that he was entirely willing to identify

for the Committee, and answer any questions it might have concerning,

"those persons whom I knew to be members of the Communist Party,"

provided that, "to [his] best knowledge and belief," they still were

members of the Party. . . .



The Subcommittee, too, was apparently satisfied with petitioner's

disclosures.  After some further discussion elaborating on the

statement, counsel for the Committee [354 U.S. 185] turned to another

aspect of Rumsey's testimony.  Rumsey had identified a group of persons

whom he had known as members of the Communist Party, and counsel began

to read this list of names to petitioner.  Petitioner stated that he did

not know several of the persons.  Of those whom he did know, he refused

to tell whether he knew them to have been members of the Communist

Party.  He explained to the Subcommittee why he took such a position: I

am not going to plead the fifth amendment, but I refuse to answer

certain questions that I believe are outside the proper scope of your

committee's activities.  I will answer any questions which this

committee puts to me about myself.  I will also answer questions about

those persons whom I knew to be members of the Communist Party and whom

I believe still are.  I will not, however, answer any questions with

respect to others with whom I associated in the past.  I do not believe

that any law in this country requires me to testify about persons who

may in the past have been Communist Party members or otherwise engaged

in Communist Party activity but who, to my best knowledge and belief,

have long since removed themselves from the Communist movement.



I do not believe that such questions are relevant to the work of this

committee, nor do I believe that this committee has the right to

undertake the public exposure of persons because of their past

activities.  I may be wrong, and the committee may have this power, but

until and unless a court of law so holds and directs me to answer, I

most firmly refuse to discuss the political activities of my past

associates. [354 U.S. 186]



The Chairman of the Committee submitted a report of petitioner's refusal

to answer questions to the House of Representatives.  H.R.Rep. No. 1579,

3d Cong., 2d Sess.  The House directed the Speaker to certify the

Committee's report to the United States Attorney for initiation of

criminal prosecution.  H.Res. 534, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.  A seven-count

indictment was returned.  Petitioner waived his right to jury trial, and

was found guilty on all counts by the court.  The sentence, a fine of

$100 and one year in prison, was suspended, and petitioner was placed on

probation.



An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia.  The conviction was reversed by a three-judge panel, one

member dissenting.  Upon rehearing en banc, the full bench affirmed the

conviction with the judges of the original majority in dissent.  98

U.S.App.D.C.190, 233 F.2d 681.  We granted certiorari [354 U.S. 187]

because of the very important questions of constitutional law presented.

 352 U.S. 822.



We start with several basic premises on which there is general

agreement.  The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is

inherent in the legislative process.  That power is broad.  It

encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws, as

well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.  It includes surveys of

defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of

enabling the Congress to remedy them.  It comprehends probes into

departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency

or waste.  But, broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. 

There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of

individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the

Congress.  This was freely conceded by the Solicitor General in his

argument of this case.  Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial

agency.  These are functions of the executive and judicial departments

of government.  No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to,

and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress. 

Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the

investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible.



It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the

Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent

legislative action.  It is their unremitting obligation to respond to

subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its committees,

and to testify [354 U.S. 188] fully with respect to matters within the

province of proper investigation.  This, of course, assumes that the

constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by the Congress as

they are in a court of justice.  The Bill of Rights is applicable to

investigations as to all forms of governmental action.  Witnesses cannot

be compelled to give evidence against themselves.  They cannot be

subjected to unreasonable search and seizure.  Nor can the First

Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief and

association be abridged.



The rudiments of the power to punish for "contempt of Congress" come to

us from the pages of English history.  The origin of privileges and

contempts extends back into the period of the emergence of Parliament. 

The establishment of a legislative body which could challenge the

absolute power of the monarch is a long and bitter story.  In that

struggle, Parliament made broad and varied use of the contempt power. 

Almost from the beginning, both the House of Commons and the House of

Lords claimed absolute and plenary authority over their privileges. 

This was an independent body of law, described by Coke as lex

parliamenti.  Only Parliament could declare what those privileges were

or what new privileges were occasioned, and only Parliament could judge

what conduct constituted a breach of privilege.



In particular, this exclusion of lex parliamenti from the lex terrae, or

law of the land, precluded judicial review of the exercise of the

contempt power or the assertion of privilege.  Parliament declared that

no court had jurisdiction to consider such questions.  In the latter

part of the seventeenth century, an action for false imprisonment was

brought by one Jay, who had been held in contempt.  The defendant, the

Serjeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons, demurred that he had taken the

plaintiff [354 U.S. 189] into custody for breach of privilege.  The

Chief Justice, Pemberton, overruled the demurrer.  Summoned to the bar

of the House, the Chief Justice explained that he believed that the

assertion of privilege went to the merits of the action, and did not

preclude jurisdiction.  For his audacity, the Chief Justice was

dispatched to Newgate Prison.{10}



It seems inevitable that the power claimed by Parliament would have been

abused.  Unquestionably it was.  A few examples illustrate the way in

which individual rights were infringed.  During the seventeenth century,

there was a violent upheaval, both religious and political.  This was

the time of the Reformation and the establishment of the Church of

England.  It was also the period when the Stuarts proclaimed that the

royal prerogative was absolute.  Ultimately there were two revolutions,

one protracted and bloody, the second without bloodshed.  Critical

commentary of all kinds was treated as contempt of Parliament in these

troubled days.  Even clergymen were imprisoned for remarks made in their

sermons.{11}  Perhaps the outstanding case arose from the private

conversation of one Floyd, a Catholic, in which he expressed pleasure

over the misfortune of the King's Protestant son-in-law and his wife. 

Floyd was not a member of Parliament.  None of the persons concerned was

in any way connected with the House of Commons.  Nevertheless, that body

imposed an humiliating and cruel sentence upon Floyd for contempt.{12} 

The House of Lords intervened, [354 U.S. 190] rebuking the Commons for

their extension of the privilege.  The Commons acceded and transferred

the record of the case to the Lords, who imposed substantially the same

penalty.{13}



Later in that century, during the reign of Charles II, there was great

unrest over the fact that the heir apparent, James, had embraced

Catholicism.  Anti-Catholic feeling ran high, spilling over a few years

later when the infamous rogue, Titus Oates, inflamed the country with

rumors of a "Popish Plot" to murder the King.  A committee of Parliament

was appointed to learn the sources of certain pamphlets that had been

appearing.  One was entitled:  The Grand Question Concerning the

Prorogation of this Parliament for a Year and Three Months Stated and

Discussed.  A Doctor Carey admitted to the committee that he knew the

author, but refused to divulge his name.  Brought to the bar of the

House of Lords, he persisted in this stand.  The House imposed a fine of

1,000 and committed the witness to the Tower.{14}



A hundred years later, George III had managed to gain control of

Parliament through his ministers.  The King could not silence the

opposition, however, and one of the most vocal was John Wilkes.  This

precipitated a [354 U.S. 191] struggle that lasted for several years

until Wilkes finally prevailed.  One writer sums up the case thus: He

had won a victory for freedom of the press.  He had directed popular

attention to the royally controlled House of Commons, and pointed out

its unrepresentative character, and had shown how easily a claim of

privilege might be used to sanction the arbitrary proceedings of

ministers and Parliament, even when a fundamental right of the subject

was concerned.  It was one of life's little ironies that work of such

magnitude had been reserved for one of the worst libertines and

demagogues of all time.{15}



Even as late as 1835, the House of Commons appointed a select committee

to inquire into ". . . the origin, nature, extent and tendency of the

Orange Institutions."  This was a political-religious organization,

vehemently Protestant in religion and strongly in favor of the growth of

the British Empire.  The committee summoned the Deputy Grand Secretary

and demanded that he produce all the records of the organization.  The

witness refused to turn over a letter-book, which he admitted contained

his answers to many communications upon Orange business.  But it also

contained, he said, records of private communications with respect to

Orangeism.  Summoned to the bar of the House of Commons, he remained

adamant, and was committed to Newgate Prison.{16}



Modern times have seen a remarkable restraint in the use by Parliament

of its contempt power.  Important investigations, like those conducted

in America by congressional committees, are made by Royal Commissions

[354 U.S. 192] of Inquiry.{17}  These commissions are comprised of

experts in the problem to be studied.  They are removed from the

turbulent forces of politics and partisan considerations.  Seldom, if

ever, have these commissions been given the authority to compel the

testimony of witnesses or the production of documents.{18}  Their

success in fulfilling their factfinding missions without resort to

coercive tactics is a tribute to the fairness of the processes to the

witnesses and their close adherence to the subject matter committed to

them.



The history of contempt of the legislature in this country is notably

different from that of England.  In the early days of the United States,

there lingered the direct knowledge of the evil effects of absolute

power.  Most of the instances of use of compulsory process by the first

Congresses concerned matters affecting the qualification or integrity of

their members or came about in inquiries dealing with suspected

corruption or mismanagement of government officials.{19}  Unlike the

English practice, from the very outset, the use of contempt power by the

legislature was deemed subject to judicial review.{20}



There was very little use of the power of compulsory process in early

years to enable the Congress to obtain facts pertinent to the enactment

of new statutes or the [354 U.S. 193] administration of existing laws. 

The first occasion for such an investigation arose in 1827, when the

House of Representatives was considering a revision of the tariff

laws.{21}  In the Senate, there was no use of a factfinding

investigation in aid of legislation until 1859.{22}  In the Legislative

Reorganization Act, the Committee on Un-American Activities was the only

standing committee of the House of Representatives that was given the

power to compel disclosures.{23}



It is not surprising, from the fact that the Houses of Congress so

sparingly employed the power to conduct investigations, that there have

been few cases requiring judicial review of the power.  The Nation was

almost one hundred years old before the first case reached this Court to

challenge the use of compulsory process as a legislative device, rather

than in inquiries concerning the elections [354 U.S. 194] or privileges

of Congressmen.{24}  In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, decided in

1881, an investigation had been authorized by the House of

Representatives to learn the circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy of

Jay Cooke & Company, in which the United States had deposited funds. 

The committee became particularly interested in a private real estate

pool that was a part of the financial structure.  The Court found that

the subject matter of the inquiry was "in its nature clearly judicial,

and therefore one in respect to which no valid legislation could be

enacted."  The House had thereby exceeded the limits of its own

authority.



Subsequent to the decision in Kilbourn, until recent times, there were

very few cases dealing with the investigative power.{25}  The matter

came to the fore again when the Senate undertook to study the corruption

in the handling of oil leases in the 1920's.  In McGrain v. Daugherty,

273 U.S. 135, and Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, the Court

applied the precepts of Kilbourn to uphold the authority of the Congress

to conduct the challenged investigations.  The Court recognized the

danger to effective and honest conduct of the Government [354 U.S. 195]

if the legislature's power to probe corruption in the executive branch

were unduly hampered.



Following these important decisions, there was another lull in judicial

review of investigations.  The absence of challenge, however, was not

indicative of the absence of inquiries.  To the contrary, there was

vigorous use of the investigative process by a Congress bent upon

harnessing and directing the vast economic and social forces of the

times.  Only one case came before this Court, and the authority of the

Congress was affirmed.{26}



In the decade following World War II, there appeared a new kind of

congressional inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history. 

Principally this was the result of the various investigations into the

threat of subversion of the United States Government, but other subjects

of congressional interest also contributed to the changed scene.  This

new phase of legislative inquiry involved a broad-scale intrusion into

the lives and affairs of private citizens.  It brought before the courts

novel questions of the appropriate limits of congressional inquiry. 

Prior cases, like Kilbourn, McGrain and Sinclair had defined the scope

of investigative power in terms of the inherent limitations of the

sources of that power.  In the more recent cases, the emphasis shifted

to problems of accommodating the interest of the Government with the

rights and privileges of individuals.  The central theme was the

application of the Bill of Rights as a restraint upon the assertion of

governmental power in this form.



It was during this period that the Fifth Amendment privilege against

self-incrimination was frequently invoked [354 U.S. 196] and recognized

as a legal limit upon the authority of a committee to require that a

witness answer its questions.{27}  Some early doubts as to the

applicability of that privilege before a legislative committee never

matured.{28}  When the matter reached this Court, the Government did not

challenge in any way that the Fifth Amendment protection was available

to the witness, and such a challenge could not have prevailed.  It

confined its argument to the character of the answers sought and to the

adequacy of the claim of privilege.  Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S.

155; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190; Bart v. United States, 349

U.S. 219.{29}



A far more difficult task evolved from the claim by witnesses that the

committees' interrogations were infringements upon the freedoms of the

First Amendment.{30}  [354 U.S. 197] Clearly, an investigation is

subject to the command that the Congress shall make no law abridging

freedom of speech or press or assembly.  While it is true that there is

no statute to be reviewed, and that an investigation is not a law,

nevertheless an investigation is part of lawmaking.  It is justified

solely as an adjunct to the legislative process.  The First Amendment

may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms by law or

by lawmaking.{31}



Abuses of the investigative process may imperceptibly lead to abridgment

of protected freedoms.  The mere summoning of a witness and compelling

him to testify, against his will, about his beliefs, expressions or

associations is a measure of governmental interference.  And when those

forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or

even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the

witness may be disastrous.  This effect is even more harsh when it is

past beliefs, expressions or associations that are disclosed and judged

by current standards, rather than those contemporary with the matters

exposed.  Nor does the witness alone suffer the consequences.  Those who

are identified by witnesses, and thereby placed in the same glare of

publicity, are equally subject to public stigma, scorn and obloquy. 

Beyond that, there is the more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those

who tend to adhere to [354 U.S. 198] the most orthodox and

uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a similar fate

at some future time.  That this impact is partly the result of

nongovernmental activity by private persons cannot relieve the

investigators of their responsibility for initiating the reaction.



The Court recognized the restraints of the Bill of Rights upon

congressional investigations in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41. 

The magnitude and complexity of the problem of applying the First

Amendment to that case led the Court to construe narrowly the resolution

describing the committee's authority.  It was concluded that, when First

Amendment rights are threatened, the delegation of power to the

committee must be clearly revealed in its charter.



Accommodation of the congressional need for particular information with

the individual and personal interest in privacy is an arduous and

delicate task for any court.  We do not underestimate the difficulties

that would attend such an undertaking.  It is manifest that, despite the

adverse effects which follow upon compelled disclosure of private

matters, not all such inquiries are barred.  Kilbourn v. Thompson

teaches that such an investigation into individual affairs is invalid if

unrelated to any legislative purpose.  That is beyond the powers

conferred upon the Congress in the Constitution.  United States v.

Rumely makes it plain that the mere semblance of legislative purpose

would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights.  The

critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to,

the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling

witness.  We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional

investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any

private rights affected.  To do so would be to abdicate the

responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure

that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's

[354 U.S. 199] right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech,

press, religion or assembly.



Petitioner has earnestly suggested that the difficult questions of

protecting these rights from infringement by legislative inquiries can

be surmounted in this case because there was no public purpose served in

his interrogation.  His conclusion is based upon the thesis that the

Subcommittee was engaged in a program of exposure for the sake of

exposure.  The sole purpose of the inquiry, he contends, was to bring

down upon himself and others the violence of public reaction because of

their past beliefs, expressions and associations.  In support of this

argument, petitioner has marshalled an impressive array of evidence that

some Congressmen have believed that such was their duty, or part of

it.{32} [354 U.S. 200]



We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the

sake of exposure.  The public is, of course, entitled to be informed

concerning the workings of its government.{33}  That cannot be inflated

into a general power to expose where the predominant result can only be

an invasion of the private rights of individuals.  But a solution to our

problem is not to be found in testing the motives of committee members

for this purpose.  Such is not our function.  Their motives alone would

not vitiate an investigation which had been instituted by a House of

Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being served.{34}



Petitioner's contentions do point to a situation of particular

significance from the standpoint of the constitutional limitations upon

congressional investigations.  The theory of a committee inquiry is that

the committee members are serving as the representatives of the parent

assembly in collecting information for a legislative purpose.  Their

function is to act as the eyes and ears of the Congress in obtaining

facts upon which the full legislature can act.  To carry out this

mission, committees and subcommittees, sometimes one Congressman, [354

U.S. 201] are endowed with the full power of the Congress to compel

testimony.  In this case, only two men exercised that authority in

demanding information over petitioner's protest.



An essential premise in this situation is that the House or Senate shall

have instructed the committee members on what they are to do with the

power delegated to them.  It is the responsibility of the Congress, in

the first instance, to insure that compulsory process is used only in

furtherance of a legislative purpose.  That requires that the

instructions to an investigating committee spell out that group's

jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity.  Those

instructions are embodied in the authorizing resolution.  That document

is the committee's charter.  Broadly drafted and loosely worded,

however, such resolutions can leave tremendous latitude to the

discretion of the investigators.  The more vague the committee's charter

is, the greater becomes the possibility that the committee's specific

actions are not in conformity with the will of the parent House of

Congress.



The authorizing resolution of the Un-American Activities Committee was

adopted in 1938, when a select committee, under the chairmanship of

Representative Dies, was created.{35}  Several years later, the

Committee was made a standing organ of the House with the same

mandate.{36}  It defines the Committee's authority as follows:



The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee,

is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the

extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in

the United States, (2) the diffusion [354 U.S. 202] within the United

States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from

foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of

the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all

other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any

necessary remedial legislation.{37}



It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution.

 Who can define the meaning of "un-American"?  What is that single,

solitary "principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our

Constitution"?{38}  There is no need to dwell upon the language,

however.  At one time, perhaps, the resolution might have been read

narrowly to confine the Committee to the subject of propaganda.{39}  The

events that have transpired in the fifteen years before the

interrogation of petitioner make such a construction impossible at this

date.



The members of the Committee have clearly demonstrated that they did not

feel themselves restricted in any way to propaganda in the narrow sense

of the word.{40}  [354 U.S. 203] Unquestionably, the Committee conceived

of its task in the grand view of its name.  Un-American activities were

its target, no matter how or where manifested.  Notwithstanding the

broad purview of the Committee's experience, the House of

Representatives repeatedly approved its continuation.  Five times it

extended the life of the special committee.{41}  Then it made the group

a standing committee of the House.{42}  A year later, the Committee's

charter was embodied in the Legislative Reorganization Act.{43}  On five

occasions, at the beginning of sessions of Congress, it has made the

authorizing resolution part of the rules of the House.{44}  On

innumerable occasions, it has passed appropriation bills to allow the

Committee to continue its efforts.



Combining the language of the resolution with the construction it has

been given, it is evident that the preliminary control of the Committee

exercised by the House [354 U.S. 204] of Representatives is slight or

nonexistent.  No one could reasonably deduce from the charter the kind

of investigation that the Committee was directed to make.  As a result,

we are asked to engage in a process of retroactive rationalization. 

Looking backward from the events that transpired, we are asked to uphold

the Committee's actions unless it appears that they were clearly not

authorized by the charter.  As a corollary to this inverse approach, the

Government urges that we must view the matter hospitably to the power of

the Congress -- that, if there is any legislative purpose which might

have been furthered by the kind of disclosure sought, the witness must

be punished for withholding it.  No doubt every reasonable indulgence of

legality must be accorded to the actions of a coordinate branch of our

Government.  But such deference cannot yield to an unnecessary and

unreasonable dissipation of precious constitutional freedoms.



The Government contends that the public interest at the core of the

investigations of the Un-American Activities Committee is the need by

the Congress to be informed of efforts to overthrow the Government by

force and violence, so that adequate legislative safeguards can be

erected.  From this core, however, the Committee can radiate outward

infinitely to any topic thought to be related in some way to armed

insurrection.  The outer reaches of this domain are known only by the

content of "un-American activities."  Remoteness of subject can be

aggravated by a probe for a depth of detail even farther removed from

any basis of legislative action.  A third dimension is added when the

investigators turn their attention to the past to collect minutiae on

remote topics, on the hypothesis that the past may reflect upon the

present.



The consequences that flow from this situation are manifold.  In the

first place, a reviewing court is unable [354 U.S. 205] to make the kind

of judgment made by the Court in United States v. Rumely, supra.  The

Committee is allowed, in essence, to define its own authority,to choose

the direction and focus of its activities.  In deciding what to do with

the power that has been conferred upon them, members of the Committee

may act pursuant to motives that seem to them to be the highest.  Their

decisions, nevertheless, can lead to ruthless exposure of private lives

in order to gather data that is neither desired by the Congress nor

useful to it.  Yet it is impossible in this circumstance, with

constitutional freedoms in jeopardy, to declare that the Committee has

ranged beyond the area committed to it by its parent assembly, because

the boundaries are so nebulous.



More important and more fundamental than that, however, it insulates the

House that has authorized the investigation from the witnesses who are

subjected to the sanctions of compulsory process.  There is a wide gulf

between the responsibility for the use of investigative power and the

actual exercise of that power.  This is an especially vital

consideration in assuring respect for constitutional liberties. 

Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the absence of a

clear determination by the House or the Senate that a particular inquiry

is justified by a specific legislative need.



It is, of course, not the function of this Court to prescribe rigid

rules for the Congress to follow in drafting resolutions establishing

investigating committees.  That is a matter peculiarly within the realm

of the legislature, and its decisions will be accepted by the courts up

to the point where their own duty to enforce the constitutionally

protected rights of individuals is affected.  An excessively broad

charter like that of the House Un-American Activities Committee places

the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance

between the public need for a particular interrogation and the right of

[354 U.S. 206] citizens to carry on their affairs free from unnecessary

governmental interference.  It is impossible in such a situation to

ascertain whether any legislative purpose justifies the disclosures

sought, and, if so, the importance of that information to the Congress

in furtherance of its legislative function.  The reason no court can

make this critical judgment is that the House of Representatives itself

has never made it.  Only the legislative assembly initiating an

investigation can assay the relative necessity of specific disclosures.



Absence of the qualitative consideration of petitioner's questioning by

the House of Representatives aggravates a serious problem, revealed in

this case, in the relationship of congressional investigating committees

and the witnesses who appear before them.  Plainly, these committees are

restricted to the missions delegated to them, i.e., to acquire certain

data to be used by the House or the Senate in coping with a problem that

falls within its legislative sphere.  No witness can be compelled to

make disclosures on matters outside that area.  This is a jurisdictional

concept of pertinency drawn from the nature of a congressional

committee's source of authority.  It is not wholly different from nor

unrelated to the element of pertinency embodied in the criminal statute

under which petitioner was prosecuted.  When the definition of

jurisdictional pertinency is as uncertain and wavering as in the case of

the Un-American Activities Committee, it becomes extremely difficult for

the Committee to limit its inquiries to statutory pertinency.



Since World War II, the Congress has practically abandoned its original

practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at

the bar of the House.  The sanction there imposed is imprisonment by the

House until the recalcitrant witness agrees to testify or disclose the

matters sought, provided that the incarceration does [354 U.S. 207] not

extend beyond adjournment.  The Congress has instead invoked the aid of

the federal judicial system in protecting itself against contumacious

conduct.  It has become customary to refer these matters to the United

States Attorneys for prosecution under criminal law.



The appropriate statute is found in 2 U.S.C.  192.  It provides:



Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of

either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any

matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee

established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of

Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes

default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question

pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a

misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than

$100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor

more than twelve months.{45} [354 U.S. 208]



In fulfillment of their obligation under this statute, the courts must

accord to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defendants

in all other criminal cases.  Among these is the right to have

available, through a sufficiently precise statute, information revealing

the standard of criminality before the commission of the alleged

offense.{46}  Applied to persons prosecuted under  192, this raises a

special problem in that the statute defines the crime as refusal to

answer "any question pertinent to the question under inquiry."  Part of

the standard of criminality, therefore, is the pertinency of the

questions propounded to the witness.{47}



The problem attains proportion when viewed from the standpoint of the

witness who appears before a congressional committee.  He must decide at

the time the questions are propounded whether or not to answer.  As the

Court said in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, the witness acts

at his peril.  He is ". . . bound rightly to construe the statute."  Id.

at 299.  An erroneous determination on his part, even if made in the

utmost good faith, does not exculpate him if the court should later rule

that the questions were pertinent to the question under inquiry.



It is obvious that a person compelled to make this choice is entitled to

have knowledge of the subject to [354 U.S. 209] which the interrogation

is deemed pertinent.  That knowledge must be available with the same

degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires

in the expression of any element of a criminal offense.  The "vice of

vagueness"{48} must be avoided here, as in all other crimes.  There are

several sources that can outline the "question under inquiry" in such a

way that the rules against vagueness are satisfied.  The authorizing

resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members of the committee, or

even the nature of the proceedings themselves, might sometimes make the

topic clear.  This case demonstrates, however, that these sources often

leave the matter in grave doubt.



The first possibility is that the authorizing resolution itself will so

clearly declare the "question under inquiry" that a witness can

understand the pertinency of questions asked him.  The Government does

not contend that the authorizing resolution of the Un-American

Activities Committee could serve such a purpose.  Its confusing breadth

is amply illustrated by the innumerable and diverse questions into which

the Committee has inquired under this charter since 1938.  If the

"question under inquiry" were stated with such sweeping and uncertain

scope, we doubt that it would withstand an attack on the ground of

vagueness.



That issue is not before us, however, in light of the Government's

position that the immediate subject under inquiry before the

Subcommittee interviewing petitioner was only one aspect of the

Committee's authority to investigate un-American activities.  Distilling

that single topic from the broad field is an extremely difficult task

upon the record before us.  There was an opening statement by the

Committee Chairman at the outset of the [354 U.S. 210] hearing, but this

gives us no guidance.  In this statement, the Chairman did no more than

paraphrase the authorizing resolution and give a very general sketch of

the past efforts of the Committee.{49} [354 U.S. 211]



No aid is given as to the "question under inquiry" in the action of the

full Committee that authorized the creation of the Subcommittee before

which petitioner appeared.  The Committee adopted a formal resolution

giving the Chairman the power to appoint subcommittees ". . . for the

purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is

authorized to do."{50}  In effect, this was a device to enable the

investigations to proceed with a quorum of one or two members and [354

U.S. 212] sheds no light on the relevancy of the questions asked of

petitioner.{51}



The Government believes that the topic of inquiry before the

Subcommittee concerned Communist infiltration in labor.  In his

introductory remarks, the Chairman made reference to a bill, then

pending before the Committee,{52} which would have penalized labor

unions controlled or dominated by persons who were, or had been, members

of a "Communist action" organization, as defined [354 U.S. 213] in the

Internal Security Act of 1950.  The Subcommittee, it is contended, might

have been endeavoring to determine the extent of such a problem.



This view is corroborated somewhat by the witnesses who preceded and

followed petitioner before the Subcommittee.  Looking at the entire

hearings, however, there is strong reason to doubt that the subject

revolved about labor matters.  The published transcript is entitled: 

Investigation of Communist Activities in the Chicago Area, and six of

the nine witnesses had no connection with labor at all.{53}



The most serious doubts as to the Subcommittee's "question under

inquiry," however, stem from the precise questions that petitioner has

been charged with refusing to answer.  Under the terms of the statute,

after all, it is these which must be proved pertinent.  Petitioner is

charged with refusing to tell the Subcommittee whether or not he knew

that certain named persons had been members of the Communist Party in

the past.  The Subcommittee's counsel read the list from the testimony

of a previous witness who had identified them as Communists.  Although

this former witness was identified with labor, he had not stated that

the persons he named were involved in union affairs.  Of the thirty

names propounded to petitioner, seven were completely unconnected with

organized labor.  One operated a beauty parlor.  Another was a

watchmaker. Several were identified as "just citizens" or "only

Communists."  When [354 U.S. 214] almost a quarter of the persons on the

list are not labor people, the inference becomes strong that the subject

before the Subcommittee was not defined in terms of Communism in labor.



The final source of evidence as to the "question under inquiry" is the

Chairman's response when petitioner objected to the questions on the

grounds of lack of pertinency.  The Chairman then announced that the

Subcommittee was investigating "subversion and subversive

propaganda."{54}  This is a subject at least as broad and indefinite as

the authorizing resolution of the Committee, if not more so.



Having exhausted the several possible indicia of the "question under

inquiry," we remain unenlightened as to the subject to which the

questions asked petitioner were pertinent.  Certainly, if the point is

that obscure after trial and appeal, it was not adequately revealed to

petitioner when he had to decide at his peril whether or not to answer. 

Fundamental fairness demands that no witness be compelled to make such a

determination with so little guidance.  Unless the subject matter has

been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the

investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of

pertinency, to state for the record the subject [354 U.S. 215] under

inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded questions

are pertinent thereto.{55}  To be meaningful, the explanation must

describe what the topic under inquiry is and the connective reasoning

whereby the precise questions asked relate to it.



The statement of the Committee Chairman in this case, in response to

petitioner's protest, was woefully inadequate to convey sufficient

information as to the pertinency of the questions to the subject under

inquiry.  Petitioner was thus not accorded a fair opportunity to

determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and

his conviction is necessarily invalid under the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment.



We are mindful of the complexities of modern government and the ample

scope that must be left to the Congress as the sole constitutional

depository of legislative power.  Equally mindful are we of the

indispensable function, in the exercise of that power, of congressional

investigations.  The conclusions we have reached in this case will not

prevent the Congress, through its committees, from obtaining any

information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role in our

scheme of government.  The legislature is free to determine the kinds of

data that should be collected.  It is only those investigations that are

conducted by use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to

protect the rights of individuals against illegal encroachment.  That

protection can be readily achieved through procedures which prevent the

separation of power from responsibility and which provide the

constitutional requisites of fairness for witnesses.  A measure of added

care on the part of the House and the Senate in authorizing the use of

compulsory process and by their committees in exercising that power

would suffice.  [354 U.S. 216] That is a small price to pay if it serves

to uphold the principles of limited, constitutional government without

constricting the power of the Congress to inform itself.



The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is

remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the

indictment.



It is so ordered.



MR. JUSTICE BURTON and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER took no part in the

consideration or decision of this case. FRANKFURTER, J., concurring



MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.



I deem it important to state what I understand to be the Court's

holding.  Agreeing with its holding, I join its opinion.



The power of the Congress to punish for contempt of its authority is, as

the Court points out, rooted in history.  It has been acknowledged by

this Court since 1821.  Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.  Until 1857,

Congress was content to punish for contempt through its own process.  By

the Act of January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155, as amended by the Act of

January 24, 1862, 12 Stat. 333, Congress provided that, "in addition to

the pains and penalties now existing" (referring, of course, to the

power of Congress itself to punish for contempt), contumacy in a witness

called to testify in a matter properly under consideration by either

House, and deliberately refusing to answer questions pertinent thereto,

shall be a misdemeanor against the United States. In re Chapman, 166

U.S. 661, 672.  This legislation is now 2 U.S.C. 192.  By thus making

the federal judiciary the affirmative agency for enforcing the authority

that underlies the congressional power to punish for contempt, Congress

necessarily brings into play the specific provisions of the Constitution

relating to the prosecution of offenses and those implied restrictions

under which courts function. [354 U.S. 217]



To turn to the immediate problem before us, the scope of inquiry that a

committee is authorized to pursue must be defined with sufficiently

unambiguous clarity to safeguard a witness from the hazards of vagueness

in the enforcement of the criminal process against which the Due Process

Clause protects.  The questions must be put with relevance and

definiteness sufficient to enable the witness to know whether his

refusal to answer may lead to conviction for criminal contempt and to

enable both the trial and the appellate courts readily to determine

whether the particular circumstances justify a finding of guilt.



While implied authority for the questioning by the Committee, sweeping

as was its inquiry, may be squeezed out of the repeated acquiescence by

Congress in the Committee's inquiries, the basis for determining

petitioner's guilt is not thereby laid.  Prosecution for contempt of

Congress presupposes an adequate opportunity for the defendant to have

awareness of the pertinency of the information that he has denied to

Congress.  And the basis of such awareness must be contemporaneous with

the witness' refusal to answer and not at the trial for it. 

Accordingly, the actual scope of the inquiry that the Committee was

authorized to conduct and the relevance of the questions to that inquiry

must be shown to have been luminous at the time when asked and not left,

at best, in cloudiness.  The circumstances of this case were wanting in

these essentials. CLARK, J., dissenting



MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting.



As I see it, the chief fault in the majority opinion is its mischievous

curbing of the informing function of the Congress.  While I am not

versed in its procedures, my experience in the Executive Branch of the

Government leads me to believe that the requirements laid down in the

opinion for the operation of the committee system of [354 U.S. 218]

inquiry are both unnecessary and unworkable.  It is my purpose to first

discuss this phase of the opinion, and then record my views on the

merits of Watkins' case. I



It may be that, at times the House Committee on Un-American Activities

has, as the Court says, "conceived of its task in the grand view of its

name."  And, perhaps, as the Court indicates, the rules of conduct

placed upon the Committee by the House admit of individual abuse and

unfairness.  But that is none of our affair.  So long as the object of a

legislative inquiry is legitimate and the questions propounded are

pertinent thereto, it is not for the courts to interfere with the

committee system of inquiry.  To hold otherwise would be an infringement

on the power given the Congress to inform itself, and thus a trespass

upon the fundamental American principle of separation of powers.  The

majority has substituted the judiciary as the grand inquisitor and

supervisor of congressional investigations.  It has never been so. II



Legislative committees to inquire into facts or conditions for assurance

of the public welfare or to determine the need for legislative action

have grown in importance with the complexity of government.  The

investigation that gave rise to this prosecution is of the latter type. 

Since many matters requiring statutory action lie in the domain of the

specialist or are unknown without testimony from informed witnesses, the

need for information has brought about legislative inquiries that have

used the compulsion of the subpoena to lay bare needed facts and a

statute, 2 U.S.C.  192 here involved, to punish recalcitrant witnesses. 

The propriety of investigations has long been recognized and rarely

curbed by the courts, though [354 U.S. 219] constitutional limitations

on the investigatory powers are admitted.  The use of legislative

committees to secure information follows the example of the people from

whom our legislative system is derived.  The British method has

variations from that of the United States, but fundamentally serves the

same purpose -- the enlightenment of Parliament for the better

performance of its duties.  There are standing committees to carry on

the routine work, royal commissions to grapple with important social or

economic problems, and special tribunals of inquiry for some alleged

offense in government.  Our Congress has, since its beginning, used the

committee system to inform itself.  It has been estimated that over 600

investigations have been conducted since the First Congress.  They are

"a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate. . . ."

 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).



The Court indicates that, in this case, the source of the trouble lies

in the "tremendous latitude" given the Un-American Activities Committee

in the Legislative Reorganization Act.  It finds that the Committee "is

[354 U.S. 220] allowed, in essence, to define its own authority, [and]

to choose the direction and focus of its activities."  This, of course,

is largely true of all committees within their respective spheres.  And,

while it is necessary that the "charter," as the opinion calls the

enabling resolution, "spell out [its] jurisdiction and purpose," that

must necessarily be in more or less general terms.  An examination of

the enabling resolutions of other committees reveals the extent to which

this is true.



Permanent or standing committees of both Houses have been given power in

exceedingly broad terms.  For example, the Committees on the Armed

Services have jurisdiction over "Common defense generally"; the

Committees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce have [354 U.S. 221]

jurisdiction over "Interstate and foreign commerce generally"; and the

Committees on Appropriation have jurisdiction over "Appropriation of the

revenue for the support of the Government."  Perhaps even more important

for purposes of comparison are the broad authorizations given to select

or special committees established by the Congress from time to time. 

Such committees have been "authorized and directed" to make full and

complete studies "of whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of

interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce"; "of .

. . all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote,

or retard legislation"; to determine the extent to which current [354

U.S. 222] literature . . . containing immoral [or] obscene . . . matter,

or placing improper emphasis on crime . . . are being made available to

the people of the United States . . . ; and of the extent to which

criminal or other improper practices . . . are, or have been, engaged in

in the field of labor-management relations . . . to the detriment of the

interests of the public. . . .{10} (Emphasis added in each example.) 

Surely these authorizations permit the committees even more "tremendous

latitude" than the "charter" of the Un-American Activities Committee. 

Yet no one has suggested that the powers granted were too broad.  To

restrain and limit the breadth of investigative power of this Committee

necessitates the similar handling of all other committees.  The

resulting restraint imposed on the committee system appears to cripple

the system beyond workability.



The Court finds fault with the use made of compulsory process, power for

the use of which is granted the Committee [354 U.S. 223] in the

Reorganization Act.  While the Court finds that the Congress is free "to

determine the kinds of data" it wishes its committees to collect, this

has led the Court says, to an encroachment on individual rights through

the abuse of process.  To my mind, this indicates a lack of

understanding of the problems facing such committees.  I am sure that

the committees would welcome voluntary disclosure.  It would simplify

and relieve their burden considerably if the parties involved in

investigations would come forward with a frank willingness to cooperate.

 But everyday experience shows this just does not happen.  One needs

only to read the newspapers to know that the Congress could gather

little "data" unless its committees had, unfettered, the power of

subpoena.  In fact, Watkins himself could not be found for appearance at

the first hearing, and it was only by subpoena that he attended the

second.  The Court generalizes on this crucial problem, saying added

care on the part of the House and the Senate in authorizing the use of

compulsory process and by their committees in exercising that power

would suffice. It does not say how this "added care" could be applied in

practice; however, there are many implications, since the opinion warns

that "procedures which prevent the separation of power from

responsibility" would be necessary along with "constitutional requisites

of fairness for witnesses."  The "power" and "responsibility" for the

investigations are, of course, in the House where the proceeding is

initiated.  But the investigating job itself can only be done through

the use of committees.  They must have the "power" to force compliance

with their requirements.  If the rule requires that this power be

retained in the full House, then investigations will be so cumbrous that

their conduct will be a practical impossibility.  As to "fairness for

witnesses," there is nothing in the record showing any abuse of Watkins.

 If anything, the Committee was abused by his recalcitrance. [354 U.S.

224]



While ambiguity prevents exactness (and there is "vice in vagueness,"

the majority reminds), the sweep of the opinion seems to be that

"preliminary control" of the Committee must be exercised.  The Court

says a witness' protected freedoms cannot "be placed in danger in the

absence of a clear determination by the House or the Senate that a

particular inquiry is justified by a specific legislative need." 

Frankly I do not see how any such procedure as "preliminary control" can

be effected in either House of the Congress.  What will be controlled

preliminarily?  The plans of the investigation, the necessity of calling

certain witnesses, the questions to be asked, the details of subpoenas

duces tecum, etc.?  As it is now, Congress is hard-pressed to find

sufficient time to fully debate and adopt all needed legislation.  The

Court asserts that the Congress has practically abandoned its original

practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at

the bar of the House. This was to be expected.  It may be that, back in

the twenties and thirties, Congress could spare the time to conduct

contempt hearings, but that appears impossible now.  The Court places a

greater burden in the conduct of contempt cases before the courts than

it does before "the bar of the House."  It cites with approval cases of

contempt tried before a House of the Congress where no more safeguards

were present than we find here.  In contempt prosecutions before a

court, however, the majority places an investigative hearing on a par

with a criminal trial, requiring that knowledge of the subject to which

the interrogation is deemed pertinent . . . must be available [to the

witness] with the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due

Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal

offense. I know of no such claim ever being made before.  Such a

requirement has never been thought applicable to investigations, and is

wholly out of place when related to the informing function [354 U.S.

225] of the Congress.  See Frankfurter, Hands Off The Investigations, 38

New Republic, May 21, 1924, p. 329, 65 Cong.Rec. 9080-9082.  The

Congress does not have the facts at the time of the investigation, for

it is the facts that are being sought.  In a criminal trial, the

investigation has been completed, and all of the facts are at hand.  The

informing function of the Congress is, in effect, "a study by the

government of circumstances which seem to call for study in the public

interest."  See Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, 172 Harper's

Magazine, Feb.1936, pp.275, 278.  In the conduct of such a proceeding,

it is impossible to be as explicit and exact as in a criminal

prosecution.  If the Court is saying that its new rule does not apply to

contempt cases tried before the bar of the House affected, it may well

lead to trial of all contempt cases before the bar of the whole House in

order to avoid the restrictions of the rule.  But this will not promote

the result desired by the majority.  Summary treatment, at best, could

be provided before the whole House because of the time factor, and such

treatment would necessarily deprive the witness of many of the

safeguards in the present procedures.  On review here, the majority

might then find fault with that procedure. III



Coming to the merits of Watkins' case, the Court reverses the judgment

because:  (1) The subject matter of the inquiry was not "made to appear

with undisputable clarity" either through its "charter" or by the

Chairman at the time of the hearing and, therefore, Watkins was deprived

of a clear understanding of "the manner in which the propounded

questions [were] pertinent thereto", and (2) the present committee

system of inquiry of the House, as practiced by the Un-American

Activities Committee, does not provide adequate safeguards for the

protection [354 U.S. 226] of the constitutional right of free speech.  I

subscribe to neither conclusion.



Watkins had been an active leader in the labor movement for many years,

and had been identified by two previous witnesses at the Committee's

hearing in Chicago as a member of the Communist Party.  There can be no

question that he was fully informed of the subject matter of the

inquiry.  His testimony reveals a complete knowledge and understanding

of the hearings at Chicago.  There, the Chairman had announced that the

Committee had been directed to ascertain the extent and success of

subversive activities directed against these United States [and] on the

basis of these investigations and hearings . . . [report] its findings

to the Congress and [make] recommendations . . . for new legislation. He

pointed to the various laws that had been enacted as a result of

Committee recommendations.  He stated that The Congress has also

referred to the House Committee on Un-American Activities a bill which

would amend the National Security Act of 1950 which, if made law, would

restrict the availability of the Labor Act to unions not "in fact

Communist controlled action groups."  The Chairman went on to say that

It cannot be said that subversive infiltration has had a greater nor a

lesser success in infiltrating this important area.  The hearings today

are the culmination of an investigation. . . .  Every witness who has

been subpoenaed to appear before the committee here in Chicago . . .

[is] known to possess information which will assist the Committee in

performing its directed function to the Congress of the United States.



A subpoena had issued for Watkins to appear at the Chicago hearings, but

he was not served.  After Watkins was served, the hearing in question

was held in Washington, D.C.  Reference at this hearing was made to the

one conducted in Chicago.  Watkins came before the [354 U.S. 227]

Committee with a carefully prepared statement.  He denied certain

testimony of the previous witnesses, and declared that he had never been

a "card-carrying member" of the Party.  He admitted that, for the period

1942-1947, he cooperated with the Communist Party . . . participated in

Communist activities . . . made contributions . . . attended caucuses at

[his union's] convention at which Communist Party officials were present

. . . [and] freely cooperated with the Communist Party. . . . This

indicated that, for a five-year period he, a union official, was

cooperating closely with the Communist Party -- even permitting its

officials to attend union caucuses.  For the last two years of this

liaison, the Party had publicly thrown off its cloak of a political

party.  It was a reconstituted, militant group known to be dedicated to

the overthrow of our Government by force and violence.  In this setting,

the Committee attempted to have Watkins identify 30 persons, most of

whom were connected with labor unions in some way.  While one "operated

a beauty parlor" and another was "a watchmaker," they may well have been

"drops" or other functionaries in the program of cooperation between the

union and the Party.  It is a non sequitur for the Court to say that,

since almost a quarter of the persons on the list are not labor people,

the inference becomes strong that the subject before the Subcommittee

was not defined in terms of Communism in labor. I submit that the

opposite is true. IV



I think the Committee here was acting entirely within its scope, and

that the purpose of its inquiry was set out with "undisputable clarity."

 In the first place, the authorizing language of the Reorganization

Act{11} must be read as a whole, not dissected.  It authorized

investigation [354 U.S. 228] into subversive activity, its extent,

character, objects, and diffusion.  While the language might have been

more explicit than using such words as "un-American," or phrases like

"principle of the form of government," still, these are fairly well

understood terms.  We must construe them to give them meaning if we can.

 Our cases indicate that, rather than finding fault with the use of

words or phrases, we are bound to presume that the action of the

legislative body in granting authority to the Committee was with a

legitimate object "if [the action] is capable of being so construed."

(Emphasis added.)  People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 487,

2 N.E. 615, 627-628 (1885), as quoted and approved in McGrain v.

Daugherty, supra, at 178.  Before we can deny the authority, "it must be

obvious that" the Committee has "exceeded the bounds of legislative

power."  Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).  The fact that

the Committee has often been attacked has caused close scrutiny of its

acts by the House as a whole, and the House has repeatedly given the

Committee its approval.  "Power" and "responsibility" have not been

separated.  But the record in this case does not stop here.  It shows

that, at the hearings involving Watkins, the Chairman made statements

explaining the functions of the Committee.{12}  And, furthermore,

Watkins' action at the hearing [354 U.S. 229] clearly reveals that he

was well acquainted with the purpose of the hearing.  It was to

investigate Communist infiltration into his union.  This certainly falls

within the grant of authority from the Reorganization Act, and the House

has had ample opportunity to limit the investigative scope of the

Committee if it feels that the Committee has exceeded its legitimate

bounds.



The Court makes much of petitioner's claim of "exposure for exposure's

sake," and strikes at the purposes of the Committee through this catch

phrase.  But we are bound to accept as the purpose of the Committee that

stated in the Reorganization Act, together with the statements of the

Chairman at the hearings involved here.  Nothing was said of exposure. 

The statements of a single Congressman cannot transform the real purpose

of the Committee into something not authorized by the parent resolution.

  See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Sinclair v. United

States, 279 U.S. 263, 290, 295 (1929).  The Court indicates that the

questions propounded were asked for exposure's sake, and had no

pertinency to the inquiry.  It appears to me that they were entirely

pertinent to the announced purpose of the Committee's inquiry. 

Undoubtedly Congress has the power to inquire into the subjects of

communism and the Communist Party.  American Communications Assn. v.

Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).  As a corollary of the congressional power

to inquire into such subject matter, the Congress, through its

committees, can legitimately seek to identify individual members of the

Party.  Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241

(1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843.  See also Lawson v. United States,

85 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 17 171, 176 F.2d 49, 52-53 [354 U.S. 230] (1949),

cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82,

90-92 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838.



The pertinency of the questions is highlighted by the need for the

Congress to know the extent of infiltration of communism in labor

unions.  This technique of infiltration was that used in bringing the

downfall of countries formerly free but now still remaining behind the

Iron Curtain.  The Douds case illustrates that the Party is not an

ordinary political party, and has not been, at least since 1945. 

Association with its officials is not an ordinary association.  Nor does

it matter that the questions related to the past.  Influences of past

associations often linger on, as was clearly shown in the instance of

the witness Matusow and others.  The techniques used in the infiltration

which admittedly existed here might well be used again in the future. 

If the parties about whom Watkins was interrogated were Communists and

collaborated with him, as a prior witness indicated, an entirely new

area of investigation might have been opened up.  Watkins' silence

prevented the Committee from learning this information which could have

been vital to its future investigation.  The Committee was likewise

entitled to elicit testimony showing the truth or falsity of the prior

testimony of the witnesses who had involved Watkins and the union with

collaboration with the Party.  If the testimony was untrue, a false

picture of the relationship between the union and the Party leaders

would have resulted.  For these reasons, there were ample indications of

the pertinency of the questions. V



The Court condemns the long-established and long-recognized committee

system of inquiry of the House because it raises serious questions

concerning the protection it affords to constitutional rights.  It

concludes that compelling [354 U.S. 231] a witness to reveal his

"beliefs, expressions or associations" impinges upon First Amendment

rights.  The system of inquiry, it says, must insure that the Congress

does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy,

nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. In

effect, the Court honors Watkins' claim of a "right to silence" which

brings all inquiries, as we know, to a "dead end."  I do not see how any

First Amendment rights were endangered here.  There is nothing in the

First Amendment that provides the guarantees Watkins claims.  That

Amendment was designed to prevent attempts by law to curtail freedom of

speech.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).  It forbids

Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press."  It guarantees Watkins' right to join any organization and make

any speech that does not have an intent to incite to crime.  Dennis v.

United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).  But Watkins was asked whether he

knew named individuals and whether they were Communists.  He refused to

answer on the ground that his rights were being abridged.  What he was

actually seeking to do was to protect his former associates, not

himself, from embarrassment.  He had already admitted his own

involvement.  He sought to vindicate the rights, if any, of his

associates.  It is settled that one cannot invoke the constitutional

rights of another.  Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).



As already indicated, even if Watkins' associates were on the stand,

they could not decline to disclose their Communist connections on First

Amendment grounds.  While there may be no restraint by the Government of

one's beliefs, the right of free belief has never been extended to

include the withholding of knowledge of past events or transactions. 

There is no general privilege of silence.  The First Amendment does not

make speech or silence permissible to a person in such measure as he

[354 U.S. 232] chooses.  Watkins has here exercised his own choice as to

when he talks, what questions he answers, and when he remains silent.  A

witness is not given such a choice by the Amendment.  Remote and

indirect disadvantages such as "public stigma, scorn and obloquy" may be

related to the First Amendment, but they are not enough to block

investigation.  The Congress has recognized this since 1862, when it

first adopted the contempt section, R.S.  103, as amended, 2 U.S.C. 

193, declaring that no witness before a congressional committee may

refuse to testify upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his

production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render

him infamous. See also McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, at 179-180; United

States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 89 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838.

 See also Report on Congressional Investigations, Assn. of the Bar of

the City of New York, 3-4 (1948).



We do not have in this case unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable

inquiries and disclosures with respect to a witness' personal and

private affairs so ably and properly denounced in the Sinclair case,

supra, at 291-292.  This inquiry is far different from the cases relied

upon by the Court.  There is no analogy to the case of Richard

Thompson,{13} involving the sermons of clergymen.  It is not Floyd's{14}

case, involving criticism of the royal family.  There is no resemblance

to John Wilkes' struggle for a seat in Parliament.  It is not

Briggs,{15} where the prosecutor sought to develop the national origin

of policemen.  It is not Kilbourn,{16} involving a private real estate

pool.  [354 U.S. 233] Nor is it Quinn,{17} Emspak,{18} or Bart,{19}

involving the Fifth Amendment.  It is not Rumely,{20} involving the

interpretation of a lobbying statute.  Nor is this a new kind of

congressional inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history . . .

[i.e.,] a broad scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private

citizens. As I see it, only the setting is different.  It involves new

faces and new issues brought about by new situations which the Congress

feels it is necessary to control in the public interest.  The

difficulties of getting information are identical, if not greater.  Like

authority to that always used by the Congress is employed here, and in

the same manner so far as congressional procedures are concerned.  We

should afford to Congress the presumption that it takes every precaution

possible to avoid unnecessary damage to reputations.  Some committees

have codes of procedure, and others use the executive hearing technique

to this end.  The record in this case shows no conduct on the part of

the Un-American Activities Committee that justifies condemnation.  That

there may have been such occasions is not for us to consider here.  Nor

should we permit its past transgressions, if any, to lead to the rigid

restraint of all congressional committees.  To carry on its heavy

responsibility, the compulsion of truth that does not incriminate is not

only necessary to the Congress, but is permitted within the limits of

the Constitution. Footnotes WARREN, J., lead opinion (Footnotes)



1. R. 153-163; Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on

Un-American Activities on Communist Activities in the Chicago Area --

Part 1, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3737-3752.



2. R. 135-149; Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on

Un-American Activities on Investigation of Communist Activities in the

Chicago Area -- Part 2, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4243-4260.



3. R. 75; Hearings,  supra, note 2, Part 3, at 4268.



4. Brief for Respondent, pp. 59-60.



5. R. 886; Hearings, supra, note 2, Part 3, at 4275.



6. There were nine citations of contempt voted at the same time. 

Petitioner's case was the second to be acted upon.  There was no debate

other than a statement by Representative Javits on a proposal to

consolidate the legislative bodies investigating subversion.  100

Cong.Rec. 6382-6386.  The resolution to prosecute petitioner passed by a

voice vote.



There was lengthier discussion and a recorded vote on the first case

considered by the House.  Id. at 6375-6382.  In none of the cases was

there any debate on the merits of the witnesses' conduct.  Id. at

6375-6401.



7. The counts of the indictment were patterned from the sequence of the

questioning by the Committee.  Petitioner was asked separately about six

persons, and these are the basis of the first six counts.  The last

count comprises the omnibus question that gave a list of twenty-five

names for petitioner to identify.  With two exceptions, the questions

asked for knowledge of past membership in the Communist Party.  The

context of the interrogation indicates that the Committee's concern was

with such past conduct.  Petitioner agreed to and did disclose his

knowledge of those he believed to be present members.



8. Now, we don't claim on behalf of the Government that there is any

right to expose for the purposes of exposure.  And I don't know that

Congress has ever claimed any such right.  But we do say, in the same

breath, that there is a right to inform the public at the same time you

inform the Congress.



9. Coke, Fourth Institute, 15.



10. H.Comm. J. (1688-1693) 227; Jay v. Topham, 12 How.St.Tr. 822.



11. Proceedings against Richard Thompson, 8 How.St.Tr. 2; Wittke, The

History of English Parliamentary Privilege, 50.



12. Floyd, for uttering a few contemptible expressions, was degraded

from his gentility, and to be held an infamous person; his testimony not

to be received; to ride from the Fleet to Cheapside on horseback,

without a saddle, with his face to the horse's tail, and the tail in his

hand, and then to stand two hours in the pillory, and to be branded in

the forehead with the letter K; to ride four days afterwards in the same

manner to Westminster, and then to stand two hours more in the pillory,

with words on a paper in his hat showing his offence; to be whipped at

the cart's tail from the Fleet to Westminster Hall; to pay a fine of

5000l., and to be a prisoner in Newgate during his life. 1 De Lolme, The

Rise and Progress of the English Constitution, 348.



13. H.L.J. (1620-1628) 110-111, 113, 116, 124, 125, 127, 132, 133-134,

183; Wittke, 76-77.  See also Kelke, Constitutional Law and Cases,

155-156.



14. H.L.J. (1675-1681) 54-55.



15. Wittke, 122-123.  With all his knavery, Wilkes was long a hero with

certain persecuted groups in England.  Here, streets and other public

places have been named for him and his writings.



16. H.Comm.J. (1835) 533, 564-565, 571, 575.



17. Finer, Congressional Investigations:  The British System, 18 U. of

Chi.L.Rev. 521, 554-561; Smelser, Legislative Investigations: 

Safeguards for Witnesses:  The Problem in Historical Perspective, 29

Notre Dame Law. 163, 167; Clokie & Robinson, Royal Commissions of

Inquiry.



18. Finer, 559; Smelser, 167; Clokie & Robinson, 186-187.



19. See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of

Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153, 168-191; Potts, Power of Legislative

Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 691, 719-725.



20. The first case to reach this Court was Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat.

204, which upheld the power of the House of Representatives to reprimand

a person for attempting to bribe a member of the House.



21. On December 31, 1827, the House Committee on Manufacturers was given

the task of inquiring into the effect that the proposed upward revision

in the tariff schedules would have upon domestic manufacturers.  The

power of the House to authorize a factfinding inquiry in aid of

legislation was seriously challenged.  After full debate, the

investigation was authorized by a vote of 102 to 88.  4 Cong. Deb. 889.



22. The subject matter of the select committee was . . . the late

invasion and seizure of the armory and arsenal of the United States at

Harper's Ferry, in Virginia, by a band of armed men. . . .  And that

said committee [shall] report whether any and what legislation may, in

their opinion, be necessary, on the part of the United States, for the

future preservation of the peace of the country, or for the safety of

the public property, and that said committee [shall] have power to send

for persons and papers. Cong.Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1859).



23. 60 Stat. 828-829.  All standing committees in the Senate were

invested with the power of compulsory process.  60 Stat. 830-831. 

During the 83d Congress, two other standing committees in the House of

Representatives, the Appropriations and Government Operations

Committees, possessed that power.  99 Cong.Rec. 16-19.



24. The first court that was called upon to review the constitutional

validity of a legislative inquiry was the New York Court of Common

Pleas.  The case arose out of the inquiry by the Common Council of New

York into the conduct of the Police Department in 1855.  Judge Charles

Patrick Daly upheld the investigative power as implicit in the functions

of a legislature, but ruled that the examination of witnesses must be

confined to the subject under investigation.  Applying this standard, he

ruled that questions directed to the national origin of policemen were

improper under the investigators' authorizing resolution.  Briggs v.

Mackeller, 2 Abbott's Practice Reports 30 (N.Y. Common Pleas 1855).



25. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (upheld conviction under R.S.  102,

forerunner of 2 U.S.C.  192, for refusal to answer questions in inquiry

into charges of corruption among certain Senators with respect to

pending bill on sugar tariff); cf. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521.



26. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (upheld power of Senate to punish

as a contempt the action of a witness in allowing the destruction and

removal of papers subject to the subpoena of a Senate committee; held

that enactment of 2 U.S.C.  192 did not impair contempt power of Houses

of Congress).



27. The first reported case in which the claim of the privilege against

self-incrimination was allowed in a congressional inquiry proceeding was

United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F.Supp. 991.  Prior thereto, several

state courts had held that legislative investigations were subject to

the witness' privilege not to accuse himself under state constitutions. 

Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, decided in 1871, is the earliest.  See also

Ex parte Johnson, 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164.



28. E.g., Excerpts from Hearings before the House of Representatives

Committee on Un-American Activities -- Regarding Investigation of

Communist Activities in Connection with the Atom Bomb, 80th Cong., 2d

Sess. 5; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Sept. 6, 1948, p. 3, col. 6-7.



29. Appropriateness of the privilege has been upheld without question in

many cases arising out of congressional inquiry.  See, e.g., Starkovich

v. United States, 231 F.2d 411; Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287;

United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200; Marcello v. United States, 196

F.2d 437; United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F.Supp. 597; United States v.

Licavoli, 102 F.Supp. 607; United States v. Cohen, 101 F.Supp. 906;

United States v. Jaffe, 98 F.Supp. 191; United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96

F.Supp. 491; United States v. Raley, 96 F.Supp. 495; United States v.

Yukio Abe, 95 F.Supp. 991.



30. The first reported decision, made in 1947, grew out of the inquiry

of the Un-American Activities Committee into certain organizations

suspected of subversive actions.  Subpoenas duces tecum had been issued

calling for the correspondence and other records of these organizations.

 Refusals to comply were followed by prosecutions under 2 U.S.C.  192. 

The District Court denied motions to dismiss the indictments in United

States v. Bryan, 72 F.Supp. 58.  The decision with respect to the First

Amendment was affirmed in Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241.



31. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43-44; Lawson v. United

States, 176 F.2d 49, 51-52; Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241,

244-250; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90-92.



32. In a report to the House, the Committee declared:



While Congress does not have the power to deny to citizens the right to

believe in, teach, or advocate, communism, fascism, and naziism, it does

have the right to focus the spotlight of publicity upon their

activities. . . . H.R.Rep. No. 2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13.



A year later, the Committee reported that ". . . investigation to inform

the American people . . . is the real purpose of the House Committee." 

H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2.



A pamphlet issued by the Committee in 1951 stated that:  "Exposure in a

systematic way began with the formation of the House Committee on

Un-American Activities, May 26, 1938."  The Committee believed itself

commanded ". . . to expose people and organizations attempting to

destroy this country.  That is still its job, and to that job it

sticks."  100 Things You Should Know About Communism, H.R.Doc. No. 136,

82d Cong., 1st Sess.19, 67.



In its annual reports, the Committee has devoted a large part of its

information to a public listing of names along with a summary of their

activities. . . .  [T]he committee feels that the Congress and the

American people will have a much clearer and fuller picture of the

success and scope of communism in the United States by having set forth

the names and, where possible, the positions occupied by individuals who

have been identified as Communists, or former Communists, during the

past year. H.R.Rep. No. 2516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7.



33. We are not concerned with the power of the Congress to inquire into

and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies

of the Government.  That was the only kind of activity described by

Woodrow Wilson in Congressional Government when he wrote:  "The

informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its

legislative function."  Id. at 303.  From the earliest times in its

history, the Congress has assiduously performed an "informing function"

of this nature.  See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the

Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153, 168-194.



34. Compare the treatment of this point in Barenblatt v. United States,

240 F.2d 875, 880-881; Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54, 58; Eisler

v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 278-279; United States v. Josephson, 165

F.2d 82, 89, and United States v. Kamin, 136 F.Supp. 791, 800-801.



35. H.Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 Cong.Rec. 7568, 7586.



36. H.Res. 5, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15.



37. H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong.Rec. 18, 24.



38. For contrasting views, see Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54,

57-58, and Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 247-248.



39. The language of the resolution was obviously taken from the

Dickstein resolution, which established the McCormack Committee in 1934

to study Nazi and other propaganda sent into the United States from

foreign countries.  H.Res.198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong.Rec. 4934,

4949.



40. In 1947, Judge Charles E. Clark, now Chief Judge of the Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote about the Committee: Suffice it to

say here that its range of activity has covered all varieties of

organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the C.I.O.,

the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Farmer-Labor party, the

Federal Theatre Project, consumers' organizations, various publications

from the magazine "Time" to the "Daily Worker," and varying forms and

types of industry, of which the recent investigation of the movie

industry is fresh in the public mind.  While it has avoided specific

definition of what it is seeking, it has repeatedly inquired as to

membership in the Communist party and in other organizations which it

regards as communist controlled or affected. United States v. Josephson,

165 F.2d 82, 95 (dissent).  See also the dissenting opinion of Judge

Henry W. Edgerton, now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, in Barsky v. United States, 83

U.S.App.D.C. 127, at 143, 167 F.2d 241, at 257.



41. H.Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong.Rec. 1098, 1127-1128;

H.Res. 321, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong.Rec. 572, 604-605; H.Res. 90,

77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 Cong.Rec. 886, 899; H.Res. 420, 77th Cong., 2d

Sess., 88 Cong.Rec. 2282, 2297; H.Res. 65, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89

Cong.Rec. 795, 809-810.



42. 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15.



43. 60 Stat. 812, 828.



44. H.Res. 5, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 Cong.Rec. 38; H.Res. 5, 81st

Cong., 1st Sess., 95 Cong.Rec. 10; H.Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97

Cong.Rec. 17, 19; H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong.Rec. 15;

H.Res. 5, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 Cong.Rec. 11.



45. This statute was passed in 1857 as a direct result of an incident

which caused the Congress to feel that it needed more severe sanctions

to compel disclosures than were available in the historical procedure of

summoning the recalcitrant witness before the bar of either House of

Congress and ordering him held in custody until he agreed to testify. 

Such imprisonment is valid only so long as the House remains in session.

 See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231; Eberling, Congressional

Investigations, 180-184.



The immediate cause for adoption of the statute was an accusation by one

J. W. Simonton, a newspaperman, that certain unnamed Congressmen were

soliciting bribes on a matter pending before the legislature.  Simonton

was cited before the House of Representatives and refused to divulge the

names of those implicated.  In the course of that episode, the

forerunner of 2 U.S.C.  192 was passed in order ". . . to inflict a

greater punishment than the committee believe the House possesses the

power to inflict."  Cong.Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 405.  See also id.

at 403-413, 426-433, 434-445.  Thereafter, having been in custody more

than two weeks, Simonton testified to the satisfaction of the committee,

and was discharged.  3 Hinds' Precedents  1669.



46. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612; United States v. Cardiff,

344 U.S. 174; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507; Musser v. Utah, 333

U.S. 95; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451.



47. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148; Bowers v. United States, 202

F.2d 447; United States v. Kamin, 135 F.Supp. 382, 136 F.Supp. 791.



48. United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 88.



49.



The committee will be in order.  I should like to make an opening

statement regarding our work here in the city of Chicago.  The Congress

of the United States, realizing that there are individuals and elements

in this country whose aim it is to subvert our constitutional form of

government, has established the House Committee on Un-American

Activities.  In establishing this committee, the Congress has directed

that we must investigate and hold hearings, either by the full committee

or by a subcommittee, to ascertain the extent and success of subversive

activities directed against these United States.



On the basis of these investigations and hearings, the Committee on

Un-American Activities reports its findings to the Congress and makes

recommendations from these investigations and hearings for new

legislation.  As a result of this committee's investigations and

hearings, the Internal Security Act of 1950 was enacted.



Over the past fifteen years this committee has been in existence, both

as a special and permanent committee, it has made forty-seven

recommendations to the Congress to insure proper security against

subversion.  I am proud to be able to state that, of these forty-seven

recommendations, all but eight have been acted upon in one way or

another.  Among these recommendations which the Congress has not acted

upon are those which provide that witnesses appearing before

congressional committees be granted immunity from prosecution on the

information they furnish.



The committee has also recommended that evidence secured from

confidential devices be admissible in cases involving the national

security.  The executive branch of Government has now also asked the

Congress for such legislation.  A study is now being made of various

bills dealing with this matter.



The Congress has also referred to the House Committee on Un-American

Activities a bill which would amend the National Security Act of 1950. 

This bill, if enacted into law, would provide that the Subversive

Activities Control Board should, after suitable hearings and procedures,

be empowered to find if certain labor organizations are, in fact,

Communist controlled action groups.  Following this action, such labor

groups would not have available the use of the National Labor Relations

Board as they now have under the provisions of the Labor-Management

Relations Act of 1947.



During the first session of this 83rd Congress, the House Un-American

Activities Committee has held hearings in Los Angeles and San Francisco,

California; Albany and New York City, New York; Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, and Columbus, Ohio.  We are here in Chicago, Illinois,

realizing that this is the center of the great midwestern area of the

United States.



It cannot be said that subversive infiltration has had a greater nor a

lesser success in infiltrating this important area.  The hearings today

are the culmination of an investigation that has been conducted by the

committee's competent staff and is a part of the committee's intention

for holding hearings in various parts of the country.



The committee has found that, by conducting its investigations and

holding hearings in various parts of the country, it has been able to

secure a fuller and more comprehensive picture of subversive efforts

throughout our nation.  Every witness who has been subpoenaed to appear

before the committee here in Chicago, as in all hearings conducted by

this committee, are [sic] known to possess information which will assist

the committee in performing its directed function to the Congress of the

United States. (R. 43-44; Hearing, supra, note 2, Part 1, at 4165-4166.)



50. The Committee convened in executive session on January 22, 1953, and

adopted the following resolution:



BE IT RESOLVED, that the Chairman shall have authority from time to time

to appoint subcommittees composed of one or more members of the

Committee on Un-American Activities for the purpose of performing any

and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do. (R.

91.)



51. The original resolution authorizing subcommittees was amended on

March 3, 1954, to require any subcommittee to consist of at least three

members, two of whom could constitute a quorum.  (R. 92.)



Petitioner appeared before a subcommittee composed at the outset of four

members.  After a recess in the course of his testimony, only two

committeemen were present.  It was during this latter phase of his

testimony that petitioner refused to answer the questions involved in

this case.



52. The bill pending at the time of the Chairman's remarks, March 15,

1954, and when petitioner testified a month later was H.R. 7487, 100

Cong.Rec. 763.  No action was ever taken on this proposal.  Introduced

by Representative Velde, it would have withdrawn the rights, privileges

and benefits under the National Labor Relations Act of any labor

organization which was substantially directed, dominated or controlled

by persons who were or ever had been members of a "Communist action

organization," as that phrase is used in the Internal Security Act.



On July 6, 1954, after extensive hearings, the Senate Judiciary

Committee reported favorably on S. 3706, a bill drafted by that

committee to amend the Internal Security Act.  Two days later,

Representative Velde introduced H.R. 9838, which was identical to S.

3706.  These bills eventually became law.  68 Stat. 775.  The Act

created the concept of a "Communist infiltrated organization," and part

of its provisions declared that a labor union that came within that

definition should be barred from the rights, privileges and benefits of

the National Labor Relations Act.  The same sanctions were applied to a

labor group that was a "Communist action" or "Communist front

organization" under the original Internal Security Act.



53. The first four witnesses testified principally about the Communist

Party activities of an employee of the National Cancer Institute of the

United States Public Health Service.  A Chicago attorney related to the

Subcommittee his experiences with Communist youth organizations during

his college days.  The sixth witness told of her work as a district

organizer for the Communist Party in Montana, Wyoming, Idaho and the

Dakotas during the 1930's.



54.



This committee is set up by the House of Representatives to investigate

subversion and subversive propaganda and to report to the House of

Representatives for the purpose of remedial legislation.



The House of Representatives has, by a very clear majority, a very large

majority, directed us to engage in that type of work, and so we do, as a

committee of the House of Representatives, have the authority, the

jurisdiction, to ask you concerning your activities in the Communist

Party, concerning your knowledge of any other persons who are members of

the Communist Party or who have been members of the Communist Party, and

so, Mr. Watkins, you are directed to answer the question propounded to

you by counsel. (R. 86; Hearings, supra, note 2, Part 3, at 4275-4276.)



55. Cf. United States v. Kamin, 136 F.Supp. 791, 800. CLARK, J.,

dissenting (Footnotes)



1. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Sinclair v. United

States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Reed v. County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376

(1928); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Landis,

Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation,

40 Harv.L.Rev. 153 (1926).



2. Symposium on Congressional Investigations, 18 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 421,

Finer, The British System, 521, 532, 554, 561 (1951).



3. The Committee originated in 1938 under H.Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d

Sess., 83 Cong.Rec. 7568, and was patterned after a resolution of 1934

authorizing the investigation of Nazi propaganda.  H.Res.198, 73d Cong.,

2d Sess., 78 Cong.Rec. 4934.  The resolution read much the same as the

present authority of the Committee which is quoted below.  By a

succession of House Resolutions (H.Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84

Cong.Rec. 1098; H.Res. 321, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong.Rec. 572;

H.Res. 90, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 Cong.Rec. 886; H.Res. 420, 77th

Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Cong.Rec. 2282; H.Res. 65, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89

Cong.Rec. 795), the Committee continued in existence until in 1945, by

amendment of the House Rules, it was made a standing committee.  91

Cong.Rec. 10, 15.  The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 retained

it as one of the standing committees and provided:



All proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other

matters relating to the subjects listed under the standing committees

named below shall be referred to such committees, respectively:  . . .



(q) . . . (2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by

subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of

(i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda

activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United

States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from

foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of

the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all

other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any

necessary remedial legislation. 60 Stat. 823, 828.



The Committee is authorized to sit and act at any time, anywhere in the

United States and to require the attendance of witnesses and the

production of books and papers.  A resolution of the Eighty-third

Congress adopted the Rules of the previous Congresses as amended by the

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.  H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.,

99 Cong.Rec. 15, 16, 18, 24.



4. 60 Stat. 815, 824.



5. 60 Stat. 817, 826.



6. 60 Stat. 815, 824.



7. S.Res. 202, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., in pertinent part provides: . . .

authorized and directed to make a full and complete study and

investigation of whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of

interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce in

furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of the law of the

United States or of the State in which the transactions occur, and, if

so, the manner and extent to which, and the identity of the persons,

firms, or corporations by which such utilization is being made, what

facilities are being used, and whether or not organized crime utilizes

such interstate facilities or otherwise operates in interstate commerce

for the development of corrupting influences in violation of law of the

United States or of the laws of any State:  Provided however, That

nothing contained herein shall authorize (1) the recommendation of any

change in the laws of the several States relative to gambling, or (2)

any possible interference with the rights of the several States to

prohibit, legalize, or in any way regulate gambling within their

borders.



8. H.Res. 298, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., in pertinent part provides: . . .

authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of (1) all

lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard

legislation, and (2) all activities of agencies of the Federal

Government intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard

legislation.



9. H.Res. 596, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., in pertinent part provides: . . .

authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and

study (1) to determine the extent to which current literature -- books,

magazines, and comic books -- containing immoral, obscene, or otherwise

offense matter, or placing improper emphasis on crime, violence, and

corruption, are being made available to the people of the United States

through the United States mails and otherwise, and (2) to determine the

adequacy of existing law to prevent the publication and distribution of

books containing immoral, offensive, and other undesirable matter.



10. S.Res. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., in pertinent part provides: . . .

authorized and directed to conduct an investigation and study of the

extent to which criminal or other improper practices or activities are,

or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations or

in groups or organizations of employees or employers to the detriment of

the interests of the public, employers or employees, and to determine

whether any changes are required in the laws of the United States in

order to protect such interests against the occurrence of such practices

or activities.



11. See note 3, supra.



12. See supra,   See also the statement by Congressman Velde, Chairman

of the Committee on Un-American Activities, April 9, 1954, at

Washington, D.C., where Mr. Velde stated, inter alia: This committee is

set up by the House of Representatives to investigate subversion and

subversive propaganda and to report to the House of Representatives for

the purpose of remedial legislation.



The House of Representatives has, by a very clear majority, a very large

majority, directed us to engage in that type of work, and so we do, as a

committee of the House of Representatives, have the authority, the

jurisdiction, to ask you concerning your activities in the Communist

Party, concerning your knowledge of any other persons who are members of

the Communist Party or who have been members of the Communist Party, and

so, Mr. Watkins, you are directed to answer the question propounded to

you by counsel.



13. Proceedings against Richard Thompson, 8 How.St.Tr. 2 (1680).



14. See 1 De Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution

(1838), at 347-348.



15. Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb.Pr. 30, 65 (N.Y. Common Pleas 1855)



16. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).



17. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).



18. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).



19. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).



20. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).

