Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

Argued December 9, 1952

Reargued December 8, 1953

Decided May 17, 1954 *

[U.S. Reports citation not yet available]

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

Syllabus



Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State

solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or

requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal

protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment -- even

though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and

Negro schools may be equal.



(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its

intended effect on public education.



(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the

basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,

but in the light of the full development of public education and its

present place in American life throughout the Nation.



(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an

education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a right which

must be made available to all on equal terms.



(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of

race deprives children of the minority group of equal educational

opportunities, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible"

factors may be equal.



(e) The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163

U.S. 537, has no place in the field of public education.   [347 U.S.

484]



(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on

specified questions relating to the forms of the decrees.   [347 U.S.

486] WARREN, J., lead opinion



MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.



These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina,

Virginia, and Delaware.  They are premised on different facts and

different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their

consideration together in this consolidated opinion. [347 U.S. 487]



In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal

representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to

the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis.  In each

instance, [347 U.S. 488] they had been denied admission to schools

attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting

segregation according to race.  This segregation was alleged to deprive

the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth

Amendment.  In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a

three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on

the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in

Plessy v. Fergson, 163 U.S. 537.  Under that doctrine, equality of

treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal

facilities, even though these facilities be separate.  In the Delaware

case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but

ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of

their superiority to the Negro schools.



The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal"

and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the

equal protection of the laws.  Because of the obvious importance of the

question presented, the Court took jurisdiction.  Argument was heard in

the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions

propounded by the Court. [347 U.S. 489]



Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the

adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  It covered exhaustively

consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states,

then-existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of

proponents and opponents of the Amendment.  This discussion and our own

investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light,

it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced.  At

best, they are inconclusive.  The most avid proponents of the post-War

Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions

among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States."  Their

opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and

the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited

effect.  What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind

cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.



An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's

history with respect to segregated schools is the status of public

education at that time.  In the South, the movement toward free common

schools, supported [347 U.S. 490] by general taxation, had not yet taken

hold.  Education of white children was largely in the hands of private

groups.  Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically

all of the race were illiterate.  In fact, any education of Negroes was

forbidden by law in some states.  Today, in contrast, many Negroes have

achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the

business and professional world.  It is true that public school

education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the

North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally

ignored in the congressional debates.  Even in the North, the conditions

of public education did not approximate those existing today.  The

curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in

rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states,

and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown.  As a

consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the

history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on

public education.



In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment,

decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as

proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. 

The doctrine of [347 U.S. 491] "separate but equal" did not make its

appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,

supra, involving not education but transportation.  American courts have

since labored with the doctrine for over half a century.  In this Court,

there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in

the field of public education.  In Cumming v. County Board of Education,

175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the

doctrine itself was not challenged.  In more recent cases, all on the

graduate school [347 U.S. 492] level, inequality was found in that

specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro

students of the same educational qualifications.  Missouri ex rel.

Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt

v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.

637.  In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine

to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff.  And in Sweatt v. Painter,

supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether

Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.



In the instant cases, that question is directly presented.  Here, unlike

Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white

schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with

respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of

teachers, and other "tangible" factors.  Our decision, therefore, cannot

turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and

white schools involved in each of the cases.  We must look instead to

the effect of segregation itself on public education.



In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when

the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was

written.  We must consider public education in the light of its full

development and its present place in American life throughout [347 U.S.

493] the Nation.  Only in this way can it be determined if segregation

in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of

the laws.



Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and

local governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great

expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the

importance of education to our democratic society.  It is required in

the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service

in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship. 

Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural

values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping

him to adjust normally to his environment.  In these days, it is

doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if

he is denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity,

where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be

made available to all on equal terms.



We come then to the question presented:  does segregation of children in

public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical

facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the

children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?  We

believe that it does.



In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for

Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this

Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of

objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school."  In

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that

a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other

students, again resorted to intangible considerations:  ". . . his

ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other

students, and, in general, to learn his profession."  [347 U.S. 494]

Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high

schools.  To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications

solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to

their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in

a way unlikely ever to be undone.  The effect of this separation on

their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the

Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against

the Negro plaintiffs:



Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a

detrimental effect upon the colored children.  The impact is greater

when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the

races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro

group.  A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to

learn.  Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency

to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and

to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a

racial[ly] integrated school system.{10} Whatever may have been the

extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,

this finding is amply supported by modern authority.{11}  Any language

[347 U.S. 495] in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is

rejected.



We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of

"separate but equal" has no place.  Separate educational facilities are

inherently unequal.  Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others

similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason

of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of

the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  This disposition makes

unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.{12}



Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of

this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the

formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable

complexity.  On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was

necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the

constitutionality of segregation in public education.  We have now

announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of

the laws.  In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties

in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and

the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and

5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term.{13} 

The Attorney General [347 U.S. 496] of the United States is again

invited to participate.  The Attorneys General of the states requiring

or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to

appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and

submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.{14}



It is so ordered. Footnotes WARREN, J., lead opinion (Footnotes)



* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South

Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No.

4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,

Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued

December 7-8, 1953, and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on

certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952,

reargued December 9, 1953.



1. In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are

Negro children of elementary school age residing in Topeka.  They

brought this action in the United States District Court for the District

of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but

does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain

separate school facilities for Negro and white students.  Kan.Gen.Stat. 

72-1724 (1949).  Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of

Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools.  Other

public schools in the community, however, are operated on a

nonsegregated basis.  The three-judge District Court, convened under 28

U.S.C.  2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a

detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground

that the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect

to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications

of teachers.  98 F.Supp. 797.  The case is here on direct appeal under

28 U.S.C.  1253.



In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro

children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon

County.  They brought this action in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of

provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require

the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools.  S.C.Const.,

Art. XI,  7; S.C.Code  5377 (1942).  The three-judge District Court,

convened under 28 U.S.C.  2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. 

The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white

schools, and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the

facilities.  But the court sustained the validity of the contested

provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools

during the equalization program.  98 F.Supp. 529.  This Court vacated

the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of

obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants

concerning the progress made in the equalization program.  342 U.S. 350.

 On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been

achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to

rectify this inequality as well.  103 F.Supp. 920.  The case is again

here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C.  1253.



In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are

Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. 

They brought this action in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the

state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of

Negroes and whites in public schools.  Va.Const.,  140; Va.Code  22-221

(1950).  The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C.  2281

and 2284, denied the requested relief.  The court found the Negro school

inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and ordered

the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and

transportation and to "proceed with all reasonable diligence and

dispatch to remove" the inequality in physical plant.  But, as in the

South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity of the contested

provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools

during the equalization program.  103 F.Supp. 337.  The case is here on

direct appeal under 28 U.S.C.  1253.



In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro

children of both elementary and high school age residing in New Castle

County.  They brought this action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to

enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory

code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public

schools.  Del.Const., Art. X,  2; Del.Rev.Code  2631 (1935).  The

Chancellor gave judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate

admission to schools previously attended only by white children, on the

ground that the Negro schools were inferior with respect to teacher

training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical

plant, and time and distance involved in travel.  87 A.2d 862.  The

Chancellor also found that segregation itself results in an inferior

education for Negro children (see note 10, infra), but did not rest his

decision on that ground.  Id. at 865.  The Chancellor's decree was

affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however,

that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the decree

after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished.

 91 A.2d 137, 152.  The defendants, contending only that the Delaware

courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro

plaintiffs to the white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. 

The writ was granted, 344 U.S. 891.  The plaintiffs, who were successful

below, did not submit a cross-petition.



2. 344 U.S. 1, 141, 891.



3. 345 U.S. 972.  The Attorney General of the United States participated

both Terms as amicus curiae.



4. For a general study of the development of public education prior to

the Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A History of Education in American

Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public Education in the United

States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII.  School practices current at the time of

the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts and

Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431;

Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX.  See also H.

Ex.Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871).  Although the demand for

free public schools followed substantially the same pattern in both the

North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to gain

momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in the North. 

The reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South (e.g., the

rural character of the South and the different regional attitudes toward

state assistance) are well explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. 

In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the War

virtually stopped all progress in public education.  Id. at 427-428. 

The low status of Negro education in all sections of the country, both

before and immediately after the War, is described in Beale, A History

of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. 

Compulsory school attendance laws were not generally adopted until after

the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918

that such laws were in force in all the states.  Cubberley, supra, at

563-565.



5. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West

Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, (1880): It ordains that no State shall deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.  What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be

the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether

colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and,

in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was

primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by

law because of their color?  The words of the amendment, it is true, are

prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive

immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race -- the right to

exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as

colored -- exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in

civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights

which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing

them to the condition of a subject race. See also Virginia v. Rives, 100

U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, (1880).



6. The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59

Mass.198, 206 (1850), upholding school segregation against attack as

being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality. 

Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in 1855.  Mass.Acts

1855, c. 256.  But elsewhere in the North, segregation in public

education has persisted in some communities until recent years.  It is

apparent that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not

merely one of sectional concern.



7. See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).



8. In the Cummin case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring

the defendant school board to discontinue the operation of a high school

for white children until the board resumed operation of a high school

for Negro children.  Similarly, in the Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a

child of Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities had

misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and

requiring him to attend a Negro school.



9. In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to

all such factors.  98 F.Supp. 797, 798.  In the South Carolina case, the

court below found that the defendants were proceeding "promptly and in

good faith to comply with the court's decree."  103 F.Supp. 920, 921. 

In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the equalization

program was already "afoot and progressing" (103 F.Supp. 337, 341);

since then, we have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's

brief on reargument, that the program has now been completed.  In the

Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's

equalization program was well under way.  91 A.2d 137, 149.



10. A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: I conclude from the

testimony that, in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in

education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving

educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those

available to white children otherwise similarly situated. 87 A.2d 862,

865.



11. K.B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality

Development (Mid-century White House Conference on Children and Youth,

1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI;

Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation A

Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What

are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal

Facilities?, 3 Int.J.Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld,

Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed.,

1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. 

And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).



12. See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment.



13.



4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates

the Fourteenth Amendment



(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits

set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should

forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or



(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an

effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing

segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?



5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and

assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the

end described in question 4(b),



(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;



(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;



(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a

view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;



(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with

directions to frame decrees in these cases and, if so, what general

directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures

should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific

terms of more detailed decrees?



14. See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).

