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SECRET FILES ON VARIOUS PROPAGANDA MATTERS

FROM: 2025/1939 7310/1941 Vol. 14

US FILE: OKW 633

OKW REPORT OF JULY 22, 1941 ON THE SITUATION IN WEHRMACHT
PROPAGANDA FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1 TO JULY 15, 1941

SUMMARY

This report appears to be the first of these periodical reports to be published after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. In Chapter II (Propaganda Aims and Methods) it is stated that now, also, the Soviet Union has entered the propaganda war. It is stated that the Soviet leaflets propagandize speeches by Stalin and Molotov, and that they appeal to the German soldiers to desert and overthrow the Hitler Government. The German report stresses in conclusion of this Chapter that these Soviet leaflets have revealed how effective the German leaflets were, inasmuch as the Soviets have in many instances used verbatim the text of German leaflets to their own ends.

In Chapter III, Nos. 1 through 22, the report refers to the individual countries. Under 2, the situation in respect to propaganda in the Soviet Union is treated. The report says that the true mood of the population is seen from the various measures taken against defeatists. It is claimed that Bolshevik atrocities were hidden behind a cloak of propaganda and attributed to the Nazis. Special Soviet hope is apparently placed in "General Sand".

Of the countries now in the Soviet orbit, of some interest is the report on Bulgaria. It states that the Communist-Soviet propaganda in Bulgaria (20) has been increasing and that it is under the leadership of the Soviet legation directed mainly against Germany. On the other hand, pro-German propaganda stresses that the fight is directed against Bolshevism but not against the slavs.

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In Chapter IV, counter-measures are discussed. By counter-measures this report understands German Wehrmacht propaganda, both domestic and external. On both fronts, domestically and externally, the situation has changed due to the opening of the German-Russian war and special attention is being paid to making the meaning of the German campaign against Russia well understood. It is reported that until the 10th of July about 40 million leaflets were already distributed. It is stressed that especially effective were those leaflets which were to be used as identification by deserters. These leaflets promised prisoners of war good treatment by the German authorities. The result was that a large number of men defected and that whole units up to battalions surrendered under leadership of their officers. The report speaks of numerous successes achieved by the use of loudspeakers. Furthermore, this report mentioned those appeals to the Soviet population which asked the people to disobey Stalin's orders regarding the destruction of commodities. The Germans pointed out that the result would be famine in the approaching winter. This approach was taken, as is reported, both on short and medium wave-length broadcasts and through the use of loudspeakers at the disposal of propaganda companies at the front.

Mention is also made of a poster campaign conducted in the Baltic languages in addition to the White Ruthenian, Ukrainian and Russian languages.

For the information of prisoners of war taken at the Eastern front a special PW paper to be printed in Russian, Ukrainian and White Ruthenian was being prepared.

Note: This report, published every two weeks, was made available only to military offices not below the rank of Army Corps.

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SECRET FILES ON VARIOUS PROPAGANDA MATTERS - VOLUME 14

OKW REPORT OF AUGUST 8, 1941 ON THE
SITUATION IN WEHRMACHT PROPAGANDA FOR THE PERIOD
JULY 16 TO JULY 31, 1941

This is the second report in the series of fortnightly reviews of the propaganda situation published after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. It follows the lines of the previous report and does not contain much additional material. As for the Soviet propaganda, the report says that it is mainly directed at the domestic front with descriptions of heroic deeds of the Soviet Army and civilian population. It also stresses the increasing Soviet leaflet propaganda containing the usual Communist slogans.

Periodically appears a Soviet leaflet taking the appearance of a newspaper. The third issue of this leaflet contains an alleged law concerning the treatment of German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. According to this law, German soldiers and officers would enjoy considerable advantages when in Soviet captivity.

In Chapter IV (Counter-Measures) it is stated that since the beginning of the Eastern campaign, 64 million leaflets were distributed by the Germans. A special campaign with 14 million leaflets was devoted to the capture of Stalin's son.

The report further mentions the effectiveness of the "Military Correspondence from Germany" (MCD) distributed through German foreign missions. It is reported that this was a successful operation and that many foreign newspapers reprinted the material because of its factual and non-polemic character.

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SECRET FILES ON VARIOUS PROPAGANDA MATTERS - VOLUME 14

OKW REPORT OF AUGUST 25, 1941 ON THE SITUATION
IN WEHRMACHT PROPAGANDA FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST
1 THROUGH AUGUST 15, 1941

This report says that the general tendency of the Soviet propaganda has remained unchanged. In addition, the report explicitly admits that Soviet broadcast propaganda has shown cleverness in appealing to German women. This is done through the announcement of names of husbands and sons who fell in captivity or who were killed at the Eastern front. The report also mentions an increase in Pan-Slavic propaganda. A considerable part of the report is devoted to British propaganda and the situation in Iran. The report speaks further of a considerable stepping up of the Soviet leaflet propaganda directed at German soldiers.

It is reported that the total number of German leaflets distributed on the Eastern front has reached the figure of 105 million.

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SECRET REPORT NUMBER 897 41 BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE 4TH MOTORIZED ARMY (4 PANZER ARMEE) (IC) ON "PROPAGANDA AND REPORTING", DATED JULY 22, 1941, ADDRESSED TO THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE WEHRMACHT (PROPAGANDA DIVISION) VOL.14

SUMMARY

This report deals with several aspects of war propaganda and reporting from the fronts and points out that certain newspaper stories did not do justice to the severity of the fighting. Special criticism is directed against the use of such words as "Flintenweiber" and "asiatische Kampfmethoden". The report stresses that although some women were participating in the fighting, many more were only caught in the fighting zone as dependents. As far as the term "Asiatic methods of fighting" is concerned, the writer of this report considers it incorrect to generalize. He also points out that various foreign nations might feel offended by such expressions.

In conclusion, the report demands a more factual front reporting since only this would achieve good propaganda. A more factual, serious, and thorough reporting is also necessary in reporting about foreign nations.

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SECRET FILES ON VARIOUS PROPAGANDA MATTERS - VOLUME 14

SECRET REPORT BY THE ARMY HIGH
COMMAND TO THE OKW/WPr, DATED JULY 31,
1941

This report contains excerpts from reports on the effectiveness of German propaganda through leaflets upon Soviet soldiers and civilians. These reports were submitted by various field units and generally stress that the leaflets were extremely effective. Almost all of the reports demand a sharp increase in the supply of these leaflets because the present numbers are insufficient. One of the reports says that at this time leaflets are more important than bombs. Another report emphasizes that the leaflets are very effective in spite of insufficient supplies. The Commissars and Officers of the Soviet Army are confiscating all leaflets they can get and there were even reports that possession and reading of such leaflets is punishable by death. Another Army Group report claims that according to statements of prisoners of war, leaflets are more effective when dropped over cities than when used over front lines.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM CONTAINED IN VOLUME
14 BY THE OKW/WPr (Ia) DATED, BERLIN,
AUGUST 12, 1941

SUMMARY

This report summarizes the effectiveness of the leaflet campaign during the first weeks of the fighting against Soviet Russia. It is emphasized that especially effective were those leaflets in which Soviet deserters were promised good treatment while in German captivity. The report mentions recent news, according to which the Commissars have shot Soviet soldiers who were in possession of the German leaflets, especially if such leaflets contained a pass through German front lines for those who wished to surrender. Because of this fact, a Russian verse was to be memorized by Soviet soldiers which would serve them as a pass-word through the German front lines when they deserted. The slogan was to be repeated over and over again in leaflets, through loudspeakers and over the radio. The report mentions special recordings with this slogan to be delivered to the propaganda companies in the field. This slogan reads about as follows: "Kill the Jewish Commissar, his mug is asking for a brick"*

* NOTE: This is apparently the type of crude propaganda which was criticized in some other reports.

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**SECRET REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE
DIVISION OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE,
DATED AUGUST 23, 1941 (VOL.14)**

SUMMARY

This report deals with the German broadcasts in the Russian language which are described as rather ineffective. They are said not to have found the proper approach to the mentality of the Russian population. An enclosure which is not available in this file is mentioned as containing a report by an expert in Russian affairs who has listened to the German broadcasts regularly and criticized them. This unidentified expert is said to have submitted his own proposals which are described as quite useful. This enclosure, however, could not be found in the file either.

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(VOLUME 14)

The files of the Division of Wehrmacht Propaganda contain a rather considerable number of German propaganda leaflets in the Russian language which were dropped over the Soviet lines. These leaflets were addressed to the commanders and soldiers of the Red Army and all other Soviet citizens. They tried to persuade them that none of the promises given them by the Bolsheviks have been fulfilled. Comparisons were being made between the life in the Soviet Union and Germany. Although some of these leaflets presented a rather convincing appeal to the Russian mind, their language very often did not conform with the mentality of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

In this respect, the views of a captured and interrogated Soviet general on the effects of the German leaflets deserve special mention. This opinion is contained in a report of the German Army Group "South"/Ic of August 9, 1941. The Soviet general was the Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Army. In answering a question about the effectiveness of the German leaflets, he said the following: "The German propaganda is extremely crude and clumsy, especially as regards the leaflets containing caricatures and verses. The contents of such leaflets do not appeal to the feelings of the Soviet people and are therefore relatively ineffective. On the whole, the German leaflet propaganda is considered "uncultured". The Finnish propaganda is considerably more cultured and effective. If expressions are used which are not found in the Russian dictionary, the point is certainly missed."

In contradiction to this evaluation by the Soviet general, there are in the files various reports submitted by individual German units in the field. All these reports, although some of them admit certain shortcomings, stress the effectiveness of propaganda leaflets distributed among the Soviet soldiers and civilians.

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A SECRET REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE SECURITY
POLICE AND SECRET SERVICE, DATED BERLIN, AUG-
UST 25, 1941, ADDRESSED TO OKW (VOL. 14)

SUMMARY

This report deals with the interrogation of a captured Soviet Major, who formerly was a journalist and an official of one of the Moscow broadcasting stations. He is identified as Grünberg. Major Grünberg was interrogated especially as to the effectiveness of German propaganda among members of the Red Army. He made various suggestions, and from marginal notations on this document, it can be seen that they were either adopted or were already in effect. For instance, Grünberg suggested that constant comparisons should be drawn between the real wages in the Soviet Union and Germany. The Soviet soldiers should be told that Germany does not intend to restore capitalism in Russia, that a return of the Tsarist system is not intended, etc.

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A GERMAN LEAFLET IN RUSSIAN AND IN
GERMAN TRANSLATION, NO. 149 R.

VOLUME 14

"Citizens of the Soviet Union, soldiers and officers of the Red Army. The German armed forces are fighting for a new order to replace the old regime, to replace Communist mismanagement and arbitrary rule. To bring bread instead of hunger and misery. A return of the land owners and capitalists will not be tolerated

Although there is still a war, the Germans are already putting into effect the following measures: The plots of land which were at the disposal of the individual members of the Kolkhozes for their personal use are declared their private property, free of taxes and duties. Provided that the harvest will be well gathered, and that the autumn plowing properly conducted, the privately owned land will be increased up to twice its original size. This will give the peasants the possibility to increase the number of cattle. For agricultural products, delivered from the communal and private fields, the German authorities will pay fixed and just prices which are considerably higher than the prices previously paid. Moreover, the Germans are establishing freedom of religion. Those who continue the war fight for their own enslavement. By terminating the senseless resistance you can help establish a new order in agriculture and improve working conditions and your whole life."

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VOL. 15
OKW/634

DIRECTIVE OF OKW/WPr OF 3 OCTOBER 1941
ADDRESSED TO ARMY GROUPS, ARMIES AND PANZER GROUPS

SUBJECT: Contents of German Leaflets

Excerpts from the directive:

In drafting leaflets not only their immediate but also their long-range effect should be taken into consideration. Promises which cannot be fulfilled should be avoided. Nor is it desirable that Russian patriotism be further jammed by patriotic appeals.

Proposals made by various Army units are contradictory. One should not forget that higher enemy officers are generally prone to delay the effects of our propaganda. Some prisoners purposely make false statements in order to confuse the German propagandists and thus to thwart their efforts.

The following suggestions expressed by Army units as to the contents of the leaflets are not acceptable:

- 1) A Russian National Assembly will decide on the future fate of Russia.
- 2) The leaflets should clearly describe the German intentions toward the reconstruction of Russia and the establishment of a new Government protected by Germany.
- 3) All the land belongs to the peasants.
- 4) Restoration of a monarchy.

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OKW/634 - VOL. 15

FORTNIGHTLY REPORT OF THE OKW/WPr ON THE PROPAGANDA SITUATION FOR THE PERIOD FROM 16TH TO 30TH SEPTEMBER 1941, DATED OCTOBER 8, 1941

The Soviet leaflet propaganda has considerably increased. Besides innumerable old leaflets no less than 100 new leaflets, magazines and newspapers were issued.

The Soviet propaganda is constantly hammering on the contention: "Our reserves are unlimited."

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OKW/634 - VOL. 15

ARMY GROUP "SOUTH" REPORTS, AUGUST 28, 1941
TO OKH AND OKW/WPr

Army Group "South" reports on August 28, 1941 to OKH and OKW/WPr that the propaganda action should take into consideration the mood of the workers in the industrial Don basin. The older workers were primarily interested in saving their working places and were opposed to destruction, whereas the younger ones are willing to fulfill the orders from above without reservations. They fight even as civilians.

The Army Group complains that the leaflets should be better adapted to the Russian mentality.

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VOL. 15 OKW/634

LETTER OF AUGUST 2, 1941 ADDRESSED TO OKW/WPr
BY THE REICH MINISTRY FOR EDUCATION AND
PROPAGANDA

The Reich Ministry for Education and Propaganda suggests the dispatch of written instructions to the individual propaganda divisions in the occupied Eastern territories.

A marginal note shows that the head of WPr refused to follow the above suggestion since the leaders of the propaganda divisions had been already instructed orally.

The suggested instructions reveal that the propaganda organization comprised the following groups:

- a) Active propaganda. The group was destined to influence the mood of the native population in favor of Germany.
- b) Press. The group's tasks were:
 - 1) Censorship;
 - 2) Information;
 - 3) Licensing and economic administration of the press.
- c) Radio
- d) Film
- e) Culture.

General instructions on propaganda issued by the Reichministry for Education and Propaganda were sent for distribution to OKW/WPr after a previous coordination of their contents with the office of Rosenberg in his capacity as "Reichsleiter" in the ideological field.

The Propaganda Divisions had to report to both the OKW/WPr and the Reichsministry for Education and Propaganda.

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REPORT FROM A GERMAN NAVAL UNIT PRESUMABLY
STATIONED SOMEWHERE IN THE BLACK SEA
ADDRESSED TO OKW/WPr

A colonel of the Soviet Coast Artillery who deserted to the Germans said that the German leaflet propaganda is ineffective with Soviet Marines since the leaflets appeal only to members of the Soviet Army and not the Navy.

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VOL. 15 - OKW/634

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE HEAD OF WPr ON NOV-
EMBER 7, 1941 BY ONE OF HIS LEADING AIDES.

This memorandum contains the following statements concerning propaganda directed at the Soviet population:

WPr reached an agreement with both the Reichsministry for Education and Propaganda and the Reichsministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. The agreement provides for an increase in propaganda material for the occupied territories.

An effective propaganda is hampered by the fact that instructions have been issued saying that a unified approach to the people of the various occupied territories is not desirable. Thus, the propaganda directed at the people of the Ukraine should be different from that performed in White Ruthenia or Ostland (Baltic States). The possibilities for a positive propaganda are limited since propaganda is permitted only within the framework of religious freedom, and casual remarks directed against the exploitation by collectivization and the Stakhanov system. The effects of the propaganda are small due to the discrepancy which exists between promises and their realization. Moreover, the propaganda divisions are understaffed and are not provided with the necessary transport facilities.

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A LETTER OF OCTOBER 15, 1941 FROM OKW/ GEN STAFF
OF THE ARMY TO OKW/WPr

The letter says that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army considers the strengthening of the propaganda directed at the Soviet population is necessary. The feeling of insecurity which prevails among the Soviet population results in a renewal of guerilla warfare, passive resistance, sabotage against supply institutions. Hence, efforts must be made to eliminate this feeling of insecurity by a purposeful propaganda which must take into account the economic, political and religious questions in the solution of which a population disappointed by Bolshevism, is primarily interested.

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 VOL. 15 - OKW/834

FORTNIGHTLY REPORT OF OKW/WPr ON THE PROP-
AGANDA SITUATION DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1
TO 15 OCTOBER 1941, DATED 20 OCTOBER 1941

The report stresses the fact that Soviet propaganda largely
utilizes nationalistic slogans. Otherwise, the report does not
contain anything worth mentioning.

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VOL. 15 OKW/834

REPORT BY PANZER PROPAGANDA COMPANY 691
TO OKW/WPr DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1941

A soviet leaflet in German which was found among the files (Sept/Oct 1941) contains a photograph of a German soldier who allegedly deserted to the Soviets, and his appeal to his comrades to follow his example. was attached to this leaflet to prove that this same soldier never deserted but was wounded and sent to a hospital in Germany. The soldier was afterwards introduced to foreign journalists.

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
VOL. 15 OKW/634

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS BY OKW/WPr, OCTOBER 27, 1941

OKW/WPr states in circular letter addressed to the Armies that in spite of certain successes of German propaganda, the Soviet population still follows Stalin's order and destroys food reserves and industrial installations. To fight the danger resulting from this, OKW/WPr prepared 6 different kinds of leaflets which warn the Soviet population against following Stalin's order. Every field Army was supposed to get 1 million of such leaflets.

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
VOL. 15 - OKW/634

FORTNIGHTLY REPORT OF OKW/WPr ON THE PROPAGANDA SITUATION DURING THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 16 UNTIL OCTOBER 31, 1941, DATED 6 NOVEMBER 1941.

The report does not contain any new aspects.

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VOL. 15 - OKW/634

DIRECTIVE OF 1 NOVEMBER 1941 BY
OKH TO OKW/WPr

The directive stresses the necessity of enlightening the German soldier about the difficult food situation in Germany. In dealing with the population of the occupied territories the German soldiers should remember that because of the privations endured by the German people they must remain unresponsive even in view of starving women and children.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM, DATED BERLIN, NOVEMBER 26, 1941

CONFERENCE OF VARIOUS PROPAGANDA OFFICIALS
AND HIGHEST WEHRMACHT OFFICERS

The main subject of the discussion was what measures should be taken to prevent leaks of classified information through "too much talking" or through intentional revealing.

Death penalties for such treason should be made public.

All media of propaganda should be employed to prevent spreading of rumors and leaks.

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SECRET INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY OKW/WPr
DATED BERLIN, DECEMBER 5, 1941

TREATMENT OF THE UKRAINIANS

Treatment of the inhabitants of the Ukraine by German authorities and troops has been rather inconsistent so far. This is due to the fluctuation between two points of view: 1) That the Ukraine is a future equal partner of the Reich and should be treated accordingly; and 2) That the Ukraine should be exploited as a colony and the people treated as colonials.

These conflicting views result on the one hand, in exaggerated promises of a political, economic or cultural nature, or, on the other hand, in the conclusion that the occupation troops can behave in the Ukraine as in enemy territory.

Neither of these extreme views is correct. The Führer has reserved for himself to decide upon the future political organization of the Ukraine. The military authorities are not permitted to issue any statement pertaining to this question. However, it can be stressed that the future position of the Ukraine will depend on the attitude and cooperation of the population.

The treatment of the Ukrainians should be generally friendly and based on realization that they were exploited by the Bolshevik tyranny.

They should not be judged on the basis of their miserable appearance and proletarianization. The Ukrainian language is not to be suppressed. Lowest-grade* schooling should not be prohibited. Press activities to a limited extent are to be permitted, under secure censorship.

It is to be realized that supplies to the front lines, and communications in general, will much depend on the good will of the Ukrainians.

They should see a liberator in the Germans and not another

* Underscored by writer

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tyrant. They are Arians with plenty of German blood.

If they are disappointed the Soviet propaganda will find again a fertile field.

NOTE: This directive was sent to the C-in-C Ukraine, and four propaganda companies under his command.

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FORTNIGHTLY PROPAGANDA REPORT OKW/WPr
DECEMBER 23, 1941 FOR PERIOD DEC 1 TO DEC 15,
1941

SUMMARY

This is the first report of this series issued since Japan entered the war. Most of this report is devoted to a survey of the reactions to Pearl Harbor and the subsequent events.

Chapter IV (Counter-Measures) makes the observation that events in the Far East have pushed developments at the Eastern front into the background. German propaganda mainly pointed out that Soviet attacks are senseless and take a great toll in lives. Anti-Soviet as well as anti-American propaganda was heavily concentrated on the Arabic countries and the Near and Middle East received special attention.

The Propaganda Division "Ukraine" has thus far distributed over 70,000 wall-newspapers, 33,000 booklets, 3,000 posters, 300 pictures of Hitler.

Other propaganda material included postcards with photographs of the Führer, Nazi flags, etc. Mobile loudspeaker units recorded music and talks in Russian and Ukrainian were increasingly used.

Under "Domestic Front", the following remark deserves mention:

"The statement by Reich Press Chief Dietrich of October 9, 1941 that 'the Eastern Campaign has been successfully concluded' which had met considerable criticism in the Army, was explained in an article in 'Mitteilungen an die Truppe', an Army periodical.

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SECRET FILES ON VARIOUS PROPAGANDA MATTERS

OKW REPORT OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1941, BERLIN, TO W/Pr
WITH COPIES TO THE MINISTRY FOR OCCUPIED EASTERN
PROVINCES AND TO THE MAIN OFFICE OF STATE SECURITY

Attached is a photostat of a report by Army Group "Center" on Improvement of German Propaganda.

SUMMARY

The report of Army Group "Center" is dated August 11, 1941. The report points out that propaganda so far has been good but should be increased and improved. This is seen from reports which had reached the Army Group "Center" after interrogation of prisoners.

"After investigating the reason for the relatively negligible effect of German propaganda so far one must come to the conclusion that German propaganda has been dealing with matters which normally are outside of the interests of the average Russian. In this instance, it is especially the anti-Semitic propaganda. Attempts to instigate anti-Jewish pogroms have failed. The reason for this is that the average Russian sees that the Jew is leading a proletarian life and that, therefore, he is not suitable for attack. The same is true of propaganda directed at his national origin. The average Russian has no fixed views on national origin but he thinks mainly in the following three spheres: 1. property; 2. family; 3. religion.

So far, only the effects of propaganda on the Russian soldier and peasant could be observed. Therefore, this memorandum is dealing exclusively with these two strata of the population and not with the workers of large Russian cities. Although Bolshevism as an idea might have penetrated into the spiritual life of the inhabitants of large cities in Russia, the Russian soldier and peasant view Bolshevism with reserve, which is based on the three

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points mentioned above. As long as German propaganda will not appeal to the Russian along these three points he will remain imprisoned by spiritual ties of Bolshevism and will fight as a courageous Russian soldier until the end. In order to prevent this it is necessary to promise the Russians a certain degree of private property so that he can view the advance of the Germans as liberation from his economic bondage ... it will be necessary to point out to the Russian that his family will never again be torn apart, but that he and his family unit will be able to expect from the Germans a sufficient economic basis. Finally, it is to be pointed out that the revival of the old Russian religious idea promises to become the major weapon in the fight against Bolshevism. It is here that it was proved how little Bolshevism has understood to capture the hearts of the Russian people. All the more, it is the task of the German propaganda to utilize this and to propagate practicing religion to a certain extent, - according to the old Roman traditions."

After this introduction, (translated almost completely), the report suggests various means by which these aims are to be accomplished: It is especially necessary to increase propaganda directed at the Red Army and the civilian population in order to counteract the very strong and very able* Communist leaflet and press propaganda. The Red Army soldiers who would desert immediately are prevented from doing so, especially because they fear that they will be immediately killed. Photographs of Russian soldiers trying to surrender but being shot have been seen. This increased the will of the Soviet Army to resist. A similar deterrent factor against surrender has been the scandalous treatment of prisoners of war* by the guards. To counteract this, the report suggests to supply large numbers of pictures showing feeding of prisoners of war, their work on harvesting, treatment in hospitals and similar material to be used as parts of the leaflet campaign.

Loudspeaker propaganda has been very successful wherever the vehicles and apparatus are available and can be used.

* Underscoring supplied by the writer.

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The report suggests that a large number of deserters, especially officers, commissars, civilians, teachers and other members of the intelligentsia be indoctrinated and sent back behind the Soviet lines as German Agents, especially among the Volga-Germans

In conclusion, the report points at the importance of propaganda by mouth and stresses the need for good and fair treatment of the population in the occupied territory.

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OKW 633

GERMAN LEAFLET NUMBER 138 RA

SUMMARY

This leaflet is in fact only a pass through the German lines for those who surrendered. It is printed on one side of the paper in Russian and on the other in German and is meant for one commander and up to 50 men. This pass promises, in addition to the usual guarantee of good treatment in captivity, an early return home at the conclusion of the war.

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SECRET FILES ON VARIOUS PROPAGANDA MATTERS

OKW REPORT OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1941 ON THE SITUATION IN
WEHRMACHT PROPAGANDA FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1 TO
SEPTEMBER 15, 1941

SUMMARY

It is mentioned that lately Soviet propaganda has improved its German language broadcasts. Efforts to improve the spiritual level can be noticed. The Soviets have begun to abandon the extreme primitiveness and the usage of very strong words. They are trying to adapt their propaganda to German mentality and to avoid both crude and uncouth language dictated by blind hatred, and too crude falsehoods which irritate the German listener from the beginning and destroy all credibility. Perhaps it is after the British example that by a factual reporting and not overbearing argumentation converts among the German population are sought.

Soviet leaflet propaganda has been constantly on the increase.

As for German leaflet propaganda, it is reported that OKW-WPr has distributed 191 million leaflets since the beginning of the German-Russian war.

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OKW 633

GERMAN LEAFLET IN RUSSIAN AND GERMAN
TRANSLATION - 145 RAB

SUMMARY

This leaflet appeals to the workers, peasants and Red Army soldiers. It concentrates on attacks against Stalin personally. Stalin is called a brazen liar, a cruel tyrant, a miserable coward, an incompetent administrator, and a bankrupt Army commander. These are the headings used to elaborate the point that the Soviet people must abandon Stalin and his leadership.

The leaflet contains the usual pass for deserters.

In translation the pass reads as follows:

"The bearer of this does not wish any senseless blood shed in the interest of the Jews and Commissars. He is leaving the beaten Red Army to go over to the side of the German Wehrmacht. The German officers and soldiers will treat the deserter well, will feed him and will take care of his employment. This pass is valid for an indefinite number of officers and soldiers of the Red Army who are surrendering to the German Wehrmacht."

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OKW 633

GERMAN LEAFLET NUMBER 146 P

SUMMARY

This leaflet, written in Russian and in German translation, is directed to Leningrad and is entitled both on top and at the bottom "Peace for the Tortured Fatherland."

This leaflet appeals to the officers and soldiers of the Red Army and the inhabitants of Leningrad. It is claimed that the heart of the Red Army has been beaten and that, therefore, the city cannot be defended and Leningrad will be completely destroyed. This leaflet again blames for this the Jews and Commissars, and appeals to the people to kill them.

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OKW 633

SECRET REPORT OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ARMY TO OKW/WPr, DATED 24 SEPTEMBER
1941

SUMMARY

The report is based on reports from Army Post Offices in the field where every month more than 500,000 letters are being censored. In order to maintain the fighting morale and the fighting spirit of the troops, it is necessary to prepare for the coming winter. The soldiers should be informed about the factual situation by able methods. The soldier should understand the importance of the campaign in the East so far and he should be convinced of the necessity of the war. No improbable claims in radio and in newspapers should be made and the enemy should not be minimized. The misery of the Soviet people which paid for the war preparations in Russia should be emphasized.

The families of German soldiers should receive all possible consideration.

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C [REDACTED]

OKW 633

US CLASSIFICATION - C [REDACTED]

GERMAN CLASSIFICATION - SECRET

SECRET FILES ON VARIOUS PROPAGANDA MATTERS

OKW REPORT OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1941 ON THE SITUATION IN WEHR-
MACHT PROPAGANDA FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 18 THROUGH AUGUST
31, 1941

SUMMARY

In the report on enemy propaganda special mention is made of leaflets appealing to the population of Poland. It is reported that Russian leaflets have appealed to the population to destroy the harvest and to form partisan units.

In the portion devoted to the propaganda situation of various countries, it is to be noted that all the Balkan countries are now being treated under one heading (NO. 15), not individually as previously.

In Chapter IV it is reported that the number of German leaflets distributed in the East has now reached 141 million.

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C [REDACTED]

SECRET REPORT TO THE CHIEF OF OKW

DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1941

SUMMARY

The Acting Mayor of Smolensk, Professor Basilowski (he is described as having German blood through his mother, educated, an expert on Russia, anti-Coviet but still influenced by Soviet might) is quoted as having expressed the following views on how Germany could win the confidence of the Russian peasant.

Should it be true what Professor Basilowski has heard that it is intended to leave the Kolkhozes intact, it would mean that Germany would destroy the fondest hopes of all Russian peasants on both sides of the front. They all have been hoping that Germany will abandon the Kolkhozes and bring about a return to individual land ownership. If Kolkhozes had to remain in the occupied territory, communist propaganda will have won a major victory since it will be able to claim that the Soviet system has proved to be good and has to be adopted by Germany too. On the other hand, the war could be considerably influenced by a German promise to distribute the Kolkhozes to individual owners. Such news would spread with incredible speed throughout the whole Soviet territory and mass desertions of peasants from the Red Army and from behind it into the occupied territory would result. This could even lead to a complete collapse of the Bolshevik regime. Should the removal of Kolkhozes not be possible immediately because of supply problems of the German Army, it should at least be immediately announced for 1942.

In connection with the above document, the file contains a secret memorandum, dated October 6, 1941:

"The Chief of OKW stated that the Führer gave the following instructions:

"The response of the German peasant population to this idea is to be utilized. Provided, that the deliveries of agricultural

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products are maintained, the German Government will gradually change existing conditions so that the Russian peasant will again achieve possession of his land."

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SECRET REPORT OF DECEMBER 19, 1941 BY ARMY
GROUP "SOUTH" TO HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMIES

EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA

I.

This report, signed legibly by von Reichenan, stresses once more the importance of continuous and concentrated propaganda.

"Although propaganda cannot be fully developed during a war of fast troop movements, captured documents and interrogation of PWs show that our propaganda is extremely unpleasant to the Russians and that in many instances it has shown results."

"It is in the nature of this work that it cannot show immediate effects but that it will only later prove its worth through the lowering of the enemy's fighting spirit."

The report stresses further that the present war situation was favoring intensified propaganda efforts. Technically that meant:

- 1) Propaganda through leaflets dropped from airplanes or dispersed by artillery shells (Red-White cases)
- 2) Loudspeaker campaigns (conducted by propaganda companies)
- 3) Spreading of rumors (through "V-Men")

The spiritual leadership in conducting propaganda should remain within the province of the (field) armies*. This is all the more important since basic directives for propaganda in the political and economic sphere could not yet be issued and cannot be expected in the future.

Propaganda must remain flexible and take into account local and temporary conditions. Captured orders and statements of PWs should be utilized. It is not enough to write a good leaflet and spread it in large numbers. It is better to redraft leaflets repeatedly.

NOTE: * To this passage an official at the receiving end attached a large marginal question mark.

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CC [REDACTED]

In these leaflets news from occupied territories could be used and, e.g. the possibility of distributing farm land could be touched upon.

The senseless losses in men and the arbitrary and cruel behavior of the Commissars are good propaganda subjects.

All leaflets must emphasize the complete hopelessness of the position of the Red Army. There is no chance for the Red Army ever to recapture their lost territory. There is only one way to survival: to surrender. The lies of German atrocities must be combatted.

Germany is not fighting against the country, and even less so, against its people -- the soldiers, farmers and workers -- but only against the system of the N.K.V.D.

II

Attached to this document are two samples of proposed leaflets.

The first draft follows the above lines and the usual arguments are included, especially appeals to end the bloodshed by mass surrender, to kill the Jews, and to start a new happy life.

The second draft suggests a slightly different line based on the winter and the hardships it causes the Russians. It points out that due to the winter the victorious German armies have temporarily and voluntarily withdrawn to a new line but that any counter-offensive by the Red Army would mean endless losses to Russian soldiers.

In appealing the the Soviet population the proposed leaflet contains the following line of reasoning: "The Soviet soldiers could have peace and security and return to their wives and sweet-hearts if they would only kill off their leaders. "The great Russian people* have only known a life of misery under their rule."

NOTE: * Underscored by the writer.

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NO. 63/42

SECRET MEMORANDUM OF JANUARY 3, 1942

BY OKW/WPr, SIGNED BY GENERAL JODL

PROPAGANDA AGAINST SOVIET TROOPS DURING THE WINTER

SUMMARY

In the introduction this report repeats previous statements that experiences thus far had proved that German propaganda directed at the Red Army was on the whole quite satisfactory.

However, it is added, the changed military situation makes an active propaganda against the enemy increasingly more difficult. Propaganda must be adapted to new conditions but it must be carried on without any decrease. Soviet propaganda has proved to be extremely flexible, both when directed at the Soviet armed forces and when appealing to the German troops.

It has at its disposal considerable technical resources. This increasing Soviet propaganda based on the system of Commissars and Politruks, must be counteracted with all means at the disposal of the Germans.

Interrogation of prisoners and captured documents have indicated that German propaganda is especially effective behind the fronts. The air forces will have to continue this activity as soon as weather permits, and will concentrate on territories with large crowds of refugees and where conditions are difficult, and therefore dissatisfaction is likely. It was seen that soldiers can be influenced greatly through their civilian population.

The report expects a change in the optimistic attitude of the enemy after the final failure of the Soviet counter-offensive. Until then large numbers of leaflets would not make a lasting impression and should not be used. Therefore, in the winter, propaganda should concentrate on local conditions.

Captured orders indicate that the Soviets have lately begun to direct leaflets at specified German units. This method is to be used by German propaganda too, in the future.

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Wherever the armies have facilities for printing their own leaflets they should do so, otherwise they should request them.

The report then states that ever since the beginning of the Eastern war OKW was trying to introduce positive propaganda slogans. For political and economic reasons, is this propaganda so far relatively limited in scope, e.g., it is not yet possible to announce the often requested distribution of farm land and the return to unlimited private property.

In any case, it is possible and necessary to counteract Soviet propaganda which has lately used especially the following lines:

- 1) The German troops are not prepared for the winter.
- 2) Their front has already been pushed back.
- 3) The alliance between the UK, USSR and USA will determine the outcome of the war.

Against this line, the following propaganda must be followed:

- 1) The British and Americans are no longer able to give aid to the USSR, after the heavy losses suffered at the hand of Japan.
- 2) Stalin announced a "Second Front" on November 6, 1941. This has not materialized. British motto "Let others do your fighting" is still true.
- 3) Stalin's Commissars and NKVD drive the soldiers into combat without any mercy. Stalin has bet everything on winter. This is a mistake. Thousands die to keep Stalin in power.
- 4) The Soviet regime is doomed. Every Red Army soldier killed is lost to his nation. The nation will live without the Soviets. The interests of the nation demand an early end to the fighting.
- 5) For 24 years the Soviet regime has suppressed and terrorized the people - using terror, hunger, collectivization, Stakhanowites, etc. Promises were never fulfilled. Now once again promises are made to induce the people to fight against the German Army. He who fights is not doing so as a patriot but to support the

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Terrorist regime.

- 6) The Wehrmacht does not fight against the people of the USSR but against the regime and its NKVD. After the overthrow of the regime the people will participate in the New Order in Europe.
- 7) The Bolshevist system of agrarian order will be changed by German authorities. They will gradually change the present system so that the peasant will once again have individual use* of the soil. As first step, the individual plots surrounding their houses which were at the disposal of the peasants will become their private property, tax and duty free should be used. In territories liberated from the cruel Soviet regime by German armies, parts of farms have already been assigned for use of individual peasants. Those who prove to be competent and hard working farmers will be given an opportunity, when the time comes, to have more land assigned for farming.

(This line is to be used only in enemy territory. It is not** to be applied in propaganda directed at the population of territory already occupied.)

- 8) The Wehrmacht brings with it freedom of religion and of religious activities for all denominations. In occupied territories religious services have long been re-established.

NOTES: * Underlined by writer.
** Underlined in original document.

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REPORT OKH/GENERAL STAFF OF ARMY
OF 1 OCTOBER 1941 TO OKW/WPr

SUBJECT: LEAFLET PROPAGANDA

A soviet parachuter who voluntarily surrendered to the Bulgarian police suggested that the Germans should inform the Russian population through leaflets on:

1. The defeats suffered by Soviet troops,
2. the German resolution to restore private property in Russia, and
3. make reassuring promises concerning a decent treatment of Russian women by German soldiers.

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SAMPLE OF A SOVIET PROPAGANDA LEAFLET

The files covering the period of November/December 1941 deal with a Soviet leaflet in German under the headline "Hitler's Gratitude". Using facsimilies of letters allegedly found with the corpse of a killed German soldier, the leaflet produces an example of how inconsiderately German home authorities behave toward dependents, refusing them allotments which they have the right to claim. The leaflet contains an appeal to German soldiers to use the leaflet as a pass for going over to the Red Army. In promising the German soldier good treatment, the text of the Soviet leaflet almost literally corresponds to the wording of German leaflets addressed to Soviet soldiers.

NOTE: The files disclose that the German authorities used the leaflet for investigating the complaint and granted a pension to the mother of the soldier concerned.

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SUGGESTIONS ON POLITICAL WARFARE BY A RUSSIAN
DEFECTOR

A letter of November 1, 1941 from a former Russian teacher of literature and history, who deserted to the Germans, to the Chief of OKW/WPr contains the following statements:

"In spite of her great military superiority and outstanding victories, Germany should not regard the war as already won ... The Russian cannot be conquered by military means alone. The German Army needs at present more forces for maintaining the communication lines than for real fighting. If the Soviets will succeed in strengthening the rear and to raise the fighting spirit of the army and the population, the outcome of the war will become uncertain.

"To achieve victory, the Germans should transform the present war into a political one.

"The Russian people must be won over to the German side so that they cease to follow the line of thinking: 'It is bad under Stalin but will it be worse under Hitler?...' German strategy is excellent, but their propaganda is bad...

"The German leaflets must reveal to the Soviet population, what it may expect in case of a German victory. Such leaflets are, at present, more important than bombs... The Soviet people must learn to realize that only Hitler can liberate them from Stalin...

"After the conquest of Moscow or Leningrad a provisional government must be established and authorized to build up a new administration and army... In confronting the Red Army such an army would succeed in fomenting civil war and winning over the Red soldiers."

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REPORT OF THE PROPAGANDA DIVISION W ATTACHED TO
THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE MIDDLE ARMY GROUP
REAR AREA (RUECKWAERTIGES HEERESGEBIET MITTE),
DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1941

The report, covering the period from 1 till 15 November 1941, deals with the general situation in and around the town of Smolensk.

The reporter states that the following question stands in the foreground of public interest: When will Germany give land to the peasants so that they could till their own soil? The Russian peasants definitely expect that the Germans would abolish the collectivization system and provide them with privately owned land. Up to now, no clear German pronouncement has been made. However, there is no doubt that an official and committing declaration about the restoration of private ownership of land would make a most favorable impression on the rural population and thwart the counter-propaganda spread by the so-called partisans.

The treatment of the POWs is also an important factor since it often happens that POWs who are physically no longer able to walk are being shot. Especially the fact that shootings occur even within villages undermines the German prestige. The people cease to believe in justice which they expected to find with the Germans. Moreover, they feel that there is a deep discrepancy between the promises contained in the leaflets and the actual behavior of the Germans toward POWs.

NOTE: A marginal handwritten remark made on this report by General Jodl, Chief of the Leading Staff of the Wehrmacht, says:

"In view of our intentions of using the Russian POWs we are interested to bring as many of them to Germany as possible. Moreover, we must refute the above contentions by stating through our own counter-propaganda that POWs who were shot were not those who could not walk, but those who were not willing to walk.

It occurs to me, that all reports contend that our false measures provoke statements of the enemy propaganda. We can try our best, the enemy propaganda will always find reason to put us in the wrong.

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Therefore, it would be better to report what propaganda counter-measures have been taken to thwart the enemy propaganda

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GERMAN CLASSIFICATION - SECRET

REPORT OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, OFFICE OF
MILITARY DISTRICT XII (WIESBADEN) TO FOR-
EIGN DIVISION OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1942

ASPECTS ON PROPAGANDA IN
THE OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES

The report deals with the results of an interrogation of a Russian PW who had the rank of major and occupied the post of "second engineer" with the counter-intelligence of the Soviet Air Force (Southeastern Front). His name was Boris Fedorovich Dubin.

Dubin's opinion was that the Bolsheviks would never give up fighting against the Germans. Neither the loss of territory nor casualties would break Stalin's and his henchmen's will of resistance. The Bolshevik system can be destroyed only by undermining it with the help of the Russian population itself and by evaluating the Soviet constitution for counter-propaganda purposes.

Ideas of collectivism has been systematically inoculated into Russian minds since 25 years. Hence, the Russians are accustomed to make collective decisions. Therefore, ideas based on collective thinking must be used for propaganda purposes.

To win over the confidence of the Russian people, the Germans should convene a National Assembly representing all strata of the Russian population. The task of this Assembly would be: First, to promulgate a new constitution abolishing Stalin's right to wield power, and Second, to enter into peace negotiations with the Germans.

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REPORT OF PROPAGANDA DIVISION "OSTLAND"
TO OKW/WPr, DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1942

From February 1st, 1942 on, the Propaganda Division Ostland was subordinated to the Commanding General of the Northern Rear Area. The Division was ordered to cooperate closely with the Army Group "North".

The report stresses that the number of 122 men allotted to the above Propaganda Division was insufficient.

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REPORT OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE FOURTH ARMY
ON THE PROPAGANDA SITUATION, DATED FEBRUARY 18,
1942

The report says that enemy propaganda has become very active since the beginning of 1942. The Soviets boast about their successes, innumerable towns and villages reconquered by them, and try to frighten the Germans by emphasizing their casualties.

The report admits that the Soviets are "Rather clever" in using literary persiflage and texts of songs for spreading revolutionary ideas among German soldiers.

With regard to the German propaganda, the report states that although, for the time being, its effect is small, it should be continued.

Comment: The small effect of the propaganda was obviously the result of the unfavorable developments of the German battle front.

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
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OKW TO OKW/WPr ON FEBRUARY 21, 1942

OKW asks OKW/WPr to take knowledge of a report written by a captain of the German General Staff after he visited the Middle Army Group.

The author reports on pronouncements made by individual Russians stressing the fact that the fight against Bolshevism can be won only with the help of the Russian population. The Mayor of Smolensk, installed by the Germans, said that a tremendous propagandistic success might be achieved by letting Russians, fighting along with the Germans, make speeches addressed to their Soviet compatriots.

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LETTER FROM OKW/WPr TO THE COMMANDING
GENERAL OF THE MIDDLE REAR AREA (SMOLENSK),
DATED FEBRUARY 24, 1942

PROPAGANDA AMONG PWs

The letter covers the following directives:

1) Although the Soviet Union did not join the International Military Conventions, Germany has declared that she will apply the terms of these conventions to all states. Hence, propaganda in favor of entering voluntary formations by PWs must not create the impression that Germany disregards the above conventions.

2) However, the voluntary joining of legions by PWs is compatible with the conventions. Therefore, the voluntary nature of such steps taken by PWs should be particularly stressed.

3) The appearance of a pressure exerted on PWs should be avoided. Even a promise of a privileged allocation of land might be regarded as pressure. Therefore, hints on privileged allocation of land should be avoided in publications dealing with the question of PWs joining voluntary formations.

4) The propaganda should be made in a way evoking the impression that it generated from the population of the occupied territories itself.

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LETTER OF THE FOREIGN DIVISION OF THE INTEL-
LIGENCE SERVICE OF GENRUARY 27, 1942 TO OKW/WPr

LEAFLET PROPAGANDA

1) The letter emphasizes the importance of appealing to the "political officers" who represent the "backbone of the Red Army". Such appeals could be made in the form of open letters addressed by captured political workers to their Comrades at home. *

2) The letter contains the suggestion to make leaflets so small that one could put them in the pocket without arousing attention.

Note: The report bears a marginal remark presumably made by the Chief of OKW/WPr. It reads: "Always the same! The Führer forbade it!!"

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DIRECTIVES ON PROPAGANDA TO BE MADE AMONG
CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

The above directives were sent on March 2, 1942 by the Foreign Division of the Intelligence Service to 23 addressees, among them to OKW/WPr. The accompanying letter says that the directives were drafted by the Reichministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and approved by the "Führer".

These directives read as follows:

Germany regards the peoples of the Caucasus as friendly peoples. The German Wehrmacht is resolved to protect the Caucasian peoples and liberate them from the Bolshevist yoke.

Through German help assaults of Bolshevist, Russian and British imperialism from which the peoples of the Caucasus have suffered so long and so much, would be made impossible in the future.

The national, cultural and economic forces of the Caucasus should freely develop. The national and cultural development will be furthered under the protection of German arms. Old traditions and customs will be preserved. The free usage of their mother tongues and their own school system are guaranteed to the Caucasian peoples.

In the religious field, all Caucasian peoples and denominations as Christians, Mohammedans, or others, will enjoy complete freedom. It is taken for granted that churches will be reopened with the entrance of German troops.

By introducing a broad self-administration the Germans will guarantee national development. The collectivization system will be abolished on Caucasian territory. The land question will be resolved according to the vital requirements of the Caucasian peoples. In the occupied Ukraine the collectivization has been already abolished.

Economic life and trade should enjoy the utmost freedom.

Individual artisanship will flourish again.

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The following slogans have to be used in appeals address to the Caucasian peoples:

Go over to the Germans and fight along with German troops, as your compatriots already do!

Long live the free Caucasus as an ally and under the protection of the greater German Reich created by Adolph Hitler!

Comment: (by translator)

1) It is obvious that the approval of the above directives by Hitler was due to the fact that they did not contain any commitments regarding the future state of the Caucasian countries.

2) Instead of being promised national independence, which the Caucasian peoples were longing for, they were fed with meaningless phrases about a free development of their national and cultural forces.

The directives represent a foul compromise between the desire to ensure the support of the Caucasian people and Hitler's aversion to recompensate those peoples by granting them the rights they were striving for. The whole concoction reveals an utter lack of creative fantasy and the ubiquitous fear to displease the Führer by saying more than he was willing to concede to peoples whom he wanted to dominate.

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REPORT OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE FOURTH ARMY
ON THE PROPAGANDA SITUATION DURING THE SECOND
HALF OF FEBRUARY 1942

The report says that the territory of the above army was literally inundated by enemy leaflets.

These leaflets contend that controversies prevail between the German State and military leadership. By comparing the industrial potential of the allies with that of Germany, the Soviet leaflets try to convince the German soldiers of the hopelessness of their fight, and so on.

Mentioning German propaganda efforts, the report says that not enough propaganda was available.

The report complains that a discrepancy exists between the propaganda slogans and the actual situation and suggests the issuance of strict orders from above which should prevent an arbitrary interpretation of previous regulations.

Note: A reader of the report (obviously a person in a higher position annoyed by the repetition of statements like the last one) made a marginal remark designating the suggestion as "twaddle".

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REPORT OF GENERAL VON SCHENCKENDORFF,
COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE MIDDLE ARMY GROUP REAR AREA

Excerpts from a report on propaganda matters and the mood of the Russian population, delivered by the above general, were on March 15, 1942 made available by OKW/General Staff of the Army to OKW/WPr. These excerpts contain the following statements:

A friendly attitude of the Russian population represents the precondition for a decisive annihilation of the partisan movement. In spite of the harsh economic measures, necessitated by our war needs, the majority of the population behaves loyally. The population regards eventual return of the Bolshevists as a disaster. The population is unreliable only where it is exposed to the terror of the partisans. "Whisper" propaganda is enormous.

Up to now, little has been done on our part to win over the sympathies of the population. A propaganda which confines itself to promising the destruction of Bolshevism is absolutely insufficient. We must offer the population definite goals which it would regard as worth while to fight for.

These goals are:

- 1) The establishment of a liberated national Russia, dependent on Germany. Her Western frontier would be determined by the German interest in obtaining land for settlements.

Note: A marginal remark reads that the usage of the words "national Russia" is strictly forbidden from above.

The establishment of a "phony" government would have a great propagandistic effect.

Nationalism was always strong with the Russians. It has been nursed by the Bolshevists. The Russian people will never put up with the idea of transforming their country into a German colony. They begin to apprehend that this is the aim of Germany.

- 2) Agrarian reforms:

The dissolution of the Kholkozes became true! Great joy among the peasants!

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The new law is important, inasmuch as the partisans have already begun to distribute land "in the name of Stalin."

3) The religious needs of the population must be taken into consideration. Concessions in this field will be deeply appreciated by the population.

The winning over of the population and even of a great part of the Red Army is dependent on the fulfillment of the above conditions. Only then will it be possible to put into being a popular movement against Bolshevism and the partisans.

We should demand from the population only as much as we need for winning the war.

The urban population must be provided food and consumer goods.

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COMPLAINT ABOUT AN INSUFFICIENT SUPPLY
WITH PROPAGANDA MATERIAL

In his report, delivered in February 1942, the Ic with the Commanding General of the Middle Army Group Rear Area complains about the lack of supplies with propaganda material.

Note: The repetition of similar complaints proves that military circles attached great importance to propaganda and regarded it as an indispensable part of the efforts to win the war.

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RUSSIAN LEAFLETS

A typical Russian leaflet carried on one side photographs of two Germans who allegedly fell alive in Russian captivity. The other side contained an appeal describing the senselessness of the war unleashed by Hitler and desertion as the only means to bring war to an end.

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REPORT OF A CAPTIVE SOVIET OFFICER

On March 28, 1942, excerpts from a report delivered by a captive Soviet officer were submitted by the Commanding General in the Ukraine to OKW/WPr.

These excerpts contain the following statements:

1) German propaganda makes a mistake in condemning Bolshevism in the lump. One should not forget that Bolshevism before 1930 was different from Bolshevism after 1930. In comparison with the Tsarist regime, there were certain advantages and freedoms which the population enjoyed from Bolshevism before 1930. Hence, Lenin's prestige should not be violated by German propaganda. On the other hand, Stalinism which developed after 1930 meant state capitalism, exploitation, terror, misery and death. Therefore, propaganda must be directed against Stalinism.

2) German propaganda must be more concrete in its appeal to Russian and Ukrainian minds.

3) Expressions used in German leaflets often do not correspond with the language spoken by contemporary Russians.

4) German propaganda does not sufficiently react to the contents of Soviet propaganda. German propaganda should try to refute the contentions of enemy propaganda in the form of dialogues.

5) The domestic Soviet propaganda constantly appeals to the national consciousness of the Russians. Not only that German propaganda fails to refute this kind of propaganda, but German deeds are bolstering it. It is not enough to make promises on paper, they must be fulfilled.

6) Soviet propagandists are always present when the interrogation of German PWs takes place. From the results of the interrogation of Soviet PWs German propagandists might obtain valuable suggestions.

7) It happened that German planes which had dropped leaflets afterwards dropped bombs or used their machine-guns. Any connection between spreading propaganda material and air attacks should be avoided.

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REPORT OF A GERMAN OFFICER WHO VISITED THE
FOURTH ARMY AND A "SONDERFÜHRER" ON GERMAN
PROPAGANDA AGAINST RUSSIA

Reporting about his visit with the Fourth Army during the period from 9 to 24 February 1942, Major Oehnichen says that many valuable suggestions on propaganda matters were being made by the so-called "Sonderführer".

(Note: These "Sonderführer" acted as Ic-aides. In most cases they were Russian or Baltic born Germans who spoke both languages fluently and were to a certain extent familiar with Russian life and people.)

The report of Major Gehnichen does not contain any new aspects. He emphasizes that propagandistic contentions become dull if not supported by actual deeds. He warns against arbitrary actions and says that there were numerous examples of the destructive results of such actions.

Attached to the above report is a long treatise on German propaganda in Russia written by "Sonderführer" Sinnecker.

The author states that the principal failure of the German propaganda was that it stressed the negative sides of Bolshevism but failed to say what will become of the countries, belonging at present to the Soviet Union, after the annihilation of the Red International. Intelligent Russian PWs and civilians invariably ask what the German victor has in store for the peoples of the Soviet Union. German propaganda cannot be successful without a clear political program concerning the future of Russia.

The propagandistic effect which could have been achieved by the abolishment of the Kholkozes has been watered down by the system of "common farms" which in the eyes of the peasants is the same thing as a Kholkoze, bearing only a different name.

The industrial workers, though partly imbued with Marxist ideology, are susceptible to propaganda, since they deeply resent their exploitation through the Stakhanov system and the fact that they are not allowed to leave their working places on their own will and are subjected to severe punishment even for minor transgressions.

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REPORT OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE SIXTH ARMY

In a report dated March 26, 1942 and addressed to OKW/WPr, the above High Command stressed the importance of leaflet propaganda but complained about the lack of possibilities to drop the leaflets. The spreading of leaflets by reconnoitering units represented only a weak substitute, the report said.

As for loudspeaker cars, the Propaganda Division had only 4 of them at its disposal and none of them was suitable for winter warfare. The report said that loudspeakers must be built so that they could be mounted on a sleigh and brought close to the front lines.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT OF THE COMMAND OF THE
FOURTH ARMY, DATED APRIL 3, 1942

The report mentioned the usage of a special kind of "bomb" for the distribution of leaflets. Spreading of leaflets by such bombs had certain advantages over dropping them by planes. It was easier to place leaflets at chosen points by bombs than by planes. On the other hand, only a limited space could be covered by bombs.

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FIRST CONFERENCE OF GERMAN PRISONERS OF
WAR

The files of OKW/WPr of April 1942 contained an article which appeared in "Pravda" of February 13, 1942 and dealt with the first conference held by German PWs in Russian hands in "one of the camps". The conference was allegedly attended by 158 delegates who unanimously accepted a resolution calling German soldiers and the whole German people to fight the Hitler terror regime, hunger and war. The text of the resolution was supplemented by facsimilies of signatures of those PWs who attended the conference. The signatures indicated the first and last names of the PWs and the troop units to which they belonged.

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INSTRUCTIONS OF OKW TO OKW/WPr CONCERNING LEAFLET PROPAGANDA

OKW was of the opinion that the AOK's must be enabled to adapt, as quickly as possible, their propaganda activities to the requirements of a given military situation. Since OKW is not in a position to develop the necessary speed in providing the AOK's with leaflets of the kind which they just need, the AOK's must be authorized to produce and issue leaflets of their own. In doing this, however, follow the general line prescribed for propaganda pronouncements and use samples of approved texts of leaflets.

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INSTRUCTION OF OKW CONCERNING PROP-
AGANDA IN THE CULTURAL FIELD

An instruction of March 30, 1942, directed to "all Propaganda Divisions" states that Germany is not interested in raising the cultural level of the Eastern population.

The restoration of schools in the occupied Eastern Territories should not exceed the limited necessities in the economic field. The furthering of the intelligentsia must be avoided because, otherwise, it might later become the backbone of national resistance.

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INSTRUCTION OF OKW OF APRIL 14, 1942
CONCERNING THE CELEBRATION OF THE 1ST OF MAY DAY

On the occasion of the 1st of May Day the following slogans should be propagated:

1) The overthrow of Bolshevism will destroy both the capitalist system of exploitation of men by men and the still worse system of exploitation of men by collectivization. In the fight between the new order and the old one the working people side with those who are determined to liberate them from exploitation.

2) In spite of the difficulties resulting from the war, the Germans have already proved that they are determined to bring freedom, namely, by the abolishment of collectivization, the establishment of free artisanship, the introduction of religious freedom, etc.

3) The First of May is the day of honor for those who fulfill their duty in fighting Bolshevism with weapons or through working.

4) The symbol of work, hammer and sickle, has been misused by the Soviets. They did not succeed in transforming compulsory work into a voluntary one.

Note: The instructions contain the characteristic remark that social achievements and working conditions in Germany may be mentioned only with certain reservations. Otherwise, they might provoke demands which cannot be satisfied.

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
REPORT ON THE SITUATION WHICH PREVAILED
IN MARCH 1942 ON BOTH SIDES OF THE FRONT
OF ARMY GROUP "SOUTH"

In spite of the fact that the enemy suffers under numerous shortcomings, his spirit is not yet broken. His attacks are still very vigorous. The number of deserters has considerably decreased due to the following reasons:

- 1) The knowledge of conditions actually or allegedly prevailing in German PW-camps. There are complaints that the treatment of deserters and minorities is the same as that of regular PWs.
- 2) The lack of evidence that peasants enjoy a better life under German rule than they had under the Bolsheviks.
- 3) The insufficiencies of German propaganda leaving the population in the dark about the real German war aims.
- 4) Persuasiveness of Soviet propaganda about German atrocities.

With regard to the mood of the population behind the German front, the report states that the enthusiasm of the "honeymoon" has vanished and a deep "crisis of confidence" is developing. The people begin to work less and to behave more reservedly toward the Germans, so that human relations cool off. The reasons for this are the following:


- 1) German occupation policy lacks unification. Contradictory orders were issued by the Wehrmacht, the civil authority, the security authorities and the economic service.
- 2) The agrarian reform has been accomplished too slow and insufficiently. The peasants do not see a practical difference between a "Kholkhoze" and the "communal farm". The promise to double the privately owned land has been curtailed.
- 3) In the cultural field, the population resents that school education is restricted to four years, that no possibilities are provided for educating agronomes, lower medical personnel, etc. The people feel offended that they are prevented to learn

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German. They compare the present lack of educational facilities with Soviet successful efforts to raise the educational level of the population.

4) The feeling of insecurity called forth by arbitrary arrests which remind the population of NKVD practices.

5) Injustices committed through illegal confiscations and requisitions.

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MEMORANDUM FOR OKW/WPr DATED JANUARY
6, 1942 FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL
IX ARMY COMMAND /Ic

The memorandum deals with a Russian deserter von Blumenthal-Tamarin who made a number of suggestions regarding German propaganda in the USSR.

Von Blumenthal is identified as born in Russia in 1881, an actor and professor whose grandfather was a German. He kept his German nationality until 1914.

Von Blumenthal lived in Russia all his life, was of Greek-Orthodox religion and active in Soviet theaters.

Attached to the memorandum to WPr are three lengthy exposes by the above "V-Man", von Blumenthal-Tamarin.

He is especially concerned about the problem of distributing land to the farmers. He had a small country house near Moscow and had always contact with the Russian peasants, especially prior to his escape to the Germans, while he and his family were hiding in a village.

The Russian peasant hates the mere word "Kolkhoz" and would do anything to be rid of the collective farms, von Blumenthal writes.

Therefore, the German armies were welcomed as liberators from Bolshevism. The NKVD and the Communist Party were worried over the open expressions of relief when the German occupation came. Collaboration with the Germans was genuine.

"Alas, the propaganda of the German armed forces is completely insufficient and disregards the most important problem of dividing the farm land.

"No decisions of the German Government were made public, and only vague hints and promises are being made", the "V-Man" says.

As for leaflets, he criticized their poor Russian language. The numbers were insufficient, and the leaflets disappeared in the forests and swamps and marshes. "People came for miles to

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see the lucky ones who found such a German leaflet, the contents spread by word of mouth."

Von Blumenthal calls all efforts of German propaganda in the East "amateurish", and "unfit to fulfill the tremendous task on hand", especially in view of the "Bolshevist propaganda against Germany which is costing billions."

He considers imperative the formation of a special propaganda outfit which would have at its disposal films, radios, Russian theaters, comic books, leaflets, etc., all directed against the Jews, English and Americans.

But most imperative, according to von Blumenthal-Tamarin, is distributing farm land. Since the population of the German occupied territories has already decreased to a mere one-third, larger assignments of land to the remaining Russian peasant would leave tremendous properties for distribution among German settlers to come from the Reich.

The writer further points out that cattle has been driven and killed off, that the farmers were not left with sufficient means to keep alive, so that a jug of milk has become a rarity in a rich farming land, and that this results in a constantly growing hatred of the Germans. Confiscations should be stopped immediately.*

* Note: To this the reporting officer added a large question mark and the word "How"?

In conclusion, von Blumenthal suggests that experienced and reliable Russians should be used in planning and carrying out the distribution of land. Under no condition, however, should White Russian emigrees, the former large land owners, be used. On the contrary, persons who had lived in the USSR and who know conditions and have not lost touch, should be called upon.

Attached to these suggestions are two additional memoranda by the same person, von Blumenthal-Tamarin.

1) In the first, dealing in more detail with problems of distributing land, a special decree is suggested, which would be given to the farmer with the land assigned to him. With a seal and signed, it would promise him full possession and ownership of the land, if he "continues to cooperate with the local repre-

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sentatives of the German Führer and delivers the required agricultural produce. Such an official document would, in the opinion of the "V-Man", leave a lasting impression.

He further urges to utilize in a concerted propaganda campaign, the solution of the land problem.

2) The second attachment deals with the question of the Russian Church.

The writer admits that it may not be desirable to permit the Greek-Orthodox Church in those parts of the German occupied Eastern Provinces which are not exclusively or primarily settled by Russians. Their church may induce nationalistic hopes and feelings.

However, in parts where the White-Ruthenians and Russians live, religious freedom will be something new and effective, and it will be attributed to the Germans.

The Orthodox Church would be able and willing to support the Germans, since it based on the idea of authority, and is no longer connected with the Tsars and a nationalistic ideology. Besides, the author stresses, the educational level of the priests is low and therefore they will not go against German propaganda efforts.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM, DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1942
FROM FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE TO OKW/WPr (AP)

The memorandum quotes, from an Italian source, a report about effective Finnish propaganda against the USSR. The author of the campaign is named as a former Russian officer, Gramoff, who considered Finnish propaganda, during the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939, as too artificial and too high-brow, and who put into effect a very effective campaign. He wrote three special and simple speeches, addressing one "The Peasants", two "The Workers", and three "Officers and Students".

These three different short lectures were recorded and used for broadcasting and by motorized loudspeaker units. The Italian journalist considered especially effective the use of old Russian folk songs, incorporated into the three lectures. The three groups were consistently addressed as "Comrades, Peasants", "Comrades, Workers", and "Comrades, Officers and Students". Each of these groups was addressed along easily understood propaganda lines, blaming the Soviets for all the misery of the Russian people.

Mention is also made of effective Finnish leaflets which promised the Soviet soldiers specific rewards for the weapons which they brought along into captivity. 100 Rubles for a pistol, 150 Rubles for a rifle, 400 Rubles for a sub-machine gun, etc.

The reporting officer stresses the fact that interrogation of Soviet officers had revealed that the Finnish propaganda was more effective than German propaganda, and he therefore suggests that it should be carefully studied and copied. It is particularly pointed out that whenever loudspeakers are used, the announcers must speak Russian without an accent.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM BY THE MINISTER FOR
OCCUPIED EASTERN PROVINCES TO OKW/WPr
DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1942

This memorandum transmits a complete new set of directives on propaganda among Caucasian peoples. It is pointed out that these directives were personally approved by the Führer and that all previous instructions are now superceded.

The instructions contain nine points. It should be stressed that Germany considers the peoples of the Caucasus "Friendly Nations" and that the German military might will "liberate them from the Soviet yoke and protect them." It is to be stressed that Germany will prevent any interference in the affairs of the Caucasian nations from Bolshevist, British, or Russian imperialism. National cultural and economic forces of the Caucasus are to be freely developed while the old traditions will be respected. The collective system on farms will be abolished and the problem of private property of the land will be "solved according to the vital needs of the Caucasian Nations."

* In appeals to the Caucasus, it should be stressed that the Caucasians ought to join the German ranks and fight side by side with German troops. Appeals should end with the following slogan: "Long live a free Caucasus in alliance and under the protection of the great German Reich of Adolph Hitler."

* Comment: A note in the file containing the above directives, (which are rather vague), indicates that enlisting of Caucasian volunteers was declared acceptable and even desirable.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM TO OKW/WPr AP 3

I. This memorandum contains the plan for the reorganization of a complete propaganda detachment. The detachment is to comprise the following units:

1. Commanding Unit
2. Unit for Active Propaganda
3. Press Unit
4. Film Unit
5. Distribution Unit
6. Courier and Telecommunications Unit.

The detachment, according to the memorandum, is stationed in Krementchuk. Under its command are units in Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk and Vinniza.

II. Additional propaganda forces numbered U1 through U6 are stationed in Zaporozhe, Melitopol, Mirgorod, Poltava, Neshin and Snovsk, attached to the seats of field commands and security divisions in the rear.


III. The sub-detachments, listed under II as U1 through U6, have advanced units under their command called Advanced Posts U1 through U6, placed in more advanced rear guard positions.

It is stressed that this organization will achieve a larger concentration of propaganda activities in the rear, to be used against partisan activities and for influencing the population. Better use of telephone communications and courier service will be made. Cooperation with police in fighting against partisans will be easier. Posters and leaflets can be distributed with cooperation of security divisions.

It is pointed out that the new organization will demand additional propaganda experts, both interpreters and military personnel.

As minimum requirements for the command of the detachment, the following are listed:

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- 1 Commander
- 1 Special Commander (Sonderführer) for Active Propaganda (Z) (Lt)
- 1 Special Commander (G) (NonCom)
- 1 Special Commander (Sonderführer) for Press (Z) (Lt)
- 1 Special Commander (G) (NonCom)
- 1 Interpreter
- 1 Special Commander (Sonderführer) Radio Engineer (Z) (Lt)
- 1 Special Commander - Program Director (Z) (Lt)
- 1 Special Commander - Film (Z) (Lt)
- 1 Film technician and projectionist
- 3 Clerks
- 1 Non-commissioned officer - accountant
- 3 Drivers
- 2 Military orderlies

As for the advanced troops, they should be composed of the following:

- 1 Commander
- 1 Interpreter
- 1 Active Propagandist
- 1 Newspaper man
- 1 Radio technician
- 1 Film expert
- 1 Typist clerk
- 1 Orderly
- 1 Driver

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SECRET MEMORANDUM DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1942
FROM PROPAGANDA DETACHMENT W TO OKW/WPr

REPORT ON THE ARMY PROPAGANDA SITUATION DURING
THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 1 TO FEBRUARY 1, 1942

The report stresses that Soviet propaganda in the area under supervision of the reporting office had considerably increased. Soviet propaganda has been using mainly nationalistic slogans. Enemy propaganda attacks especially the Führer personally and it is claimed that the SS in the course of a large-scale purge of the General Staff had shot over 500 officers. It is further reported that the number of Soviet leaflets and booklets circulating behind the German front had reached the highest numbers yet. The partisans are directing a very able whispering propaganda. On the other hand, activities of communist radio stations did not increase.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM DATED JANUARY 31, 1942 BY
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TO MINIS-
TRY FOR OCCUPIED EASTERN PROVINCES

Intercepted letters written by Russian emigrees from all parts of Europe have repeatedly indicated their disappointment over Germany's policies toward Russia. These emigrees feel that beyond the goal of destroying Bolshevism, Germany wants to destroy Russia completely and divide it up in order to make the country into a mere colony.

"This view is based on alleged statements made by official German personalities, on public speeches and on various newspaper articles, and especially on administrative measures taken in the Eastern Provinces, mainly, in the Ukraine."

Attached to this memorandum is a copy of a letter written by a Russian emigree, O. Kravchenko, from Sofia, on January 9, 1942. The letter is addressed to another Russian, Oreshoff.*

* Note: Oreshoff was apparently working for the Germans, since the address carried a German APO number.

The Kravchenko letter is mentioned as an example "because it shows how many anti-Bolshevist Russians are misled into an anti-German attitude."

It also shows, the memorandum adds, why the will to resist of the Red Army soldiers is on the increase and why agriculture and industry in the occupied territories are lagging.

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COPY OF LETTER DATED SOFIA, JANUARY 9, 1942
TO JULI ORESHOFF

The letter, along the lines mentioned in the accompanying memorandum, contains only a few remarks in addition. The writer quotes with special bitterness German pronouncements that they "Slavs are to be driven behind the Ural Mountains", and similar statements which make the task of Russians who fight communism especially difficult.

The writer also points out that changing of old Russian names of towns and streets into German names leaves the impression that the Germans really want to stay for a "Thousand Years" and exploit and Germanize every part of the territories.

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LETTER FROM MINISTRY FOR OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES TO OKW/WPr, DATED BERLIN, MARCH 13, 1942

INTERCEPTED MAIL OF RUSSIAN EMIGREES

In connection with the Kravchenko letter, and other similar communications, the Ministry told OKW/WPr that it considers such statements as an expression of disappointment of these people over the fact that they are not given a role in the new order of Europe.

The Ministry says that surveillance of such mail must continue. In cases of criticism, based on personal feelings, it can be disregarded. "When, however, expressions of ill will toward German measures are found, necessary steps must be taken to safeguard the security of the State."

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SECRET MEMORANDA ON HAND-DISTRIBUTION

The file contains several original memoranda of various army commands, suggesting, along lines contained in previous documents, a positive approach to the problem of giving the peasants land.

The memoranda, dated mostly January, 1942, are submitted to OKW through channels.

A memorandum, dated February 6, 1942, and originating with the office of the Command-in-Chief of the Army Group "North", summarizes the problem in the following manner:

"Since the peasant population is originally opposed to Bolshevism and the Partisans, we have to make the peasants into active participants in the fight against Communism. This is all the more urgent since our security forces are spread thin and needed for the protection of our rear and flanks. The German troops cannot carry fear and terror into every village of the vast Soviet territory. Next to bringing horror and fear to all criminal and consistently pro-Bolshevist elements, we have to gain the good will of the people.

This will be done through giving them rights to the land which they toil."

This memorandum is accompanied by a secret memorandum of February 14, 1942 by OKW/WPr - WFST in which it is stated that the Minister for Eastern Provinces Rosenberg notified OKW of his report to the Fuhrer who had accepted the proposals of Rosenberg regarding the agrarian problem.

The various suggestions in the matter submitted by WPr since the beginning of the Eastern campaign "will be adopted to a considerable extent."

WPr in cooperation with the Propaganda Ministry will exploit the new order to the utmost.

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ANONYMOUS LETTER DATED HAMBURG, JANUARY 2³
1942

The letter was sent to OKW/WPr by Intelligence III U. It is a letter from a soldier from the Eastern front who complains in most bitter terms of the "stupidity of army propaganda" shown in articles describing "heroic German attacks in 30° below zero temperatures."

The writer points to the many soldiers whose hands or feet or both were frozen and had to be amputated and who resent such writings.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM, FEBRUARY 7, 1942,
OKH TO OKW/WPr


This report complains about a radio feature which praised very highly the German Army Post Offices.

This broadcast was heard by troops who have not received any mail from home for weeks or even months and who are very bitter about this.

If, for understandable reasons of communications, weather, etc., mail deliveries have to be slow, at least such misguided propaganda should be omitted and rather explanations be given.

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
SECRET MEMORANDUM BY ACK 2, OF FEB 25, 1942

DIRECTIVES FOR LEAFLET PROPAGANDA

This memorandum refers to 5 German leaflets directed at the Soviet soldiers. One original Russian text is attached with translation. The other 4 leaflets are available only in German translation. All these leaflets were printed and distributed in relatively small numbers (3,000 to 6,000 copies) since they were of a more local character. The reporting officer attached a handwritten note stating that the Russian text was available only in one instance and, therefore, no opinion on the quality of language could be made available.

All 5 leaflets end with the slogan "Stalin Kaputt." This slogan replaces the previous pass through German lines.

Note : Attached short summaries of above leaflets.

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1

LEAFLET I.B.A. 2 DIRECTED AT SOLDIERS
OF RED ARMY DIVISIONS NOS. 6, 148,
132 AND 307

This leaflet starts out with a repetition of enemy propaganda, that the Germans cannot stand the Russian winter and that the Russian counter-attacks will result in a complete defeat for national socialism. Against this the leaflet points out that Soviet losses have been very heavy; that the commissars have lied to the Red Army soldiers; that companies have been badly cut up; that German reserves are on the way; that the German Army has beaten Poland and France and that the invincible German sword will now fall down and finish the defeat of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is argued that Soviet soldiers should immediately surrender after having smashed their weapons. When joining the German lines they should use the slogan, "Stalin is finished." (Stalin Kaputt)

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LEAFLET IBE 2

This leaflet is headed by the words "Read! Destroy! Tell Others!", and is addressed to the Red Army soldiers claiming to tell them the latest news from all over the world. Much is made of the failure of the Red Army to recapture Kharkhov and of the fall of Singapore, said to be the strongest fortification in the world, and of the defeats of the Allies in Africa, of successes of the German submarine campaign and similar material. The words "Stalin Kaputt" should be used by those who surrender.

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3

LEAFLET IBE 3

This leaflet is addressed to Red Army soldiers who are asked to read and destroy it but to tell others of continuous German victories. News is kept from the Soviet people by the Commissars. For those who want to know the truth, "the only way is to go over to the German side." As password "Stalin Kaputt" is used.

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4

LEAFLET IBK 2

On top of this leaflet the following words appear: "Read! Laugh! Destroy - Whisper!"

Red Army soldiers are asked to laugh at the senseless, useless, lying propaganda of the Commissars. The leaflet contains a scene called "Awakening of Spring in the Kremlin", with Stalin and Molotov receiving a report from "General Winter". General "Winter" has failed and is derided by Stalin. He will be replaced now by General "Mud".

The leaflets also makes fun of new directives allegedly issued to the Commissars in regard to propaganda and of a decree by the Supreme Soviet of February 14, 1942, making all Soviet civilians between the ages of 16 and 55 available to the war effort.

The leaflet concludes with the usual appeal to Soviet soldiers to desert and to surrender to the Germans who are promising to liberate Russia. No pass is needed for those who go over to the Germans. It is enough to shout "Stalin Kaputt".

In its last part this leaflet appeals to the Red Army soldier as follows:

"Red Army Soldier! If you want to laugh heartily and loudly with us about our remarks and about the lying propaganda of your Commissars, come over to our side."

Comment: It is difficult to see how anybody could find much humor in this material.

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5

LEAFLET IBK 3

As leaflet number 4, this again appeals to the Red Army soldiers who are asked to laugh with the authors and to destroy the leaflet, but to use it for whispering to others. It contains several items dealing with the situation in North Africa and the Far East, Anthony Eden's visit to Stalin and also a scene between F. D. Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and Frank Knox. Roosevelt is described as "the laughing third man." Roosevelt is quoted as saying "As long as Stalin lets his soldiers be killed in Europe, America is safe from a German invasion."

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IBE 101, DATED MARCH 1943

The leaflet mentions successes of the German Armies and defeats of the Allies and ends with the usual appeal to Red Army soldiers to come over to the German lines with raised hands and shouting "Stalin Kaputt". In addition, the leaflet contains a pass with a suggestion to the deserter to bring along his overcoat, his cooking utensils and his spoon.

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LEAFLET IBA 44

This leaflet in Russian contains the usual pass through German lines. On the front page there is a photograph of a Russian prisoner of war with the following text in his own handwriting and with his signature as "Sergey Kramarenko". This PW writes that he has been in German hands for six months and that he has been treated very well. He has been given an opportunity to volunteer for work in Germany and he wishes that all Soviet prisoners of war would volunteer to hasten the annihilation of the Russian armies.

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
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LEAFLET IBA 101

The leaflet appeals in Russian and in German to "Comrades, Dear brothers" and again in the text to "Russian brothers". The leaflet attacks Stalin and his Jewish Bolshevist Regime and asks the Soviet soldiers to throw away their arms and to desert.

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LEAFLET IBA 102

This leaflet in Russian and German is directed specifically at soldiers of the 38th, 40th and 60th Soviet Armies. It contains the slogan "Stalin Kaputt" and also the former pass through German lines. The leaflet says that any further resistance by the Red Army is sheer madness.

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SECRET REPORT FROM ARMY HIGH COMMAND 2
Ic/A.O. TO OKW/WPr, DATED APRIL 3, 1942

SUMMARY

AOK reports on the advantages of a pass over the simple expedient of having a slogan. Although the slogan "Stalin Kaputt" is easily understood both by Red Army soldiers and the Germans, it is stated in this report that a pass in the hands of the Soviet soldier is much more effective. Those who wish to surrender will always try to have in their possession such a pass. However, it is conceded that in view of strict supervision by Officers and Commissars, the Russian soldier may not be able to have such a pass, and in such cases a password such as "Stalin Kaputt" is very useful.

The reporting officer adds that troops were searched for passes prior to an attack.

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
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SECRET REPORT OF ARMY HIGH COMMAND 2
Ic/A.O., DATED MAY 10, 1942

Attached to this report are numerous new leaflets both in the Russian language and in German translation. Several of these leaflets are long and some contain pictures. Most of the material are appeals to soldiers to surrender. Several are meant as information and appeals to peasants. One of the leaflets is in the form of a short newspaper. Almost all contain the usual slogan "Stalin Kaputt" and a pass through the German lines.

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LEAFLET IBA 42

This leaflet in the Kazakh language encourages Red Army soldiers to go over to the Germans where they are promised good treatment. The leaflet contains a photograph of a group of Kazakh deserters and facsimilies of their signatures.

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GERMAN LEAFLET IN RUSSIAN AND IN GERMAN
TRANSLATION -- IBA 41

SUMMARY

The original of this leaflet contains a photograph of a Sergeant of the Soviet Cavalry Regiment No. 78, and his signature in facsimile. In the text of the leaflet the sergeant is praised for the wisdom he had shown in deserting to the Germans. The leaflet also contains the usual pass.

Note: The photograph shows the sergeant flanked by two women, a younger and an older one, perhaps his mother and wife or sister. This would indicate that the photograph was taken from the sergeant's wallet after capture or in case he was killed, after his body was found.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM AOK 2 -Ic/A.O.,
JUNE 3, 1942

Attached to this are several new leaflets in Russian and German. Several new approaches can be observed from attachments to this memorandum.

I.B.A. 18 appeals to Red Army soldiers to surrender so they will have better food, clean baths, medical care, tobacco, etc. The slogans of this leaflet are: "Jews and communists are in the rear. The stupid ones are at the front. The smart ones are in Germany."

Leaflet I.B.A. 23 points out that Hungarian soldiers have relieved German soldiers in this particular sector. The Hungarians, the leaflet further says, are well known for their kind hearts and hospitality, and they are only fighting against Jewish Bolshevism and for a just and happy Europe. All who will surrender to the Hungarian troops will be well treated."

Leaflet I.B.M. 6 is a special appeal to the workers in the armament industries and in transportation. The leaflet asks these workers to sabotage the industries and transportation in order to shorten the war and to defeat Stalin. Rail workers are asked to put water or sand into sensitive gears, to destroy safety devices, brakes, etc.

Leaflets I.B.H. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 contain cartoons and inscriptions only in addition to the pass and slogan. The slogan in these is "Bayonets into the ground".

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SECRET PERIODIC REPORT OF OKW/WPr ON PROPAGANDA MATTERS FOR PERIOD DECEMBER 16, 1941 TO JANUARY 15, 1942, DATED JANUARY 22, 1942

Soviet leaflet propaganda against the Germans during the period is reported as relatively insignificant. No leaflets originating in the USSR were dropped over German territory itself; leaflets were directed at German units at the Eastern front only.

Soviet propaganda is using incidents such as the Nazi destruction of the Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky Museums for a concentrated effort.

In Chapter IV, "Counter-Measures", the report discusses German propaganda measures directed at the Soviet army and population.

During the month, 9 million copies of new leaflets, mostly with photographs and cartoons, were distributed among members of the Red Army. It is reported that in these leaflets suggestions from the front lines were adopted, unless such suggestions "violated directives for propaganda of political or economic nature."

These leaflets stressed especially the empty promises of aid to Russia given by England and America. The few military successes of the Red Army were exaggerated out of all proportion and were achieved under terrible sacrifices, as the German propaganda stressed.

Special leaflets to stir up and to enlist the support of Tartars were printed.

The Caucasian population was addressed in three languages: Russian, Georgian, and Azerbaijan.

The total number of WPr leaflets used by the armies in the East since the beginning of the war against the USSR has reached 433 million.

Propaganda units in the East were mainly active in the fighting against the partisans.

"Propaganda by Mouth" was organized so as to reach the civilian

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population through mayors, aldermen and other inhabitants of the villages who were instructed.

Posters, wall-newspapers, pictures of the Führer and other propaganda material is extensively used as well as loudspeakers.

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REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF WPr/AP FOR PERIOD
JANUARY 10 - 16, 1942

This report is dated January 19, 1942 and deals with various aspects of enemy propaganda and counter-propaganda.

In the Chapter devoted to Soviet propaganda, the report stresses that a slight increase in Russian leaflet propaganda was observed. Leaflets were not dropped over Germany proper, but 25 previously known and 32 new types of leaflets were reported from occupied Eastern territories.

Of the 32 new Soviet leaflets, 28 were in German and 4 in the Russian language.

Propaganda material designed for German troops is, as usual, mostly in the form of a periodic news coverage with pictures. They are called "Soldiers' Truth", "News from Abroad", etc.

In addition, there are numerous short leaflets which are different in content but which follow the same trend of thought.

"It should be especially noted that the Soviet leaflets react with speed to certain events and that this is done in a great variety of forms."

The report says in this connection:

"The main subject is at present naturally, the winter-war. This theme is repeated with variations over and over again. Comparisons with Napoleon's retreat are made and a collapse of the German forces is predicted."

In the Polish "General Government" leaflets were reported which incite to sabotage against the Germans.

As for our own, German, propaganda, the report mentions 10 new types of leaflets, two of which were directed at Caucasian units fighting in the Crimea. These leaflets were printed in the Russian, Georgian and Azerbaijan languages, and sent in mixed containers.

Five additional leaflets in various Eastern languages were to be used in sectors where troops of Tartar and Caucasian origin were considerably represented in the Soviet armies.

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These leaflets have revealed for the first time that the Tartars have taken up arms in order to fight side by side with the Germans for the liberation of their people - the report adds. A further leaflet in Finnish is also mentioned.

The report further states that the number of leaflets distributed by the troops since the opening of the Eastern campaign has reached 436 million.

An interesting observation is contained under heading V of this report:

"In view of the fact that the final decision, - with all due regard to the great value of Wehrmacht propaganda, - will be won by force of arms, the Propaganda Sections, Belgium and France, were ordered to release 1/4 and 1/3, respectively, of their personnel for dispatch to the East. The released forces will partly be made available to the fighting forces direct, partly to rear guard units, such as propaganda units fighting against the partisans."

The report also states:

"The Propaganda Sections in the East were instructed to treat reports about Bolshevik terrorism in re-occupied territories with utmost reserve and not to release them at first."*

It is reported that the appearance of Cossack units composed of former PWs has made a great impression in Smolensk.

* Comment: The reason for this instruction seems to be the fear that such reports might deter the population of occupied territories from cooperating with the Germans.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM (DRAFT) OKW/WPr, DATED
JANUARY 13, 1942

TO COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OSTLAND, UKRAINE AND REAR
CENTER AND THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPAGANDA SECTIONS

The memorandum points out that "Soviet propaganda has increasingly been using falsified documentary proof of alleged destruction of Russian cultural, artistic and religious places and objects by the German armed forces." This results in insulting the national feelings of the Russians.

WPr needs for the purposes of counter-propaganda pictorial and written material on the destruction of cultural values by the Soviets and on atrocities committed by Soviet civilians and soldiers.

The memorandum instructs the respective units to provide for fast photographic coverage of conditions found at the capture or recapture of important national shrines, such as Ysanaya Polyana (Tolstoy) or the Tchaikovsky Museum.

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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CIRCULAR OF GERMAN
FOREIGN OFFICE INFORMATION DIVISION NO.
31/1941

ENEMY SLANDEROUS PROPAGANDA CONCERNING
OCCUPIED AND ANNEXED TERRITORIES

This lengthy report dated November 24, 1941, lists a variety of subjects treated by Allied propaganda.

It is interesting only for the reason that it bears an initialed marginal note dated January 14, 1942 - "obsolete!"

This note and the dates indicate to the writer that communications were slow and relations between the two related offices strained.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM - OKW/WPr (API)
OF JANUARY 15, 1942

TO CHIEF OF AIRFORCES STAFF /Ia
MAJOR LEAFLET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST TARTARS

It is stated that according to Hitler's instructions to the Chief of OKW, an intensive campaign amongst the Tartars and the Mohammedan population is to be started with full air force support. The Tartars and Mohammedans are to be induced to rise against Bolshevism and to join with the German troops.

Starting January 16, 1942 OKW/WPr will deliver leaflets by special planes.

Leaflets are to be used against Caucasian units, especially in the Crimea near Feodosia, Kertch, Sevastopol.

Since AOK 11 has only very few reconnaissance planes at its disposal, the Luftwaffe must give its utmost possible support.

A special unit is to be designated for this work at once.

Note: A Secret Airforce Headquarters report of January 19, 1942 indicates that a unit was assigned to "cooperate in the proposed leaflet dropping."

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SECRET MEMORANDUM, JANUARY 27, 1942
BY OKW/WPr TO CHIEF OF STAFF OF AIR FORCES

The memorandum recalls a directive issued by Hitler that an intensive leaflet propaganda should be carried out among the Tartar population. In spite of urgent requests, no transport planes had been made available for this operation. It was reported that only 60 such airplanes were at the disposal of the Luftwaffe in Berlin and that all these planes were needed for deliveries of warm clothing and heating equipment to the front. Not one single transport plane could be spared. OKW/WPr was, therefore, able to deliver only a small portion of the leaflet supply to AOK 11 with the help of one transport plane, which is under its command. In view of these circumstances the mass dispersal of the leaflets ordered by the Supreme Commander could not be carried out and OKW requests to bring this matter to the attention of the Chief of Staff of the German Air Forces so that in the future such highest orders can be carried out.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM DATED BERLIN, JANUARY 14,
1942 BY THE FOREIGN DIVISION (INTELLIGENCE)
TO OKW/WPr

Attached to this memorandum is a report by a "V-Man" on German propaganda directed at the Russians. The reporting office adds that the V-man has added to his proposals the following:

"Time will show what results the propaganda will have but a full-scale, centrally directed propaganda offensive should be conducted and sufficient material resources and qualified personnel must be made available. This personnel should have not only a knowledge and experience, but also the necessary lack of scruples.

Summary of V-Man's Proposals

The main methods by which the enemy can be influenced are:

- 1) Leaflets
- 2) Banners and posters
- 3) Loudspeakers
- 4) V-Men
- 5) Film

1) Leaflets. In addition to dropping of leaflets from airplanes the method of releasing balloons could be employed under favorable atmospheric conditions. In spite of the smaller numbers of leaflets distributed in this manner, it should be employed whenever aiming at certain targets and continuous dropping of leaflets is desired. This method should be employed mainly during night hours. Instead of balloons, kites can be used under favorable wind. Shells filled with leaflets should be employed too. When positions are evacuated according to plan, it is suggested to leave appropriate propaganda material behind.

As for the text, the following observations are made:

The most effective promises to be incorporated into leaflet propaganda are:

The prisoners will be released home. If his home has not

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been occupied yet, he should be promised the right to join the militia with equal rights as German troops or dispatch to well-appointed camps. Those who are released home will be given land or an independent trade or a leading position. Those who have committed sabotage prior to their surrender and can prove it (destruction of weapons, munitions, liquidation of commissars) or who give correct information on enemy positions will, in addition, receive considerable rewards.

The leaflets must continuously stress the hopelessness of further resistance, the heavy losses, the local difficulties in supplies and other appropriate subjects.*

* Note: It is interesting to note in this connection that the V-man stresses the need to support such propaganda by an attitude of "keep smiling" in cases when one's own position has become unfavorable due to weather, continuous attacks, etc.

The memorandum further deals with special means to be adopted to local conditions, on how to inform the enemy of the best method of surrender. For instance, during patrol or guard duties.

2) Banners or streamers are suggested in cases where short slogans can be effectively employed. Such banners hoisted over own lines will, of course, be the target of enemy fire. The effect should be laughter and waste of ammunition. Whenever possible, balloons can be used with streamers attached. To speed surrender of enemy troops, pictures of food or the smell of good food can be utilized.

3) Loudspeakers. Since loudspeakers operating from own lines will inevitably draw enemy fire, it is suggested to use loudspeakers attached to balloons and released at night close to the enemy's positions. This type of propaganda will have to adapt very closely to local conditions. Most effective, according to the memorandum, will be loudspeaker propaganda when used continuously.

Each AK, if not each division, ought to have a special loudspeaker installation.

4) V-Men. It is doubtful whether collaborators could be

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found among those who were captured so far. The author of the proposal adds that he himself, had seen transports of prisoners of war of which only 3,000 out of a total of 7,000 have reached their destination. Therefore, he considers it desirable to treat newly captured personnel in a better way, until it is known whether they can be utilized for sabotage behind enemy lines or in the militia or as centers of additional desertions amongst enemy troops. They also could be used as announcers and speakers over the microphone or megaphone. The author of the memorandum suggests to look out for better qualified personnel such as former employees of the Diplomatic Service, of Intourist, etc.

5) Film. Projecting short films or slides against low clouds over the enemy line seems to be a possibility to the writer of the memorandum. Although this would not be a major propaganda effort in itself, he considers it a good supplementary method.

No matter which method is used, it should always be based on the assumption that it can be effective only if employed continuously, consistently, and in large masses. A statistical study of the effectiveness of various methods should be centrally organized.

To this memorandum and proposal OKW/WPr commented in a secret memorandum of January 20, 1942 that nothing very new was contained and that questions of directing active propaganda against the Soviet Union should be left to WPr. The Foreign Division replied on January 23 in a secret memorandum to WPr that it considered proposals contained in this memorandum important enough to transmit even if perhaps no entirely new aspects were treated. WPr retracted on January 27 and agreed that all interesting proposals should be received and transmitted.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM, JANUARY 17, 1942
OKH TO OKW/WPr

This memorandum reveals certain existing conflicts of authority over propaganda efforts between the command in the Ukraine and other commands.

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SECRET REPORT OKH TO OKW/WPr, DATED
JANUARY 17, 1942

Rear Army Command "Center" Ic/ reported that German propaganda is in danger to be considered by the Russian peasant in the same way as Soviet propaganda. In spite of repeated requests to fulfill some of the promises made to the Soviet peasants in respect to their ownership of the soil, nothing has happened so far. The farmers who have made special efforts to gather the harvests have received nothing except a promise to double their privately owned land. Although the war has caused great difficulties, confidence of the population in the Germans has been increasing wherever partisan activities were suppressed. This confidence stems from the hopes of the peasants that the Wehrmacht will bring them a return to private ownership of land. A fulfillment of this hope, no matter how small, would greatly influence the positive cooperation of the people.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM OF JANUARY 16, 1942 ARMY
GROUP "NORTH" TO OKW/WPr

The reporting office points out that in recent directives regarding propaganda, no mention was made of previous promises to give the peasants in the occupied territories additional farm land for private use. It seems a wrong approach to drop such a promise in dealings with the civilian population, while propaganda directed at Soviet troops has been using it continuously.

In this connection, Army Group "North" also points out that OKH has ordered that the sales tax of 4% of all income of the Kolkhozes be collected. Since this tax will be assumed by the individual peasant, who was promised his land tax and duty free, there is an obvious discrepancy between earlier promises and present practices.

If it is necessary to postpone an announcement of the distribution of land, at least earlier promises should not be violated.

In a secret memorandum of January 27, 1942, OKW/WPr stated that taxation of agricultural products of the Kolkhozes does not constitute violation of previous promises.

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SECRET MEMORANDUM BY FOREIGN DIVISION TO
OKW/WPr

According to an interrogation, supported by other sources, the present Russian language leaflets are only part adapted to Russian mentality. Frequently, it has been pointed out that German propaganda has created the impression as if it were conducted by Russian emigrees who are not sufficiently informed about the true conditions in the Soviet Union.

The draft of a leaflet submitted by a Russian "V-Man" is attached.

The interrogated officer is identified as Colonel Boris Sasanoff, who was shown various samples of German leaflets and who considered them insufficient. He made various suggestions on improvements and was offered collaboration with the Russian Section of National Socialist Propaganda.

The draft of the leaflet attached to this document is addressed as an open letter to the workers, soldiers, commanders of the Red Army in Moscow and Leningrad. It is signed by several former officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the Red Army. It follows the usual lines of propaganda, pointing out the misery of men, women and children in the Soviet Union, attacks the Jews, Commissars, NKVD agents and appeals to the population to sabotage the Soviet war effort and to help the German Army in order to prevent further destruction of the beautiful Russian cities. Throughout the text, the leaflet addressed the readers repeatedly as "Beloved Brothers."

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SECRET MEMORANDUM, JANUARY 20, 1942,
WFST TO WPr

The memorandum transmits a plan containing ideas of a Captain Dr. Pauls on propaganda. Field Marshal von Reichenau wished to present these ideas personally to the Führer, as is stated in the memorandum.

"In view of the changed military situation, the ideas of Captain Pauls have achieved special importance. From a military point of view, it has become a matter of urgency to safe-guard the rear of the German troops against the danger of Ukrainian revolt. To this end, propaganda is of utmost importance and it is requested that the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories be contacted in order to elaborate on the proposal.

"WFST has suggested to the Führer that prisoners of war of Ukrainian origin be released above the present level, that is, for auxiliary guard duties, auxiliary police, interpreters and agricultural work.

"The formation of active national Ukrainian fighting units under German command to be used against the Bolsheviks has been rejected by the Führer. On the other hand, formation of auxiliary police units composed of reliable inhabitants was permitted. *An active participation in the fight is a political question to be decided by the Führer on recommendation by the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories.

* Note: This sentence was crossed out in the original document in blue pencil but is easily legible.

Propaganda efforts directed at the German troops in the Ukraine, as suggested on page 7 of Captain Paul's memorandum, are considered necessary by WPr.

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SUGGESTIONS MADE BY CAPTAIN DR. PAULS OF THE
STAFF OF ARMY GROUP "SOUTH"

DATED HEADQUARTERS, DECEMBER 4, 1941

This document, on 10 pages, starts out with the statement that, independent of military successes, the outcome of the war will depend mainly on the resistance Germany can offer to the blockade. If the army and Germany itself, and Europe to some extent, cannot be sufficiently fed, the war cannot be waged for an indefinite period. The present additional need of agricultural products can be met mainly from the Eastern territories alone, and the major share will be taken by the Ukraine.

It is, therefore, necessary to achieve greatest productivity. With intensive production, the goal of German self-sufficiency in food production can be, in the course of time, achieved despite present difficulties and the war situation. In addition to other factors, this result will depend mainly on German organization methods and on the attitude of the Ukrainian population. Only if we succeed to make the population voluntarily cooperate with all their strength, a maximum production can be achieved. A population which has not been reached by propaganda shows no interest, or is even driven to despair by unnecessary and thoughtless acts and can be made to work only by terror, will never achieve full production. On the contrary, such a population becomes a danger to the fighting troops and their communications.

In the beginning, the attitude of the population in the Ukraine was very favorable to German propaganda. In the Western Ukraine, the German troops were met with open sympathies and, also, in the Eastern Ukraine the attitude changed later on. The people were ready to join the Germans in the fight against Bolshevism and for a reconstruction of the country while long-harbored political aims were put into the background.

In the half year of our occupation this attitude of the population has considerably changed to our disadvantage. This process

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is continuing. The reason for this cannot be found in the continuously more difficult food situation but more so in our own behavior. The population accustomed to propaganda, expected immediate political, economic and cultural directives after the German occupation. These expectations were not fulfilled to a large extent.

The underestimation of the enemy led us to believe in the fast decision in the East. This hope, in turn, made us postpone the decision about future political arrangements in the Eastern territories until the end of the war. Failing clear political directives and attractive slogans, a propaganda vacuum was created, or what is even worse, official statements of conflicting nature. The longer this situation prevailed, the greater the disappointment, especially among the elements friendly towards the Germans. Distrust among those were sitting on the fence was growing and national Ukraine or Pan-Slav or even Bolshevist propaganda found good opportunities. Occupation troops committed arbitrary actions and conducted wild requisitions which caused great damage. The uncertainty about the future of the Ukraine as a nation had the worst effect. Even the last peasant has understood that the Germans did not come as altruistic liberators into his land, and that apart from the defeat of Bolshevism, they had their own very real aims. Pronouncements and measures by leading personalities of the German Reich have now made it clear that the Ukraine is "attributed only the status of a colonial territory to be exploited." The population seems to have no importance and starvation and annihilation of millions of Ukrainians appears to play no major part in the considerations.

It is not the intention of the writer to examine how far this attitude corresponds with the interests of the Reich and is dictated by economic and political necessities. This memorandum solely wishes to point to the dangers of this course of action and to the extraordinary possibilities of a different policy.

In view of the fact that an early decision in the East cannot be expected, a re-examination of our relations with the Ukrain's

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civil population seems to be urgently needed. Little can be seen at this time of the original sympathies toward the German occupation armies. The original cooperation and trust in German leadership has changed into distrust. The constantly prevailing German attitude of superiority, stemming from a complete misunderstanding, presents a dangerous underestimation of the Ukraine population and their considerable natural intelligence. Famine is threatening now, too, causing one of the population's greatest hardships. Instead of blaming for this Bolshevism and to present the population with expressions of our sympathies, instead of organizing aid for the Ukrainians, on the contrary, open statements are made in which approval of starvation is expressed because this will decrease population.

Once the Ukrainians become aware of such danger to their national existence, the former ally will change into an enemy full of hatred. Those who know the history of the Ukraine are aware of the fact that throughout centuries the people have brought sacrifices in their fight for national independence. It must not be forgotten that centuries-old ties of religious, cultural, racial and economic nature have connected the Ukraine with Moscow and that at this time we have nothing to offer to replace these ties. We also have to remember that the Ukrainians have an equally old tradition of conspiracies. Comparisons with 1918 are inevitable. It is necessary to both war economy and feeding of the population for years ahead. War can be waged in the long run only in cooperation with the population. This realization must become not only common among the authorities, but it must be translated into fast actions. Spokesmen of different institutions must not follow their own policies. Those who do not operate from the common basis of directives to be issued along the lines suggested in this memorandum are dangerous and must be replaced.

If the Ukraine is to become, at this late stage, an active participant in our fight against Bolshevism, the following conditions must be met:

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1) The whole population must be placed under the influence of a concerted propaganda comprising the following:

(a) An explanation of the Bolshevik danger and our common interests.

(b) The expectation that demands of goods will be met to a certain extent with progressing consolidation.

(c) Immediately to be realized promises regarding the distribution of land. No promises which we cannot or do not wish to fulfill.

(d) An easily understood gesture showing that we want to leave to the population the minimum requirements for subsistence.

(e) The expectation that the people will have limited autonomy and concessions in the cultural field.

(f) An explanation of the necessities of war and especially of measures of economic warfare.

(g) Descriptions of the high social and cultural standards in Germany.

(h) "Grossraum-Propaganda" on "Ukraine and Europe".

(i) Release of Ukraine prisoners of war.

(k) An appeal to form active national-Ukrainian fighting units under German command to be used in the war against Bolshevism.

2) This propaganda has to be followed by respective decrees, especially in regard to (c), (d), (i) and (k). Part of this will be the necessary indoctrination of troops and organs of civil administration on the dangers of wrong treatment and attitude (in enemy territory). To this belongs, for instance, dispatch of Ukraine specialists to Germany.

In addition to already discussed economic advantages, such a policy will have great importance from the point of view of military and political consequences. So far National Ukraine Kossack units were formed and have fought under German command against partisans. Experiences were good. This approach has to be

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followed and intensified. It is quite possible that with able propaganda and renewal of mutual trust, larger units up to at least divisions can be formed. The importance of such Ukrainian units and their participation in the fight on the front is as follows:

1) By an active participation in the war against Bolshevism, the Ukrain will be placed into an irrevocable anti-Moscow position. The population must be made into an ally of Germany without any reservations.

2) The German command will welcome any additional fighting units to relieve own forces.

3) The effect on the opposing Red Divisions of fighting against such Ukrainian units should be extraordinary. It will prove the complete failure of all Pan-Slav propaganda. This situation will give additional impetus to our propaganda which so far was not in an advantageous position.

4) The desire of the Ukrainian nationalist to conspire will find an outlet.

In conclusion, the memorandum urges once more a speedy adoption of the proposals contained in it, based on the understanding that the good will of the Ukrainian population is of utmost importance and that from all points of view a colonial exploitation connected with mass starvation will harm the interests of Germany in the war.

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INSTRUCTIONS OF OKW/WPr DATED BERLIN,
FEBRUARY 3, 1942

In connection with reports reaching OKW about the growth of national Russian organizations which have shown an anti-German attitude, police actions were already taken, propaganda counter-action must be taken in addition.

It is necessary to avoid mentioning the groups as "National Russian Organizations".

In the propaganda it must be stressed that Germany is not fighting against the peoples of the Soviet Union but only against the Soviet regime. Germany does not want to subjugate the peoples of the Soviet Union but wants to liberate them from terrorism. Germany protects the individual and his family. The freedom of the peoples living in the East depends on the success of German arms. The population must understand that it has to bring sacrifices in order to achieve final liberation. Soviet propaganda has begun to replace communist with nationalistic slogans. Stalin has betrayed for 24 years Russia and it is a propaganda trick when he now appeals to the nationalist feelings of the people. Under pressure of German victories he has now started to make promises to the peasants. In this connection, the Jewish, Bolshevik suppression and denationalization should be pointed out.

In conclusion, this instruction recommends as most effective, counter-propaganda, an increase of loudspeaker campaigns. The population should in this way be informed about the situation and unpopular measures of the German occupation authorities should be explained. Orderly conditions in Germany are to be stressed. Posters describing National Socialism in Germany are to be displayed. In addition, leaflets would be used.

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